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Executive Summary
1 Introduction
This report surveys the development, conduct and regulation of the private security industry in the eight countries 
currently party to the European Union’s Stability Pact for South East Europe. The privatization of security in the 
region that followed the end of Communism in the early 1990s mirrors a global trend in which security roles that 
traditionally fell exclusively within the realm of the state have been gradually outsourced to private actors. 
In its early years, the industry was initially unregulated and displayed problems seen in other economic sectors 
emerging from a centrally driven socialist command economy. Some parts of the industry were strongly associated 
with organised criminal elements, as well as in some circumstances extreme nationalist politics. Over the last 
decade the sector has begun to professionalise, as the governments of the region have made legislative efforts 
to introduce controls. Whilst in most cases the members of the private security industry do not pose a direct 
threat to the states or citizens of South Eastern Europe (SEE), significant concerns remain, ranging from cases of 
improper criminal, political or paramilitary affiliations, to the improper use of force in individual cases.
The report assesses the situation in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (including the internationally administered territory of 
Kosovo) and Romania. It examines the background to the privatization of security, contemporary security threats, 
services provided by private security companies (PSCs) and the regulation and oversight of PSCs. The report is 
the first of its kind conducted in the region and could be used as an initial guide for policy-makers, and also as 
the basis for more detailed future research. It was not possible to cover most issues that fell within the scope 
of the research in depth and opportunities to corroborate information have been limited. However, this report 
represents a sufficiently accurate picture of the current situation to identify key trends, as well as the major 
issues of concern, both in individual countries and across the region as a whole. It is hoped that by discussing 
this issue it will stimulate both domestic and international attention. 
This summary sets out key thematic findings and recommendations that apply to each country and entity of the 
region and also some of the country specific recommendations that are made at greater length in the country 
chapters.  
2 General findings
2.1 Industry growth and consolidation
A number of factors have created a demand for private security provision in SEE over the last decade, ranging 
from high crime rates, to public corruption, poor standards of policing, and a legacy of inter-ethnic distrust in 
former conflict areas. Coupled with the withdrawal of state security protection from newly privatised property 
and a legacy of inter-ethnic distrust in former conflict areas, this has led to the substantial growth of the private 
security sector. The SEE region has seen one of the most rapid privatizations anywhere in the world during the 
last decade, moving from an almost total absence of private security provision at the end of the 1980s, to the 
point where the industry is now a major employer and security provider. 
PSCs now offer largely similar services that reflect worldwide industry norms – guarding offices, factories, and 
other public buildings as well as providing armed response units and escorting valuable commodities and cash 
when in transit. Some of the countries in the region display smaller niche private security markets largely directed 
at the provision of close protection services (bodyguards) and, very rarely, the provision of private security to 
private homes.
While the market in some parts of the region is still relatively undeveloped, in other parts, particularly EU accession 
states, the industry has expanded to a point where the number of PSC employees significantly exceeds police 
personnel. In recent years the industry has also shown signs of consolidation in most countries, leading to a net 
decrease in the numbers of companies that operate despite an overall expansion in the sector. Domestic PSCs 
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still dominate the private security market in the region however, with relatively few international firms having a 
presence. This is in part due to a prohibition on the operation of international PSCs in many countries. In EU 
candidate countries though, the private security market has opened up to foreign competition and a number of 
international firms have already entered the market.
The report recommends that:
n The regulatory authorities of each country and entity should work together with the most progressive 
members of the private security industry to introduce and implement far-reaching regulations that meet the 
best international standards, so as to ensure that PSCs operate in a safe and professional way. 
2.2 Patterns of affiliation
There were problems with the affiliations of PSCs in almost every country or entity in the region, whether to 
political parties, criminal, paramilitary or ethnic groups which is a concern. 
Security sector affiliations: in virtually every country there is evidence of former police officers being employed 
by the private security industry. While the employment of former police personnel by PSCs is not a problem if it 
is adequately managed, where such links mean that the sector is not properly policed there is the prospect that 
illegal activities go unpunished. In some cases (especially Croatia, Kosovo and Bulgaria), concerns were raised 
that the private security industry was in competition with the police or publicly owned security companies, e.g. 
competing alongside PSCs for contracts. This carries the risk that PSCs come to be seen as providing policing ‘on 
the cheap’, with the prospect that public security provision is undermined in the long-term.
Ethnic affiliations: in divided societies, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, there was 
also evidence of sectarianisation within the PSC industry. The case of Bosnia is perhaps the strongest, in part 
because the nature of regulation discourages rather than encourages the creation of multi-ethnic companies.
Political affiliations: in contrast to many other parts of the world where PSCs have performed a political role in 
disrupting the constitutional order and helping to destabilise governments, the countries of SEE are by and large 
fortunate in having a PSC sector that has not posed a threat to the legal authorities. The issue of specific political 
links between political parties and the private security industry was however highlighted in Serbia and Croatia as 
well as, to a lesser extent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo.
Paramilitary affiliations: this was an issue of great concern in Macedonia as there was evidence that ethnically 
based groups, formally from the security forces, had established security firms. There is also more limited 
evidence of links between PSCs and former paramilitaries in Serbia and Kosovo. 
The report recommends that:
n The legal framework should clearly distinguish the roles of private and public security providers in all cases. 
Although public security services have an important crime prevention role that should not be neglected, a 
clear separation should be enshrined in law between the traditional ‘core’ function of public security services 
– law enforcement, and the additional protective services that PSCs typically offer. Joint working agreements 
between the police and PSCs should be considered in situations where the police and private security guards 
work together (e.g. during public events).
n Thorough background checks of PSC owners and employees are conducted and that in the case of ownership 
of companies such checks also include the backgrounds of close family members in order to discourage 
ownership of PSCs by criminals.
n Where ethnicity has been a conflict issue, steps should be taken to discourage PSCs of exclusive ethnicity 
operating over the longer term.
n Where companies have a clear affiliation with former or current units or groups within the security sector, 
including non-formal paramilitary or rebel groups, it is vital that this situation is challenged and monitored on 
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an ongoing basis. A general prohibition on the use of names with paramilitary associations by PSCs should 
be considered.
n Direct links between specific political parties and specific PSCs should be prohibited.
2.3 Legislation and regulation of the sector
Although most countries in the region have chosen to regulate the domestic conduct of the private security 
industry, great variation still exists, ranging from states that have not introduced specific legislation covering PSCs 
(e.g. Serbia), to those with the most advanced regulatory systems (Bulgaria and Romania in particular). While 
this has not entirely eliminated problems with the conduct of particular firms or their staff, in countries where 
industry growth has been most rapid, regulation has helped to induce professionalism. In terms of prioritisation, 
it is clear that Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia are all countries where support for the state in 
regulating and professionalising the private security sector is most needed.
The report recommends that:
Licensing of companies:
n Licensing systems should be established that clearly define the type of security services that PSCs may and 
may not provide. 
n Legislation should clearly set out the criteria against which licence applications are to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis for every new company and/or contract. These should include, inter alia, whether the 
company and its proposed activities would threaten public security and law and order; undermine economic 
development; enhance instability and human suffering; increase threat perceptions in neighbouring countries; 
contribute to or provoke internal intervention or external aggression; violate international embargoes, etc.
n Licences should be time-limited in order to ensure regular re-accreditation and high levels of professionalism, 
and regular monitoring of PSC activities should be carried out, with penalties including fines and revocation 
of licenses in the case of violation of the law. 
n Legislation should have an extra-territorial dimension to cover the eventuality that companies may work 
overseas in countries with inadequate legal frameworks. 
n Guidelines should be established that define when it is appropriate to use a PSC and when it is appropriate to 
use the police, to ensure that the police and PSCs are seen as complementary institutions working towards 
the same end, rather than as competitors.
Licensing of personnel: 
n Governments should ensure that PSC owners, directors, their spouses and employees are licensed to work 
in the sector according to objective criteria.
n Background checks should be carried out prior to licences being awarded to ensure that personnel have no 
criminal record, no past responsibility for human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian 
law and have not been dishonourably discharged from the police or armed forces.
n Each company should maintain accurate records on its employees to allow for inspections by state oversight 
bodies.
2.4 Oversight and enforcement
Most of the countries of the region exhibited some problems with the effective implementation of the laws 
governing PSCs and with broader oversight of the sector. Concerns were raised especially about those PSCs 
that employed significant numbers of former members of public security forces, where perhaps ‘favours’ can be 
called in. Allegations were made in most countries that the authorities had not investigated cases of law breaking 
by PSCs in all cases.
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The report recommends that:
n Complaints of heavy-handedness or illegal behaviour by PSC staff should be investigated promptly and 
thoroughly, and prosecutions brought where appropriate.
n The oversight process itself should be monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis.
n All states should provide an additional layer of oversight above and beyond that provided by national 
police and intelligence services, looking in particular to develop the capacity of ombudsman’s offices and 
parliamentary committees to scrutinise the work of the private security sector and handle complaints.
2.5 Use of force and firearms
PSCs are permitted to carry firearms in every country or entity in the region with the exception of Kosovo, where 
only international personnel can be armed. In most cases PSCs are restricted to the use of short-barrelled 9mm 
weapons. A few countries (e.g. Albania and Serbia) permit the use of automatic weapons. Despite allegations 
of misconduct by PSC personnel, with a few important exceptions, there are relatively few proven cases of the 
misuse of force or firearms across the region. However, evidence of lax armoury discipline is available in some 
countries, which entails the risk of weapons being misused by individual PSC employees.
The report recommends that:
n Strict and detailed guidelines should be provided by national legislation for the use of minimal force in 
accordance with best international practice by personnel working within the industry. This should cover the 
use of firearms and less-lethal weapons systems such as chemical sprays, shock equipment and batons.
n Less-lethal weapons should be seen as an alternative to the use of deadly force rather than as a 
lesser step. Their use should be monitored on the same basis as the discharge of a firearm and regulated 
similarly.
n There should be regular and random inspections of PSC armouries to ensure that weapons and 
ammunition are stored in secure conditions and adequate accounting mechanisms are in place.
2.6 Training and professionalism
Though concerns about professionalism and conduct remain, the private security industry in SEE has significantly 
professionalised over the last decade or so, to the point where in most cases, its members pose little or no security 
threat. This is partly due to the natural consolidation of the industry over time, since the larger companies that 
usually come to dominate the market cannot afford to develop a bad reputation. However there are cases of 
improper criminal, political or paramilitary affiliations and the improper use of force by PSC personnel. 
While beneficial in most cases, the training that is available to PSC staff in all countries has not raised standards 
across the board. Training providers range from state security forces to independent colleges and PSCs themselves. 
The curricula offered and the duration of the courses also vary widely from country to country, though most 
include basic elements such as understanding the law, use of weapons and firearms (where relevant), and first 
aid. In many cases the content and effectiveness of training appears inadequate. 
Industry self-regulation is present in approximately half of the countries and entities in the region where companies 
have formed trade associations of one form or another to represent their interests. This has not however been 
backed up by the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct in all cases. 
The report recommends that:
n States should establish and effectively oversee a training regime for PSC staff that gives personnel a good 
grounding in relevant international humanitarian law, human rights laws, first aid and gender issues. All 
personnel should be properly trained in and committed to respect best international standards and practices 
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relevant to the field and in particular the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
n Licensing of PSC personnel should be conditional on the successful completion of approved training. 
n The PSC industry should look at strengthening voluntary codes of conduct and trade associations where they 
exist and creating them where they do not. 
n Employers of PSCs should only employ companies that adhere to these voluntary standards.
2.7 Transparency and accountability
There were concerns about a lack of transparency of the security industry in most of the countries that were 
studied, and different issues were raised in each case. However, particular problems were encountered in 
Moldova, Serbia and Albania.
The report recommends that:
n Laws should lay out basic minimum requirements for the transparency and accountability of private security 
company operations, ranging from internal systems of governance (e.g. rulebooks, responsibilities of boards 
of governors, staff recruitment, training and conduct) to financial and contractual matters (e.g. duties of 
public disclosure; company structures, issues of ownership and interest).
2.8 Procurement
Limited transparency meant that insufficient information was available on the procurement practices of either 
private businesses or public institutions employing PSCs. While international organisations were in some cases 
able to provide details of their tendering procedures and the criteria used, many client organisations approached 
for the research were either unwilling or unable to reveal their practice in this area. Often it was apparent that 
contracts are awarded either on an informal basis, or simply according to cost.
The report recommends that:
n Procurement policy and practice should exclude companies with known links to political parties, organised 
crime cartels or paramilitaries. The governments of the region have a special responsibility to effectively 
regulate PSCs and to empower other national institutions such as parliaments and ombudsman’s offices to 
scrutinise the sector in this area.
n Governments and other major clients should establish clear contracting policies with financial and criminal 
penalties for breach of contract. Contracts should be put out to tender and awarded on criteria that require 
issues other than cost to be taken into account, including strict adherence to national and international law 
on the use of force. Safeguards should be put in place to minimise the risk of contracts being awarded on 
the basis of political influence.
2.9 Linkages to Security Sector Reform
Although a professional and well-regulated sector is vital for the successful development of SEE countries’ 
economies, the importance of the private security sector has generally not been recognised by those countries 
and international institutions that have been providing Security Sector Reform (SSR) support in the region. 
However, the private security sector is often one of the largest groups of armed actors, and PSCs use force in the 
course of their work. They should therefore be a key element of SSR work.  
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The report recommends that:
n The private security sector should be included in any mapping of the security sector prior to and during 
SSR projects.
n PSCs should be the subject of democratic civilian control and incorporated into SSR programmes including 
regulation and oversight. 
3 Country findings
3.1 Albania
In Albania, the private security industry is still relatively small and underdeveloped. This reflects the economic 
situation in the country but is also in part a result of legislation that caps the size of companies relative to the 
number of local police in each district. While this ensures that the local police will not be outnumbered by any 
one company, it also acts as a disincentive towards professionalisation, and inhibits effective companies from 
taking advantage of their improved reputations by expanding. Successful PSCs are unable to merge with each 
other, which has been one of the principal drivers towards better professionalisation elsewhere in the region. 
There are a number of concerns in Albania relating to the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW). 
Private security guards are permitted to carry military weapons, use their own weapons and to store weapons at 
home – bringing with it the danger of misuse of weapons in the domestic environment. Background checking of 
individual security guards appears to be insufficient and there is evidence that there are unlicensed operators 
working in the industry, a fact that undermines the regulatory and training system. There is also evidence that 
some companies have inappropriate links to political parties, and that some PSC staff have used disproportionate 
force in the course of their work. The report recommends that SALW legislation be revised to ensure that guards 
are appropriately armed and only licensed trained individuals are permitted to work as security guards.
3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is complex largely because of the devolved nature of government 
in the country. At present there is no national legislation covering the regulation of the private security industry 
but rather two, significantly different, pieces of regulation in each of BiH’s ‘Entities’. Further, in the case of the 
Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FBH), implementation of the current legislation is further devolved down to 
the cantonal level. As a result of these complex arrangements which make it illegal for a PSC registered in one 
entity to work in the other, the industry remains structured along largely ethnic lines and the consolidation that 
has occurred in some other parts of the region has yet to happen. While there were some questions related to 
the enforcement of the legislation in BiH, recent raids by the authorities have seen a number of illegal operators, 
including some in possession of sizeable stocks of military arms and explosives, brought to book. The report 
makes a number of recommendations including the introduction of national regulation, and that companies 
themselves need to work together in order to promote self-regulation through the creation of a trade association 
and code of conduct.  
3.3 Bulgaria
The situation in Bulgaria has improved significantly in the last decade and the private security industry itself is 
perhaps the most developed in the region. Initially the industry was strongly associated with organised crime 
but a series of regulations introduced by the government of Bulgaria over the last eight years has significantly 
reduced the involvement of organised crime in the industry and encouraged professionalisation. The industry has 
now advanced to the stage that international companies operate in Bulgaria, and Bulgarian firms have started 
to export their services abroad, including to Iraq. However, concerns remain about the industry. Unlicensed 
operators can still be found, there is no legal requirement for background checks of individual PSC employees, 
and competition between the police and the private industry remains. The report recommends that the police 
should no longer attempt to directly compete with the private security industry, that the regulatory authorities 
should be more proactive in investigating complaints against the industry, and that parliamentary oversight 
should be strengthened.
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3.4 Croatia
In Croatia the private security industry has developed significantly over the last decade. While the sector remains 
dominated by Croat firms, a number of companies have emerged as market leaders and the sector is now 
expanding at a rate of about 10% per year. Although a cross-industry code of conduct has not yet been agreed, 
state regulation is such that this is not as big a concern as in some other countries. However, there have been 
allegations that the industry has links with organised crime groups and some PSCs have party political affiliations. 
The report recommends that the government should continue to monitor this and update and simplify the current 
regulatory structure. 
3.5 Macedonia
PSCs have only operated in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, hereafter referred to as 
Macedonia), since 1994. The industry remains fairly small and is highly likely to go through a process of both 
expansion and consolidation over the next few years. Foreign firms are presently prevented from operating inside 
Macedonia but this is likely to change as the country gears itself up for EU accession. There are a number of 
important concerns largely related to the affiliations of some companies. Firstly, it seems that private security 
companies in Macedonia reflect the ethnic segregation seen in wider Macedonian society, being largely mono-
ethnic. Secondly, some PSCs have direct affiliations to some former police and army units that fought in the 
emergency in Macedonia in 2001. These are issues of concern that the government should seek to address. Of 
greatest concern however is the lack of evidence of external oversight or the implementation of regulations in the 
country, including adequate background checks for people wanting to work as private security guards.  The report 
recommends improving working practices of PSCs and strengthening firearms legislation.
3.6 Moldova
It is difficult to address the situation of Moldova with any great certainty, as there are significant problems with 
transparency in the country as a whole and most especially in Transdniestria, where there only seems to be one 
extremely well connected company offering security services. While regulation of the sector does exist it is overly 
bureaucratic and in need of simplification. The industry itself continues to be fairly small and it is likely to expand 
as the economy develops.  The report recommends that the regulatory system should be simplified and that 
current competition between the police force and the industry should be ended through establishing clear lines 
of responsibility between the public and private security sectors. 
3.7 Romania
Although small in size, the security industry in Romania, along with Bulgaria, is probably amongst the most 
developed in the region, both in terms of professionalisation and the legislative framework. Romanian PSCs 
initially emerged in an unregulated environment where the line between legitimate business and organised crime 
was very indistinct. However, since 1996 the sector has become increasingly regulated. A number of concerns do 
remain though, primarily based around the issue of the effective implementation of legislation and of oversight. 
Further, recent firearms legislation has brought into question the extent to which companies control the firearms 
that are issued to PSC personnel. Also, at times PSCs are permitted access to automatic weapons, a practice 
that is of questionable utility and some risk. As with Bulgaria, the industry is open to foreign companies, some 
of which have now entered the domestic market, and some Romanian firms have begun exporting their services 
to Iraq and elsewhere. The report recommends that relationships between the private security industry and the 
police and other state bodies be clarified in order to prevent competition. There should also be a review of existing 
training requirements for security guards and the capacity of oversight actors should also be strengthened.
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3.8 Serbia and Montenegro
Serbia
The situation in Serbia is probably of the greatest concern in the region. At the current moment there is no direct 
legislation that addresses the private security market. This has meant that the industry, while extensive and 
well developed, contains some companies that are essentially fronts for organised crime organisations. The 
current regulations covering SALW are also of concern. Weapons are owned by and licensed to the individual 
guard meaning that there is a greater potential for their misuse. Further, automatic military style weapons are 
commonly used by the industry despite their being inappropriate for such usage. The report recommends that 
the government adopt a licensing system as soon as possible that will begin to eliminate the more unprofessional 
parts of the industry. In the interim it is vital that international employers of security services in the country adopt 
some basic principles in order to ensure that the company they employ is professional.
Montenegro
While the private security industry started in Montenegro in 1992, which is relatively early compared to many of 
the entity’s neighbours, the industry only really began to pick up in the late 1990s. The key concerns regarding 
the privatization of security in Montenegro centre around the need for existing laws to be properly implemented. 
While a licensing system exists it is not fully implemented and even those companies that have registered are 
not required to conduct background checks of their staff. It has also been common practice for police officers 
to undertake security work when off duty, leaving the issue of police oversight open to a potential clash of 
interests. The report recommends that there is a clearer relationship between PSCs and the police, an increase in 
transparency with the regulation of PSCs and the introduction of rigorous training programme, which will address 
the appropriate use of force and other issues. 
Entity of Kosovo
In Kosovo the security industry dates from the international intervention of 1999. Under Kosovo’s current 
constitutional arrangements, the management and oversight of security is a reserved responsibility of the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Within the industry, a key distinction is made in law between a small number 
of armed international PSCs and the larger number of domestic unarmed PSCs. There is also a separation 
between local unarmed PSCs and local bodyguards who may be armed. The key issue of concern in the territory 
is the competition and animosity between the private security industry and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). 
This was partially generated by the KPS allowing off duty officers to provide security services in the past, as 
well as by the creation of a semi-commercial segment within the KPS, which provides guard services. While 
this has recently been partially curtailed it continues to be a matter of some concern. There is also evidence 
of links between some companies and the former Albanian armed group the KLA, and with organised crime 
groups. There have also been a number of cases where security guards have used unnecessary or undue force, 
pointing to a need to overhaul the training system and background checks that the industry currently applies, 
especially amongst armed bodyguards. The report recommends that clear lines of demarcation between the 
state and private security sectors are established to avoid competition and potential animosity and that the 
training, arming and vetting of PSCs and their personnel are improved. 
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Acronyms
ANA Albanian National Army 
BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy
CSS Center for Security Studies
DfiD Department for International Development
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAR European Agency for Reconstruction 
EUFOR European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission
EUPM European Union Police Mission
EURISC European Institute for Risk Security and Communications Management 
Europol European Police Office 
FRY  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HDZ  Croatian Democratic Union
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program 
IDM Institute for Democracy and Mediation
IDP internally displaced person
IFOR Implementation Force (NATO)
IPP Institute for Public Policy
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army 
KPC  Kosovo Protection Corps 
KPS  Kosovo Police Service
LCESFA Law on the Control of Explosive Substances, Firearms and Ammunition
LCFTADGT Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
MEP  multi-ethnic police
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoE Ministry of Economy
MoI Ministry of Interior
MoPO  Ministry of Public Order
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MTR  Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBPS National Border Police Service
NFP National Focal Point
NGO  non-governmental organisation
NLA  National Liberation Army
OHR  Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP  Partnership for Peace
PISG  Provisional Institution of Self-Government (Kosovo)
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PMC Private Military Company
PSC Private Security Company
RS  Republika Srpska (BiH)
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP  stabilisation and association process 
SAS  Small Arms Survey 
SCG  State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
SECI Center Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime.
SEE  South Eastern Europe 
SEESAC  South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SFOR  Stabilisation Force (NATO Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SFRY  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SSR Security Sector Reform
SSSR Support to Security Sector Reform
UCPMB  Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac
UN  United Nations
UN DDA  United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR  UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIBH  UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK  UN Mission in Kosovo
UNPoA United Nations Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW
UNSC United Nations Security Council
VJ  Yugoslav National Army 
VSCG  Serbian and Montenegrin MoD and state army
WAC  weapons authorisation card
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Definitions
close protection
the provision of armed or unarmed personal protection to an individual (the principal).
immunity agreement
a legal agreement, between states, or between states and companies, which exempt private security companies 
from prosecution under the laws of the country in which it operates.
mercenary
individual combatants fighting in foreign conflicts for financial gain. 
n Mercenaries are defined within international humanitarian law.  There are United Nations and Organization of African Unity Conventions 
that ban their use.
Private Military Company (PMC)
a company that provides military services for profit. 
n This normally can vary from the offer of fighting through to military training and logistics support.
Private Security Company (PSC)
a company that provides security services (generally of a police type) for profit to other organisations and/or 
individuals.
Rapid Response Units (RRU)
mobile units that respond to a specific situation or incident.
static security
the security of fixed assets, normally a building or a warehouse.
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Introduction
1 The privatisation of security, a global trend
Over the last decade, a range of writers and observers 
have monitored the global rise of privatised security.1 
Increasingly, private security companies (PSCs) are 
taking on roles that are traditionally the preserve of 
state security providers. These roles include escorting 
and transporting high-risk commodities; providing rapid 
response services attached to alarm systems; stewarding 
large public events; operating prisons; securing courts; 
and providing static security to a wide range of facilities, 
such as banks, ports and embassies. 
In 1999, the Confederation of Security Services (CoESS) 
estimated that there were more than 500,000 guards 
working for 10,000 companies that specialise in the 
surveillance of industrial sites, offices, public buildings, stores and airports, the transportation of money, and the 
protection of individuals and homes in member states of the EU.2 Today, with the eastern expansion of the EU, 
that number may well have doubled, without taking into consideration illicit PSCs and their employees.
The expansion of the role and importance of the private security industry has probably reached its zenith in 
modern Iraq, where private contractors are providing vital security services to a wide range of clients, including the 
US and UK armies, the Government of Iraq and a whole host of private enterprises, such as oil and transportation 
companies. Yet, the private security sector is neglected in most analyses of security sector reform, even though it 
may constitute a significant segment of the sector, in some countries outstripping the police in terms of number 
of employees. For example, countries in which the number of domestic PSC employees and the size of PSC 
budgets exceed those of public law enforcement agencies currently include the US, the UK, Israel, Germany, 
Russia, South Africa, and the Philippines.3 This neglect is unfortunate since regulation of the private security 
industry is an essential component of state control of the use of force. SSR is fundamentally an exercise to bring 
about effective democratic civilian control of those institutions that exercise violence on behalf of the community. 
As PSCs use force in the course of their work they too should be the subject of democratic civilian control and fall 
within the scope of SSR programmes.
Some have argued that the privatisation of security in Europe and North America is part and parcel of the 
changing nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War, with developed nations in particular adopting 
new security doctrines that entail increasingly high-tech armies, in which non-core functions are increasingly 
outsourced to private firms.4 In many countries, such as the UK and the US, this has involved the use of private 
companies to provide logistical support to the military, including, but not limited to, catering for the armed 
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1 For example Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.
2 ’Joint Declaration on the Mutual Recognition of CoESS and UNI-Europe and the Social Dialogue’, Report of Berlin Conference, 10 June 
1999, p 8.
3 The ratio of private security guards to police in Germany is 1.5:1, in the US 3:1 and in California 4:1. In some other less developed countries 
the ratio may be even more. In the US, PSCs out-spend public policing by 73% (1997) and employ more than 2.5 times as many personnel 
in an industry that, already in 1991, was employing 1.5 million personnel and generating $52 billion in spending. In contrast, public law 
enforcement was employing 600,000 personnel and spending $30 billion. In Israel, PMCs and PSCs are the single largest employer in the 
country with over 100,000 employees and the revenues generated are said to clearly surpass the large Israeli defence expenditures. In Great 
Britain, the private security industry is larger than the government’s police force, with 7,850 PSCs employing more than 162,000 people, 
compared to 142,000 public police. In South Africa, there are 10 times more people engaged in private policing than public police. The 
largest security force in the Philippines is neither the 102,000 strong national police nor the 120,000 strong national army, but the 182,000 
private security guards who are virtually armies for hire. See: E. Eppler, Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 2002, p 28; Blakely E.J. and Snyder M. G, Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States, Washington D. C., Brookings, 
1997, p 126.
4 Singer P.W, The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What We Have Learned and Where To Next? Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF), Geneva, November 2004.
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forces and the maintenance of equipment.  Yet, the phenomena is also a natural consequence of economic 
liberalization, which has seen European and North American states downsize their public sector and take 
increasingly less responsibility for public safety as ever more services, whether in schools, prisons or policing, 
are outsourced.5 Economic arguments aside, the merits of this model is that it allows institutions to increase 
efficiency by concentrating on their core functions – crime prevention and law enforcement in the case of the 
police – while hiving off other burdens, such as prisoner transportation and forensics.6 The uneven economic 
growth associated with globalisation and economic liberalisation also contributes to the demand for private 
security as societies become more polarised and new property owners look for security above and beyond that 
which state agencies can provide.7 With these mutually reinforcing factors in play, it seems that the phenomenon 
of privatised security is here for the foreseeable future. Policy-makers and researchers must learn to deal with 
the associated challenges of regulation and accountability posed by a market which continues to grow in both 
size and importance.
2 Roles and definitions of private security providers
PSCs operate at one end of a continuum of private security provision, which also includes unofficial and/or 
illegal operators, such as mercenaries, paramilitaries, vigilantes, neighbourhood civil defence forces, as well 
as the more official operators that provide military-style services – Private Military Companies (PMCs). The 
range of different types of security companies that comprise the private security industry is illustrated by the 
following categorisation provided by the International Peace Operations Association, a US advocacy and lobbying 
organisation for private security firms. This categorisation divides providers into one of three groups: Non-lethal 
Service Providers (NSPs), Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs).8
MILITARY SERVICE PROVIDERS (MSP)
NSP
(Non-lethal Service Providers)
PSC
(Private Security Companies)
PMC 
(Private Military Companies)
Mine and UXO Clearance
Logistics and Supply
Risk Consulting
Industrial Site Protection
Humanitarian Aid Protection
Embassy Protection
Military Training
Military Intelligence
Offensive Combat
PA&E
Brown and Root
ICI of Oregon
ArmorGroup
Wackenhut
Gurkha Security Guards
Executive Outcomes (Active)
Sandline International (Active)
MPRI (Passive)
Source: Adapted from Brooks, ‘Protecting People: The PMC Potential’, Comments and Suggestions for the UK Green Paper on Regulating 
Private Military Services, Alexandria, International Peace Operations Association, 25 July 2002.
5 For example private security companies have taken over the administration of prisons in some countries including the UK, Canada, Mexico 
and Lesotho. See for instance Prison Privatisation Report International No. 49, Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) University 
of Greenwich,  August/September 2002, available at <http://www.psiru.org/justice/ppri49.asp>
6 In fact studies of police work have shown that most officers’ time is spent on peripheral functions that could easily be performed by private 
actors. Schönteich M, “Introduction”, in M. Schönteich et al., Private Muscle: Outsourcing the Provision of Criminal Justice Services, Institute 
for Security Studies, Monograph No93, January 2004, p. 10. In some countries, however, the core functions of state security institutions 
are also being outsourced, opening new questions and challenges about the role of the private sector. For example the multi-national firm 
Accenture recently won a US contract awarded by the Department of Homeland Security worth up to $10 billion to track foreign visitors using 
digital photographs, fingerprints and other biometric data. ‘Big Bucks for Biometric Screening,’ Wired News (online), Reuters, 1 June 2004, 
available at <www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,63683,00.html>
7 It is interesting to note that this model of security privatisation has led to deep-rooted association between PSCs and organised criminal 
networks in other parts of the world, particularly where economic downturn combined with military downsizing has created a supply of former 
state security personnel willing to provide private property protection services. This model has been noted in both Italy and Russia. Varese , F. 
‘Is Sicily the Future of Russia? Private Protection and the Emergence of the Russian Mafia,’ Archives Européenes de Sociologie, 1994.
8 Alternative categorisations can be found elsewhere, e.g. Wulf H, ‘Change of Uniform – but no Uniform Change in Function. Soldiers in Search 
of a New Role.’ in BICC Conversion Survey 2002, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2002, p. 97-98. Updated in Wulf H, Die Internationalisierung 
von Krieg und Frieden, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2005; ‘Green Paper,’ UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p. 10. A similar list with only 
5 types of activities and services provided, but with more companies listed, is presented by Weingartner G, ‘Krieg als Geschäftszweig. Private 
Sicherheitsdienstleister und Söldner im Lichte des Kriegsvölkerrechts,’ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, No2, March/April 2004, p. 
150. An interesting attempt at categorisation is made by Singer, who does not distinguish between PMCs and PSCs but lumps them together 
as Private Military Firms (PMF). Singer P. W, Corporate Warriors, 2003, p. 91.
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While all such categorisations are problematic in some way (e.g. by introducing an artificial distinction between 
companies whose roles may vary over time), most operators will tend to fit in one or other of the above ‘boxes’ 
on most occasions. Nevertheless, there can often be overlap in the activities undertaken by PSCs and PMCs. 
According to the above categorisation, PMCs are those firms that offer military services for private profit. Many 
PMCs are in fact essentially ‘passive’ operators, providing training and organisational support, rather than 
undertaking offensive military operations. Nevertheless, it is PMCs that attract the most attention and criticism 
from observers, who see them as posing the most pressing difficulties with regard to regulation. In recent years 
the PMC debate has centred on the use of the industry in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. While this is 
understandable, as the contribution of the private sector to the coalition forces in Iraq has been significant, it 
is likely that Iraq is an exception rather than an example of the future patterns of conflict – not least because it 
is unlikely that there will be another regime change war for many years due to the 
significant cost of fighting the war. Further, the debate regarding Iraq often confuses 
the use of contractors who are, for instance, driving trucks, with contractors providing 
security and yet others who provide services which are primarily military.9
In contrast to PMCs, PSCs offer an essentially protective, policing-style service for 
their clients, whether individuals or organisations. This tends to either take the form 
of ‘Close Protection’, where personal protection is given to an individual, particularly 
in the form of bodyguards; ‘Rapid Response’, where mobile units respond to a 
specific problem, such as a burglary; and ‘Static Security’, where assets, most often 
buildings, are secured. 10 
In less developed states and conflict areas, protective security may be of a high-level 
variety designed to deter attacks by guerrilla forces. In environments such as this, 
companies are more likely to perform multiple functions and to adopt both ‘passive’ 
and ‘aggressive’ tactics as required, blurring the PMC/PSC distinction as they do so. 
However, in more peaceful environments, such as Western and South Eastern Europe, contracts are more likely 
to involve guarding VIPs, banks, embassies and industrial facilities from routine criminality. 
3 The South East European context
The private security industry in South Eastern Europe (SEE) emerged in the early 1990s as the region moved 
away from Communism. The countries of the region, some of which have experienced violent conflict and all of 
which remain in transition, have all faced problems in providing effective security for their citizens in recent years. 
To differing degrees, all countries  have faced problems with weak state institutions, traditions of authoritarian 
policing, public corruption and rising rates of organised and petty crime. These factors have reduced the public’s 
faith in state security providers and created the demand for private security provision. Coupled with the withdrawal 
of state security protection from newly privatised property, these factors have created the conditions for the 
substantial growth of the private security sector across the region.
The early structure and practice of the industry generally reflected the chaotic nature of the transformation from 
socialism to capitalism in a largely unregulated market. Many of the early security companies were little more 
than fronts for organised gangs of racketeers and often gained customers through intimidation as well as feeding 
on the desperate need to gain some form of security in an increasingly insecure environment. An important 
secondary factor in the evolution of the industry in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was the emergence 
of ethnically based conflicts, often themselves prosecuted with the help of non-state actors. These conflicts 
were in part prosecuted by non-state actors including ethnic paramilitary organisations (comprised of ‘quasi-
private military combatants’11), neighbourhood self-defence units, international PMC companies and regional 
9 See for instance Taylor G, ‘Legal limbo shadows civilian sin war zone,’ The Washington Times, 06 July 6 2005, available at <http://www.
washingtontimes.com/national/20050706-123345-1812r.htm>
10 There is also some overlap with private intelligence companies who offer surveillance for their clients. In Eastern Europe, it is common 
for former state security personnel to work in this market. According to one study, Romania has more than 160 private intelligence services, 
most run by former Securitate or military intelligence personnel, while Russia has over 12,000 private security enterprises or security 
services companies, employing some 120,000 personnel typically with KGB or GRU backgrounds. Van Bergen Thirion C. J, The Privatization 
of Security: A Blessing or a Menace?, South African Defence College, Pretoria, 1998.
11 Andreas, P.  ‘The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia’. International Studies Quarterly, 48 (1): 29-51, 2004.
Personal Protection Officer (PPO), 
Zvonimir Security k.d, 2001
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mercenaries.12 An atmosphere of inter-communal distrust and animosity has followed these wars helping to 
generate additional demand for protection from some elements in society. The termination of these conflicts also 
provided significant numbers of ex-combatants who subsequently sought and found employment in the private 
security industry. 
In fact, the SEE region has probably seen one of the most rapid privatisations of security worldwide. While at the 
end of the 1980s there was virtually no private security industry in the region, it has now expanded to be a major 
employer and security provider. Yet, until now the emergence of the industry has not been mapped on a regional 
scale and while there has been some discussion on the role of international PSCs and PMCs in the region, the 
rise of the domestic industry has gone largely undocumented.13 The few reports examining the international 
private security sector have tended to focus on the misconduct of individual PSC employees rather than their role 
and the impact of the industry as a whole.14
4 Purpose of the report
The private security sector is often neglected in most analyses of security sector provision and reform, and it is 
often bypassed by analysts who are drawn to the more dramatic questions surrounding the work of PMCs. This 
report forms part of a broader three-part project by International Alert and Saferworld, which aims to:
a) conduct research on the growth, conduct and regulation of companies in selected regions worldwide;
b) develop a workable methodology for conducting primary research on private military/security 
companies;
c) contribute towards the development and elaboration of regulatory norms and standards to guide the 
work of the industry.
In view of the dramatic growth of the industry in the SEE region in recent years, the immediate purpose of this 
report is to provide the reader with an overview of the current situation within the countries and entities in the 
region, as defined by the European Union Stability Pact for SEE.15 In attempting to provide the first-ever overview 
of the work of PSCs in the region, this report has focussed on some of the basic research questions that apply 
to the sector, such as:
n How many PSCs are operating in each SEE country?
n What services are they providing and for whom?
n What is the hiring process?
n What threats are they hired to protect clients from?
n What impact do they have on security, business confidence and public security provision?
n What legislative and regulatory frameworks are in place?
12 The last two types of private security providers supply especially interesting examples of the privatisation of security in SEE and the inability 
of state governments to regulate non-state violent actors. The US military company MPRI was employed by as military advisers in Bosnian, 
Croatia and Macedonia during the post-Yugoslav conflicts of the early 1990s, while Russian Cossack fighters from the Kuban and other parts 
of Russia were employed as mercenaries in both the Moldovan war (1991-1992) and the Bosnian conflicts.  Vankovska, B. “Privatisation of 
Security and Security Sector Reform in Croatia,” in Lilly and von Tangen Page (eds.) Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities 
of The privatisation of security, a global trend of Security,  International Alert, London: 2002; Ionescu, D. From SSMR to the Republic of 
Moldova+ PMR, Chisinau: Museum, 2002. Also Derluguian, G.M. and Cipko, S. “The Politics of Identity in a Russian Borderland Province: The 
Kuban Neo-Cossack Movement, 1989-1996,” Europe-Asia Studies, 49 (8) December, p 1485 -  1500.
13 One of the few reports to address the rise in the domestic industry was Vankovska B, ‘Privatisation of security and Security Sector Reform 
in Croatia’, in Lilly D and M von Tangen Page (eds), Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security, 
International Alert, London, 2002. 
14 The most famous example of which is the involvement of employees of the US PSC DynCorp, which had the Civ-Pol contract in Bosnia, in 
prostitution and people trafficking.  See ‘Woman sacked for revealing UN links with sex trade’, The Times, London, 07 August 2002, available 
at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-376444,00.html>
15 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Romania.
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n How well are they implemented and enforced?
n Do these meet international standards and best practices?
n What weapons do they have legal access to and how are they used?
n What level of training do they have?
n Who has oversight and responsibility for their work?
n What action, if any, should be taken to improve the work of the sector?
In order to address these questions, the report attempts to summarise key findings in the different issue areas 
– ranging from regulatory frameworks to the use of force and firearms – for each country and entity of the region. 
Country-specific recommendations are then given at the end of each chapter. The report concludes with an 
assessment of key developments across the region before outlining a number of recommendations for the region 
as a whole.
4.1 Methodology
The second objective of the study is to develop a methodology for researching PSC regulation and conduct that 
can, with appropriate amendments, be made use of elsewhere in the world. To date, information on the activities 
of PMCs/PSCs has been difficult to obtain, partly because of secrecy within the industry, but also because of 
the novelty of the sector itself and the slowness of researchers to respond to a multi-disciplinary challenge. With 
a few notable exceptions, most reports on industry activities have tended to be journalistic, descriptive and 
particular in nature, rather than analytical or comparative. Therefore, in addition to the information contained in 
the country chapters and conclusion, this report also contains an annexed explanation of the methods adopted 
by the research team and the research questionnaire used by local researchers in the field. The annexed 
questionnaire was designed jointly by International Alert and Saferworld and, after an initial pre-test in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Croatia, was developed iteratively during and after the research carried out for this report. 
The country chapters of this report were compiled using the completed questionnaires submitted to the project 
team in London. 
4.2 Scope and depth of research
This report is by its very nature a provisional one. It is important to state that this report is the first of its kind 
conducted in the region and, although no doubt overdue, was envisaged as preliminary ‘snap-shot’ of the SEE 
environment, to be used as an initial guide for policy-makers, and as the basis for more detailed future research. 
In this respect the report has two important limitations. Firstly, it was not possible to cover in depth most issues 
that fell within the scope of the research. Secondly, the opportunities to corroborate information have been 
limited. Consultations with government authorities and international organisations working in the area have, 
however, been possible in most cases, providing additional guarantees of report’s accuracy. The authors are 
therefore confident that this report represents a sufficiently accurate picture of the current situation to identify 
key trends as well as the major issues of concern, both in individual countries and across the region as a whole. 
It is hoped that by discussing this issue it will stimulate both domestic and international attention. The authors 
therefore look forward to receiving responses from all interested parties and hope that the debate it stimulates 
will be positive and forward thinking.
This report is the result of collaboration between SEESAC and two UK based international NGOs, International Alert 
and Saferworld, and local researchers in the region.  A number of entities, which are not classed as independent 
states, were included in the study largely on the basis that they have a sufficiently different legislative framework 
and private security industry that they merit separate attention. No viewpoint should be inferred by their inclusion 
as to what their final status or their current position is or should be.
5 The need for regulation and oversight
Despite the relatively large size of the PSC industry (in terms of expenditure and employees) in many countries, 
much of the international debate regarding the privatization of security has, for reasons stated above, concentrated 
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on PMCs. In comparison to the burgeoning literature on military security providers, little emphasis has been given 
to researching those companies that provide policing-style services. This is unfortunate in some ways, as the PSC 
industry poses many of the same challenges in terms of accountability and regulation as its military counterpart. 
The problems associated with poor regulation of the sector are wide ranging and include the following:
n The introduction of PSCs weakens the state’s monopoly over the use of force, a trend that is enhanced 
in cases where PSCs are armed;
n By introducing a market for security services, differentials in security are likely to arise between the 
rich and the poor. In the worst case, state security agencies may be undermined by the private security 
market leaving security a preserve of the wealthy;
n Unlike state security providers, PSCs are not directly accountable to the electorate and parliament, but 
to company boards and shareholders. This introduces new governance challenges;
n In the absence of adequate legislation and regulation, there can be no control over the type or quality of 
services that companies provide to their clients. Untrained staff with dubious backgrounds may be able 
to access weaponry and use force in an inappropriate way, threatening human rights;
n Companies empowered to use force in various ways may easily serve as fronts for organised crime, 
or come to fulfil a political or paramilitary function, particularly in territories emerging from armed 
conflict;
n In states with a history of ethnic conflict there is the added potential for PSCs to be misused against 
ethnic as well as political opponents;
n There is serious potential for conflicts of interest to arise because of close ties between former government 
officials and PSCs; and
n A poorly regulated private security sector can harbour and abet corruption, hinder rather than help law 
enforcement, and even grow to challenge the state and its security structures. 
While the above list is hardly exhaustive, it serves to underline the considerable challenges associated with the 
introduction of private security and the consequent need for adequate regulation and oversight of the sector. 
These risks are all too real, as recent cases from some of the most advanced private security markets in the 
world demonstrate. In the US for example, PSC guards have been found to engage in unwarranted violence or 
illegal dealings on numerous occasions.16 In the UK, some companies induce rather than alleviate insecurity, 
while others cause confusion about the boundaries of responsibility between themselves and the police, leading 
to antagonism between the two sectors.17
5.1 National regulation
Regulation at the national level is key to achieving effective control of the private security market. Yet, at the 
present time many states have no laws governing the work of PMCs/PSCs, while others have only partial or flawed 
ones. A comparative study of the European regulatory environment conducted by the European Confederation 
of Security Services (CoESS) and the Union Network International (UNI) points to significant differences even 
between European countries.18 Some states, such as Denmark, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain, have strict 
and comprehensive controls regulating PSC services, while others, such as Germany, Austria and Italy, have 
only narrowly defined regulations. With the growth of the industry in recent years, there has been a move to 
strengthen controls in some countries. For example in the UK, licensing procedures are now published and 
licensing is conditional on criteria such as training; registration and insurance; the manner in which activities are 
16 Zielinski M, ‘Armed and Dangerous: Private Police on the March’, Covert Action Quarterly, available at www.caq.com/CAQ54p.police.html 
In the US, most of the 1 million-plus guards are unlicensed, untrained and not subject to background checks. There are no federal laws 
governing the more than 11,000 PSCs. State laws remain spotty. Their burgeoning $12 billion-a-year industry is marked by high turnover, low 
pay, few benefits and scant oversight. See: Hall M, ‘Private security guards are Homeland’s weak link’, USA Today, 23 January 2003, available 
at www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-22-security-cover_x.htm
17 Gallagher J, ‘Anti-Social Security’, New Statesman & Society, No 8, 31 March 1995, p 21 - 22.
18 Weber T, ‘Eine vergleichende Übersicht der Rechtsvorschriften für die private Sicherheitsindustrie in der Europäischen Union,’ Arbeitspapier 
für die gemeinsame Konferenz von CoESS und UNI-Europa, Dritte Europäische Konferenz für private Sicherheitsdienste, Brüssel, 12/13 
Dezember 2001. Birmingham, ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd. See also: Hemmer D. and Bauer W. T, ‘Privatisierung und Liberalisierung 
öffentlicher Dienstleistungen in der EU, Teil 4: Sicherheit,’ Paper OGPP, Österreichische Gesellschaft für Politikberatung und Politikentwicklung, 
Wien, August 2003.
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to be carried out; the production and display of the license; and information that the licensee has to provide.19
While the industry itself is taking on an increasingly transnational form, all states have a responsibility to introduce 
legislation covering the work of private security firms, since they may at any time become the clients or home base 
for companies. In both guises, governments have responsibility for the conduct of companies using force in the 
course of their work under international humanitarian and human rights law. A combination of past experience 
and international best practice points to the following areas as being priorities for national regulation:
5.1.1 Licensing of companies
Licensing systems that clearly define the type of security services that PMCs/PSCs may and may not provide 
should be established. Legislation should clearly set out the criteria against which licence applications are 
to be assessed on a case-by-case basis for every new company and/or contract. These should include, inter 
alia, whether the company and its proposed activities would jeopardise public security and law and order; 
undermine economic development; enhance instability and human suffering; augment the threat perception in 
neighbouring countries; contribute to or provoke internal intervention or external aggression; violate international 
embargoes, etc.20 Licences should be time-limited in order to ensure regular re-accreditation and high levels of 
professionalism, and regular monitoring of PSC activities should be carried out, with penalties including fines and 
revocation of licenses in the case of violation of the law. Legislation should have an extra-territorial dimension to 
cover the eventuality that companies may work overseas in countries with inadequate legal frameworks. Lastly, 
guidelines should be established that define when it is appropriate to use a PSC and when it is appropriate to 
use the police, to ensure that the police and PSCs are seen as complimentary institutions working towards the 
same end rather than as competitors.
5.1.2 Transparency and accountability
The law should lay down basic minimum requirements for the transparency and accountability of private security 
companies’ operations, ranging from internal systems of governance (e.g. rulebooks, responsibilities of boards 
of governors, staff recruitment, training and conduct) to financial and contractual matters (e.g. duties of public 
disclosure, company structures, issues of ownership and interest).
5.1.3 Licensing of personnel
Governments should ensure that PMC/PSC owners, directors, their 
spouses and employees are licensed to work in the sector according 
to objective criteria. Background checks should be carried out prior 
to licenses being awarded to ensure that personnel have no criminal 
record, no past responsibility for human rights violations or violations 
of international humanitarian law and have not been dishonourably 
discharged from the armed forces. These licences should also be 
temporal with regular re-accreditation to ensure retraining and high 
levels of professionalism. Each company should maintain accurate 
records on its employees to allow for inspections by state oversight 
bodies.
5.1.4 Training and professionalism
States should establish and effectively oversee a training regime for PSC staff that gives personnel a good 
grounding in relevant international humanitarian law, human rights laws, first aid and gender issues. All personnel 
19 The UK introduced regulations for domestic private policing services with the Private Security Industry Act of 2001. The Act established 
a Security Industry Authority (SIA), which specifies licensing criteria and supervises their enactment plans for door supervisors, wheel-
clampers, key holders, manned guarding, private investigators and security consultant. SIA, ‘Who will need a license?,’ at <www.the-sia.org.
uk/licenses/who-will-need.asp> And SIA, ‘The Private Security Industry Act,’ at <www.the-sia.org.uk/legislation/the-act.asp>
20 Schreier F. and Caparini M, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies, Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper No 6, Geneva, March 2005.
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should be properly trained in, and committed to respect, best international standards and practices relevant to 
the field and in particular the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Licensing of PSC personnel should be conditional to 
the successful completion of approved training. The PSC industry should look at strengthening voluntary codes of 
conduct and trade associations where they exist and creating them where they do not. Employers of PSCs should 
only employ companies that adhere to these voluntary standards.
5.1.5 Use of force and firearms
Strict and detailed guidelines in accordance with best international practice should be provided by national 
legislation for the use of minimal force (including of less-lethal weapon systems) and firearms by personnel 
working within the industry, Less/non-lethal weapons should be seen as an alternative to the use of deadly force 
rather than as a lesser step. Their use should be monitored on the same basis as the discharge of a firearm and 
regulated similarly. States should ensure that all armed security personnel carry first aid kits/field dressings. 
There should be regular and random inspections of PSC armouries to ensure that weapons and ammunition are 
stored in secure conditions and adequate accounting mechanisms are in place. 
5.1.6 Procurement
Governments and other major clients should establish clear contracting policies with financial and criminal 
penalties for breach of contract. Contracts should be put out to tender and awarded on a competitive basis 
against objective criteria that require issues other than cost to be taken into account. These should include, 
among other things, strict adherence to national and international law on the use of force. Safeguards should be 
put in place to minimise the risk of contracts being awarded on the basis of political influence.
5.1.7 Oversight and enforcement
States should monitor the activities of PMCs and PSCs to ensure they are acting in line with national and 
international law. The exact means and operational procedures for enforcement should be clearly detailed 
in the relevant legislation. This should include provision for oversight above and beyond that carried out by 
policing agencies. It is particularly important to implement parliamentary oversight mechanisms that require 
companies to appear before committees on demand, in order to account for their conduct in line with contracts, 
and ombudsman’s offices to deal with complaints.
5.1.8 Linkages to Security Sector Reform
All actors, including states and international organisations, should promote security sector reform programmes 
that lead to the development of accountable security forces with proper civilian oversight and control so as to 
reduce the need for the use of private military and security companies. Regulation of the private security sector 
should also be included in SSR programmes in the region, as there is little evidence that this largely armed group 
of security professionals has been included in assessments or programmes to date.
5.2 International and regional regulation
Given that the private security industry is increasingly transnational in nature, national legislation on its own 
is not sufficient to ensure effective regulation. The best hope for effective regulation of the industry lies in 
the creation of mutually reinforcing regulatory frameworks at the national, regional and international levels. 
At present, however, it is not clear exactly which international laws apply to the industry, partly because the 
legal status of PMCs/PSCs is unclear under existing international treaties. For example, personnel employed by 
such firms do not fall under the 1989 ‘International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and 
Training of Mercenaries’. Those efforts that are underway to remedy the situation should continue. In addition, 
governments should work towards the agreement of instruments with regional application, as a bridge between 
the national and international levels. In the European area, this means pursuing discussions within EU, NATO and 
OSCE on common standards for the industry. Any such agreement could inform future global standards.
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Albania
1 Background to the privatization of security
Following the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the 
totalitarian regime headed by Enver Hoxha, Albania became isolated, with virtually 
no contact outside its borders. Today it remains one of the poorest countries in 
Europe, with GDP per head of only a little over $1,000.1 Since 1990 the economy 
has struggled to recover from the distortions of the communist regime, the impact 
of the move to a market economy and the 1997 crisis. Law and order cannot be 
guaranteed in some parts of the country, and organised crime and corruption are 
endemic.
Some of these problems have their roots in 1997, when an uncertain political and 
economic transition was derailed during a period of economic and political crisis. This resulted in members of the 
public comprehensively looting the vast military stockpiles that state security forces had established for defensive 
purposes.2 The international community responded by deploying a number of missions to the country, including 
an Italian-led Multinational Protection Force to help create a secure environment for the provision of international 
aid, an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to coordinate international efforts, 
a European Community Monitor Mission, (now European Union Monitor Mission - EUMM), and a Multinational 
Advisory Police Element (MAPE) established by the Western European Union (WEU) to help restore a viable police 
force - since replaced by the Police Assistance Mission of the EC to Albania (PAMECA).  Albania aspires to NATO 
and EU membership and has a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, and a NATO cell in Tirana 
to coordinate Partnership for Peace assistance. Slow but steady progress is being made towards fulfilling the 
requirements for EU accession and NATO membership despite the obvious challenges.
The first companies to work in the Albanian private security sector began operating 
in 1993 following the adoption of the first law that regulated their activities.3 
The first licence was issued on 26 June 1993 to ‘Ro-Gat Security’, a company 
hired initially to provide static security services.4 Across the sector this field of 
activity has expanded rapidly, accompanying the expansion of the economy. 
Although static security remains the mainstay of the sector in Albania, further 
liberalisation of the economy from 1993 onwards has increasingly led to PSCs 
offering security services to private banks, international business, international 
institutions, construction sites, private media etc, as well as close protection of 
persons.
At the moment, according to Ministry of Public Order (MoPo) figures, there are 269 PSCs in Albania, which in 
2004 employed 4,093 security guards.5 There is a cap on the numbers that any one security company can 
employ as they may not exceed more than five per cent of the number of police in the same district. This means 
there are considerable variations in the size of companies ranging from two or three staff up to 200 in the 
largest urban centres.6 This, combined with a prohibition on international firms entering the Albanian market, 
1 See ‘Albania at a Glance’, (World Bank 2004), http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/alb_aag.pdf; also ‘Country Profile of 
Albania’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPagean
dc=Pageandcid=1007029394365anda=KCountryProfileandaid=1018696633488, accessed 28 July 2005.
2 Bonn International Center for Conversion, Conversion Survey 2002, (NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden: 2002), p 130.
3 Before 2001 the work of PSCs was regulated by the Law No 7696, dated 07 April 1993, ‘On the Service of Civil Guards’ and Law No 7985, 
dated 13 September 1995, ‘On some Supplements and Changes in Law No 7696’, dated 07 April 1993, ‘On the Service of Civil Guards’. This 
legislation was abrogated after the approval of the new legislation in 2001.
4 Interview with Begator Mane, Administrator, ‘Ro-Gat Security’ PSC, 17 January 2005.
5 Speech by the General Director of State Police, Leader Bajram Ibraj, to PSC convention, on 06 November, 2004. 
6 Law No 8770, dated 19 April 2001, ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’, Article 11, Paragraph 2 (State Gazette No 23, May 
2001).
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has probably restricted the development of larger companies, which has been the norm elsewhere in the region.7 
The largest density of PSC activity and therefore companies (approximately 120) is in Tirana, the capital and the 
largest city in Albania, where most state institutions, international organisations and businesses are located.8 
The best-known companies are Albapol, Albguardia, Alsig, Oktapus, Ro-Gat Security and Vili.
2 Contemporary security threats
Insecurity and crime are serious problems in Albania. The main reasons are the relatively high levels of poverty, 
unemployment, corruption and the problems inherent in building an efficient rule of law. The situation was 
aggravated as a result of the chaotic events of 1997, one legacy being the widespread availability of small arms 
and light weapons (SALW) in the country.9 There have been many instances of robbery of businesses at gunpoint 
and of kidnapping of businessmen for ransom. Some cases of kidnapping have had a tragic end with the killing of 
the victim. In some parts of Albania, blood feuds remain a very important issue although their incidence appears 
to be diminishing gradually. There are also instances of policemen involving themselves in problems that add to 
insecurity, especially the illegal trafficking of drugs and human beings.10 These are the circumstances in which 
confidence in the ability of the state to provide security is undermined, resulting in a significant increase in the 
use of private security providers. This phenomenon not only involves the hiring of security guards by businesses 
or individuals but also in individuals choosing to arm themselves and therefore take personal responsibility for 
their security. 
Most crimes in Albania are directed against property. According to one estimate, in 2003, 34 per cent of all 
crimes were burglaries and other damage to property; this equates to an average of five reported thefts a day in 
Albania during 2003.  Similarly, in 2004, 33 per cent of recorded crimes were directed at property.11 Although 
the figures in Table 1 point to rising crime levels, in reality these statistics reflect under-reporting in the past, and 
the rise in reported crime may actually be a sign of increased state efficiency. However, it is difficult to read any 
broad trends into the figures as the data remains questionable.12
Table 1: Crime Statistics 2002 – 2004
2002 2003 2004
Recorded crime 4,975 5,668 7,537
Crimes against people 1,586 1,698 1,910
Crimes against property 1,322 1,677 2,529
Source: Website of Ministry of Public Order www.mpo.gov.al.
7 The law demands that technical directors and employees of PSCs be Albanian citizens and have their permanent residence in Albania. Law 
No 8770, dated 19 April 2001, ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’, Article 2, Paragraph 2.  (State Gazette No 23, May 2001).
8 Interview with Commissar-in-Chief Ilirian Zaimi, Director of the Sector for Community Policing and the Collections of Arms in the General 
Directorate of State Poliande, 18 January 2005; and Papa A et al, Directory of Members, (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tirana, 
2004).
9 The Albanian Government estimates that a total of approximately 550,000 SALW and 840 million rounds of ammunition were removed from 
government control in 1997. Interview with Ministry of Defence officials, 14 April 2005 and MoPo official statistics for weapons collection, July 
2005. Given the initial confusion surrounding the looting of these weapons, and the difficulty of conducting a full inventory at the time, initial 
estimates were much higher, in the order of 600,000, UNDP Albania SALW project website, http://www.undporg.al/salwc/?background. 
According to official estimates, of these weapons, approximately 200,000 remain in the hands of civilians; 220,000 have been accounted 
for during the various weapons collection programmes. The exact number of weapons that left Albania in this period is not known, though the 
number is assumed to be large because of the demand created by the conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia.
10 See Dying to Leave, Handbook: The Business of Human Trafficking, (PBS, 2003), available on http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/
shows/dying/handbook2.html.
11 Alimadhi A, Sigal-Alsig, ‘Sigurimi i biznesit me 10 mije leke ne muaj’, Biznesi, 23 July 2004, p 6.
12 The Albanian Ministry of Public Order is continually trying to improve its data collection techniques, e.g. by holding a roundtable in 
October 2003 that focussed on reform of registered crime statistics. Albanian statistical records are generally not very reliable and are not 
independently verified. Under-reporting is a large problem and since 1992 there has been pressure to improve crime statistics year on year, 
leading to a situation where in many cases only crimes that were solved were reported. Interview with Sotiraq Hroni, Institute for Democracy 
and Mediation, 09 February 2005.
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3 Services provided by PSCs
The main forms of protection provided by PSCs are static security, close protection, rapid response and the 
secure transit of cash and valuables. As the economy and financial systems have been liberalised, PSCs 
have been contracted to provide security services at private banks, international businesses, international 
institutions, independent media companies etc, as well as close protection services for individuals. Another 
sign of economic growth is the appearance of many construction sites, especially in Tirana, which are guarded 
by PSCs. The rising number of banks, together with their branches in various districts, also contributes to the 
demand for not only static security guards, but also alarm devices and the vehicles and expertise to transport 
money and valuable goods.
The largest firms offer all forms of 
protection, whilst the smaller ones 
tend to specialise. In general, PSCs are 
employed by businesses, international 
organisations, embassies, hotels, 
banks, construction companies and 
state institutions. For example, security 
guards from Ro-Gat Security, a company 
operating throughout the country, are 
employed by the UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, 
USAID, National Bank of Greece, United 
Bank of Albania, Raiffeisen Bank, World 
Bank, Swiss Embassy, General Directory 
of State Revenues, Albanian Public 
Radio and Television.13  At the moment 
the Albanian Electro-energy Corporation, 
the state agency responsible for the 
production and distribution of electricity, 
is considering employing PSCs to collect 
unpaid electricity bills for the time period 
2001 - 2003.14   
Given the range of security services offered by PSCs, licences are issued by MoPo according to different 
categories: Category A covers those companies that provide security to private and public buildings; Category 
B to those companies that provide physical security to people; and Category C to those companies that protect 
cash and valuable goods.  PSCs within Category A operate only in the district where they are licensed, whereas 
PSCs licensed according to categories A+B, B and C are authorised to operate throughout the country.15   
Rather than issuing a contract to a PSC, it is still common practice for middle-sized companies and organisations 
to employ individuals as security guards on the company payroll. This practice is not recognised in the relevant 
laws and is therefore illegal. Generally, individuals do not feel the need to contract PSCs for personal protection. 
As a rule, if a person perceives a threat against his life or property he asks for temporary protection from the 
state police. The state police usually provide protection to politicians. In a new development in 2004 there was 
an agreement between an insurance company, ‘Sigal’, and a PSC, ‘Alsig’, to offer a package deal that included 
both insurance from theft, and guarding services. 
13 Interviews with Pashk Tusha, Expert of State Police, Former Director of State Police in Durres, 17 January 2005; Arben Caka, Director, State 
Police Commissariat for Security of the Object of Most Importance, 26 January 2005; op cit Mane and Zaimi.
14 Panorama daily newspaper, 24 January 2005.
15 Law No 8770, dated 19 April 2001, ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’, Articles 4 and 5. (State Gazette No 23, May 2001).
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4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
The current legislation on PSCs prohibits police from also working as security guards.16 In addition to the military 
background of some PSC staff, the technical director is required by law to have between five and ten years of 
police or military experience. Therefore even if there are no formal links, informal connections and communication 
between the police and PSCs may take place. It is also common for PSC staff to have worked in the state police. 
On the whole the police do not regard control of PSCs as a great priority, since the police consider themselves to 
be understaffed and perceive other demands on their time and resources as being of a higher priority.17
A permanent working agreement between the state police and PSCs does not exist, but they do cooperate on a 
case-by-case basis. For example, PSCs helped the state police to guard the polling centres in some districts during 
the parliamentary elections in 1997 when the state police, as well as other state structures, were recovering 
from the disastrous effects of the financial crisis. PSCs operating in the districts of Tirana and Lezha have also 
been involved in the voluntary collection of SALW from the civilian population. This latter cooperation was highly 
praised in a speech by the General Director of state police in his meeting with PSCs on 06 December 2004 when 
he said that PSCs had ‘created new spaces in the prevention of criminal activity and in the securing of public 
order’.18
4.2 Political affiliations
Some interviewees consulted for this research allege that in the first years after the law on PSCs was approved 
(1993) licences to run security companies were only granted to supporters of the Democratic Party, which was 
then in power.19 The first law on PSCs was abrogated and replaced by the new one approved in 2001 mainly 
because the new law introduced the stipulation that PSCs must have a Technical Director with a strong police 
background. This was considered to be an important step towards raising the level of professionalism of PSCs 
and limiting political influences upon them.
One acute problem mentioned by the administrators of PSCs during the research for this report is the practice 
of public procurement by government agencies for the security of public buildings and sites, (aside from those 
considered of greatest importance and secured by the state police). Favouring the company that offers the lowest 
bid is not necessarily the best option because it potentially undermines the quality of services PSCs provide 
and does not offer incentives for further investments in these companies. Many PSC directors agree that the 
tendering process needs to be reformed and the government should set clear standards and requirements that 
PSCs need to fulfil in order to be considered for contracts for securing major public sites and buildings, such as 
ports, airports and public corporations.20
4.3 Organised crime affiliations
No evidence was found of direct links between organised crime and the PSC sector during this research. However, 
given that organised criminality, including racketeering, is a significant problem in Albania, and in view of the 
problematic links identified during this research in neighbouring countries, further research is probably warranted 
in this area.
16 Ibid.
17 Op cit Hroni.
18 Speech by the General Director of State Police, 06 November 2004.
19 Op cit Hroni.
20 Interviews with Astrit Miho, Albguardia PSC, 18 January 2005; Vasil Kacorri, Technical Director, Rea PSC, 16 January 2005; op cit Mane.
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5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
The main laws regulating the work of the security industry are: 
n Law No 8770, (19 April 2001) ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’; and
n A supplement to the Law, (passed in September 2002), Law No 8936, ‘On a supplement to Law No 8770’, 
State Gazette (23 May 2001). 
Prior to 2001 the work of PSCs was regulated by:
n Law No 7696 (07 April 1993), ‘On the Service of Civil Guards’; and
n Law No 7985 (13 September 1995), ‘On some Supplements and Changes in Law No 7696’ (07 April 
1993). 
Both PSCs and their personnel are required to register with the state police in the MoPo. Article 7 specifies that 
the PSC must be registered with the General Directorate of State Police. Article 14, Paragraph 2 specifies that 
the technical director of PSC must be registered with the General Directorate of Police. Article 15, Paragraph 2 
specifies that the employees of PSC be registered with the Directorate of Police in the District where the PSC 
operates. Both the technical director (Article 14, Paragraph 1c) and employees (Article 15, Paragraph 1c) of PSCs 
are required not to have a criminal record.  Police officers who have been dismissed from the police for corruption 
or for breaking the police oath may not receive a licence. This is not specified in the law but is in line with police 
procedures.
All PSCs operating in Albania are nationally owned. The law demands that Technical Directors and employees of 
PSCs be Albanian citizens and have their permanent residence in Albania.21 International PSCs can enter into the 
Albanian market through cooperation with Albanian PSCs or Albanian individuals; Article 2, Paragraph 1 states 
that: ‘The service of guarding and physical security is done through private subjects organized in commerce 
companies by Albanian citizens or in collaboration with foreign citizens’. Currently there are no joint ventures 
involving foreign PSCs and individuals. In general it appears that the laws concerning PSCs are enforced, both 
by PSCs and the institutions of the State Police. The few instances of not obeying the law consist of employees 
serving without uniform and, more rarely, without the personal license. Cases like this were discovered by police 
controls and the respective PSCs were fined.  Fines for breaking laws range from €800 to €1800. Additionally a 
Technical Director can receive a personal fine of between €150 and €400.  
5.2 Use of force and firearms
The majority of security guards are not armed with firearms. More commonly a guard carries a rubber baton 
and a radio for communication with the operations room or Technical Director. Firearms are typically only issued 
to rapid response squads, guards that patrol in banks or guards on close protection duty. The weapons most 
commonly used by security guards are Kalashnikov assault rifles and TT pistols. Article 9 of the law states that: 
‘The Technical Director and the serving employee are provided with weapons, ammunition and special tools for 
performing the service of guarding and physical security. The type and amount of weapons, of ammunition and 
special tools are determined by the order of the Minister of Public Order’.22 Although Technical Directors and 
bodyguards can carry concealed weapons, and commonly do so, they are not allowed to buy their own firearms. 
The police supply and register all firearms that PSCs carry. In the case of paralytic weapons (e.g. sprays), a PSC 
has to gain special permission from the police for their use, purchase the weapon and then report the purchase 
to the police. Weapons are registered both to the employer and to the individual guard(s) who use them. Guards 
are not permitted to use their own weapons for work. 
21 Law No 8770, dated 19 April 2001, ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’, Article 2, Paragraph 2.
22 Ibid, Paragraph 3.
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The law on PSCs does not cover storage methods, but PSCs must observe the same general laws and norms that 
regulate the use and storage of SALW held by the state police and military forces. Some of the regulations and 
norms are specified in a manual prepared for PSCs by the State Police, which states that ‘weapons are secured in 
armouries and safes’. The general practice is for weapons and ammunition to be stored together on the company 
premises and a register to be kept. Some companies also have internal regulations on storage, and the larger 
companies are generally thought to maintain good storage standards. In practice however, since most companies 
do not have many registered weapons (for example, Ro-GAT has 100 guards but only 6 registered weapons), it is 
apparently commonplace for weapons to be handed over to the next guard at the end of a shift without going into 
storage. In some cases guards also take weapons, especially pistols, home. This is particularly true for some of 
the smaller PSCs that have no headquarters as such, but work primarily through radio communication.23 This is 
also a matter of some concern as it means that the weapons issued to guards are not under the control of the 
company at all times.
Several administrators and technical directors of PSCs interviewed during this research expressed an opinion 
that the weapons currently in use by PSCs are not suitable for security work. They advocated the replacement of 
Kalashnikov assault rifles with weapons that are less cumbersome to carry and of a lower calibre. 
PSC staff are instructed in the industry manual provided for them by the MoPo to use force to the minimal extent 
possible.24 The guidance given with respect to the use of firearms is that they may be used in ‘extreme cases’ 
for the protection of the guard’s life, other lives, or to prevent the destruction of property and goods they guard. 
However, according to PSC staff interviewed for this research, the legislation governing PSCs would benefit from 
further clarification and elaboration on the use and handling of firearms. 25
In recent years however there have been no reported cases in the media where PSC employees have abused 
human rights, with the exception of cases wherein they have committed major crimes when off duty; for example 
on 23 January 2005 a PSC employee living in Shkoza, 6 km away from Tirana was involved in a fight over rights 
to a property and shot two people, killing one and wounding the other.26 However, an absence of media reports 
does not mean that human rights abuses have not been committed by PSC staff. On the whole, the media in 
Albania is only interested in high profile cases. Human rights NGOs consulted for this research did not have any 
reports pertaining specifically to excessive use of force or firearms by PSCs on record.27 It appears, however, that 
in addition to the formal PSC market there is a parallel practice in which smaller private companies who cannot 
afford or do not want to pay for a PSC, hire individuals who possess their own weapon to provide security cover. 
This is a matter of concern as these individuals are working outside the normal regulatory framework. The use 
of personal weapons, possibly illegal ones, in such cases is also highly problematic.28 Unfortunately during this 
research no further information was available on the extent or impact of such practices.  
5.3 Professionalism and training
In general, professionalism among PSC staff is not high, except for those employees who have had police or 
military training, such as Technical Directors or those employed in rapid response units. Many are pensioners 
(as the law permits their employment to the age of 65) and they are not motivated to pursue a career in the PSC 
sector. A large proportion of PSC staff have other regular jobs and are employed in PSCs on a part-time basis 
in order to boost their income. Junior staff do not have secure jobs, nor are there any trade unions to protect 
their interests. They are dependent on the Technical Directors for their training and supporting their licence 
application at the MoPo. 
23 Op cit Mane; Kacorri; Miho.
24 ‘The guard uses the minimum of necessary force. This means that force is exerted immediately upon the appearance of circumstances 
that make its use necessary and the exertion of force stops immediately with the disappearance of those circumstances. The scale and 
intensity of the force depends on the resistance and means of the adversary’. Tusha P and Softa F, Shoqerite e ruajtjes, (Europa, Tirana: 
1997), p 53.
25 Op cit Mane; Kacorri; Miho.
26 Topollaj D and Karaj V, ‘Si me qelluan per nje cope toke’, Panorama, 24 January 2005.
27 Interviews with Professor Dr Valentina Hysi, Albanian Helsinki Committee, 27 January 2005; Edmond Prifti, Albanian Human Rights Group, 
21 January 2005.
28 Op cit Hroni.
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Albanian legislation requires that, prior to receiving a licence to work at a PSC, junior staff must be trained 
by the Technical Director of a PSC for a period of 15 days, after which they must pass a test organised by the 
State Police. After the licence has been issued, guards must undergo an annual five-day training programme 
(determined each year by the State Police). The training covers legislation and regulations, PSC responsibilities 
and duties under the law, the use of weapons, the use of telecommunication equipment, basic first aid and how 
to extinguish a fire. It was not possible to ascertain the depth and quality of training on any of these topics during 
this research. Technical Directors themselves are required to have qualified at military or police academies.29  
As the training is administered by the PSCs themselves, quality varies, and there is no guarantee that the 
employees actually undergo the required training each year. While police have the right to inspect the training, 
they do not administer it and the level of monitoring carried out by the police varies from district to district.30 PSC 
Technical Directors and administrators interviewed for this research identified improved training as a priority for 
the industry. Most were of the opinion that the MoPo should establish certified courses for the PSC employees 
so as to harmonise and raise standards.
A trade association for PSCs has recently been formed, but has yet to function properly or develop binding 
regulations for its members. One PSC director referred to the association as a ‘self proclaimed’ association 
that serves only private interests. Nevertheless, if the industry wishes to promote greater professionalism, the 
association should be encouraged and expanded.
5.4 Oversight
A three-person commission within the General Directory of State Police is responsible for licensing PSCs. The 
work of PSCs is monitored by the Sector for Community Policing and the Collections of Arms in the General 
Directorate of State Police and its specialists in the various directorates of state police in the districts. This 
commission and its specialists in the District Police Directories carry out periodic inspections of PSCs, their 
documentation, and the employees during service and training sessions. The Technical Director of a PSC must 
submit a written report to this office every three months on the activity of the company.31 Company licences 
are reviewed annually by the police and if there have been irregularities, the licence is apparently not renewed. 
At the time of publication, no official figures were available to indicate whether this happens or how often. In 
2004 the Director General of Police mentioned two instances when employees of PSCs had used their weapons 
unlawfully and 57 instances of fines being given to administrators, technical directors and employees.32 The most 
frequent reasons for disciplining of PSCs in 2004 were: irregularities in documentation; employing unlicensed 
staff; personnel working without uniforms or company badges; and employees wearing uniforms while off-duty.33 
Aside from oversight by the police directorate, there do not appear to be other provisions for oversight of PSCs in 
Albania, such as the use of an Ombudsman’s office or parliamentary committees. 
6 Conclusion and recommendations
Although there are no statistics that can prove the correlation between the reduction in crime levels and the 
operation of PSCs in Albania, local analysts believe it is likely that they have made some contribution towards 
crime prevention.34 For example the installation of security cameras and the presence of private security guards 
in banks has a discouraging effect on crime, and many public institutions, such as museums, now contract PSCs 
in the belief that this will give them added protection. 
29 Law No 8770 dated 19 April 2001, ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’, Article 16.
Op cit Tusha P and Softa F.
30 Op cit Mane; Kacorri; Miho.
31 Article 17 of Law No 8770 dated 19 April 2001.
32 Speech by the Director General of State Police, 06 November 2004.
33 Op cit Zaimi. 
34 Op cit Hroni; Tusha; Caka. The crime prevention impact of PSC was also mentioned by State Police officials interviewed and in the speech 
of Director General of State Police in the meeting with administrators of PSCs on 06 December 2004.
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With the expansion of the Albanian economy, it is expected that the number 
of PSCs will grow. Many established PSCs have predicted the need for stricter 
regulations as the private security market becomes increasingly crowded. 
For example, it has been suggested that all companies be required to have 
an operation room or base equipped with communication devices. At present 
many PSCs lack this technology. The administrators of the largest and most 
established PSCs have a confident outlook about the future of the sector and 
speak of investing in their businesses, both by bringing the latest equipment 
into Albania and by training their staff. Another rapidly expanding sector is the 
sale of protection equipment. Some PSCs have argued that the law should 
be amended to allow them to purchase non-lethal weapons, such as nerve-
paralytic gas sprays. This is a matter that should be addressed with some care 
- if these and other weapons such as electric stun guns are issued they should 
be used only as an alternative to the use of firearms and not a lesser weapon 
that could be used more indiscriminately. However, a potential barrier to the 
long-term development and consolidation of the industry and the increase 
in technical and professional knowledge is the cap on the size of companies 
relative to the number of police in a district. While the purpose of the law is 
laudable – protecting the relative power of the public security sector in the 
face of a growing private one – an unintended consequence may be that that 
consolidation does not occur because companies cannot afford to bring in 
improvements while their size is restricted. As suggested below, alternative methods should therefore be sought 
to both contain the sector’s growth relative to the public sector and raise standards simultaneously.
6.1 Main recommendations 
n Law enforcement agencies should pay increased attention to the practice of hiring armed individuals rather 
than licensed PSCs to secure property and fully enforce the law in this area.
n Further clarification and elaboration is needed on the law governing handling and usage of firearms by PSCs 
in order to close loopholes and limit their possession and use.
n The use of assault rifles (Kalashnikovs) by security guards should be phased out. 
n PSC storage practices should be reviewed with a view to ensuring that registered SALW remain in company 
stores when not in use and that handovers between staff are correctly documented.
n The laws on storage of SALW and ammunition by PSCs should be amended, and a requirement for the two 
to be stored separately introduced.
n The MoPo should develop a system of certified training courses for PSC employees, which would encourage 
the development of a well-trained security guard profession. Particular attention should be given to training 
guards in the minimal use of force and firearms, consistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
n Joint working agreements between PSCs and the police should be introduced as standard, so as to clarify 
the exact roles and responsibilities of both parties and thereby reduce the incentives for the two sectors to 
enter into competition.
n The PSC industry should consider strengthening the professional trade association to ensure that it is fully 
functioning and work towards developing an industry-wide code of conduct.
n In order to raise standards and combat corruption in procurement, the government should establish a set of 
standards and requirements for PSCs that wish to be considered for contracts for securing major public sites 
and buildings.
n The government should review the cap on the size of PSCs since it currently acts as a barrier to 
professionalisation of the industry. Other options such as imposing limits on the overall size of the industry, 
or providing exemptions to proven firms on the basis of objective criteria could be considered.
n Oversight should be improved by empowering parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman to scrutinise 
the conduct of PSCs and handle public complaints.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 Background to the privatization of security
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) suffered more damage and loss of life during the 
conflicts of the early 1990s than any other successor state of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).1 Following the 1995 Dayton Agreement, 
international peacekeeping forces - first under NATO auspices and then from 
December 2004 as the European Union Stabilisation Force (EUFOR) - have 
enhanced security to a great degree. By 2004 the United Nations announced 
that half of the estimated two million people displaced from their homes had 
returned to their communities, three quarters of them to the Federation of 
Bosnia Herzegovina (FBiH) and one quarter to the Republika Srpska (RS).
Yet although security continues to improve, in many areas ethnic divisions continue to frustrate a proper 
rehabilitation process. The reality is that ten years after the end of a war that displaced half the population, 
BiH is still struggling to overcome strong political and ethnic tensions. One burdensome legacy of the 1995 
peace settlement is a complex constitutional structure in which BiH is divided into two semi-autonomous entities 
comprising the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in turn consisting of ten cantons), and the Republika 
Srpska, a single administrative unit. Political, bureaucratic and often ethnic differences make the operation of 
this structure difficult at times, creating significant challenges for eventual integration into the EU and NATO. At 
least until very recently, major reforms in the defence, rule of law and public administration sectors which are 
of pressing importance for national development and peace-building, have tended to be driven by the Office of 
the High Representative, the international office with unprecedented executive powers charged with overseeing 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. A bureaucratic regulatory framework and 
parallel Entity structures also contribute to the country’s economic problems, with 20% of the population living 
below the poverty line, and domestic and international investment remaining low.2
PSCs first emerged in Bosnia in 1995, immediately after the wars. The first company known to have operated in 
the country was a Croat-owned firm ‘Soko’, that started up in 1995. The first PSC of Bosnian origin was BLOC, 
which began operating in 1996.3  It is perhaps unsurprising that today the industry’s structure reflects the legal 
structure and workings of the country as a whole, the industry being regulated not at the national, but only at 
Entity and Cantonal levels. This system makes it highly impractical for a firm to obtain the multiple registrations 
necessary to operate legally across Entities. In the case of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), 
where administration is further devolved to Cantonal level for implementation, it is also difficult to work across 
Cantons. According to current records only one firm in FBiH, ‘Alarm West’, has a cross-Cantonal spread of work. 
Despite the difficult regulatory environment, the market has expanded considerably in the past ten years with a 
growing number of PSCs becoming registered in the country. According to official figures there are currently 41 
companies operating across BiH employing around 2,000 people.4 The biggest names in the industry are GAMA, 
BIGA, Alarm West, IPON, Sword, Laufer, Cipos 007 and Sector Security. Unlike many other countries in the region 
where PSCs predominantly operate in major business centres, there is considerable diversity in the location 
where companies work. Decentralised government and ethnic segregation are major factors in determining this 
geographical spread of activity. The list below shows the locations where the major firms in BiH operate.
1 Estimates of the total number of casualties range from around 150,000 to 250,000. See e.g. BBC News Online BiH Country Profile, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1066886.stm accessed 05 May 2005.
2 Country profile, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarke
t/Xcelerate/ShowPageandc=Pageandcid=1007029394365anda=KCountryProfileandaid=1019233782245, accessed 28 July 2005.
3 Interview with Muamer Bajraktarević, Cantonal Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sarajevo, 04 April 2005.
4 Information given by the Cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs in FBIH and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in RS; Interview with Duško 
Vejnovic, Professor, Advanced School for Internal Affairs in Banja Luka, 29 January 2005; op cit Bajraktarević.
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n Sarajevo:   Alarm-West, Gama Sigurnost, Cipos 07, BIGA Security, Glock Sigurnost; 
n Banja Luka:  Sector Security;
n Bihac:  Bodyguard Filekovic;
n Tuzla:  Puma, Cobra Security; 
n Mostar:  Buntić Sekurity, Alarm West, IPON Graupa; and 
n Siroki Brijeg:  Kamir, Delta, Redarstvenik.5
As discussed further below, the lack of national regulation within BiH poses major problems for the control and 
development of the industry.  This is not simply due to the quite different regulations that apply between FBiH and 
RS. There are also serious questions about the extent to which companies are linked to either organised crime 
groups or ex-warlords from the war period with related issues surrounding the enforcement of regulations. 
2 Contemporary security threats
The increasing demand for private security services in BiH has its root in rising crime rates across the country at a 
time when faith in the state security services is low, and the public feels generally insecure in a post-war context. 
The slow but constant liberalisation of the once socialist economy that has occurred in all ex-Yugoslav republics 
has also brought ever greater amounts of property into private ownership, creating the necessary conditions for 
a demand for PSCs. Theft and armed robbery are the threats that most commonly persuade clients to employ 
PSCs in BiH. Thus far there has not been a major market for close protection services.6 
In 2004 there were 28 armed robberies of post offices, banks and money transport vehicles across the entire 
country, and approximately five million convertible BiH marks (KM) in cash was stolen. Police clear-up rates are 
low in both Entities. Of the 13 armed robberies in RS, only four cases were solved, while in FBiH, only six of 15 
cases were solved.7 Although commercial clients are the main employers for PSCs, fear of theft also causes some 
private citizens to employ PSCs to provide static security for their apartments out of fear of break-in. Additional 
motives for using private security companies include a lack of faith in the state security sector’s ability to protect 
property, a fear of losing property that was illegally gained, and to collect unpaid debts.8 
The range of threats above was generally considered to be serious by most interviewees consulted for this 
research. Official statistics provided by the FBiH authorities indicate that the rate of violent crime there is lower 
than the European average, but rising (see table below).9 However, there seems to be little difference in the crime 
rate in those areas where security companies are operating and those where they are not present. This correlation 
could be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, it may be that PSCs are not doing a good job. Secondly (and more 
probably), it is possible that private security companies are more likely to operate in areas experiencing high 
crime and that they are actually having a positive impact.10 Third, it may be that the use of PSCs is an effective 
deterrent only at those sites where they are in use, but that this is having a displacement effect on crime within 
cantons, making it more likely that neighbouring sites are targeted by criminals with the same net result in terms 
of recorded crimes. It is difficult to come to any firm conclusions on this question since the validity of these 
figures is undermined both by the fact that court statistics are widely believed to underestimate the level of 
crime, and the fact that the general public tend to report crimes reluctantly.11
5 Interviews with Mirsad Jašarević, Executive Director of Sicra Security, Sarajevo, 13 January 2005; Marinko Buntić, Owner of Puma-Buntić 
Security, 26 January 2005; Lazar Stupar, Head of the Police Department in RS, 01 February 2005.
6 Op cit Jašarević.
7 Karić S and Muminović D, ‘Thieves took more than 5 Million KM’, The Independent newspaper, 16 January 2005, pp 12 - 13.
8 Interview with Mirsad Abazović, Professor, Faculty of Criminal Sciences, Sarajevo, Security Department, 31 January 2005.
9 Official information from Cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs.
10 Data does not include Una-Sana, Mostar and West Herzegovina Canton. 
11 Op cit Abazovic; Vejnovic.
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Table 1: Number of reported criminal incidents in FbiH.
CRIMINAL ACTS 2002 2003 2004
Theft 1,057 2,010 2,139
Serious Theft 7,696 8,234 11,138
Robbery 241 364 577
Frauds 163 219 240
Violent Behaviour 180 192 219
Source: Official information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the FBIH.12
An increase in the availability of firearms in BiH is one of the main reasons that the armed robbery rate is on the 
increase. All evidence points towards the continued widespread presence of substantial numbers of firearms 
throughout BiH. While pre-war statistics on registered firearms indicated that there was almost one firearm for 
every ten members of the public, the figure is now higher.13 It is impossible to accurately estimate the quantity of 
firearms and military equipment that entered BiH during the war, but the figure is believed to be high. As routine 
seizures by the security forces demonstrate, many of these firearms have remained in the country after the end 
of the conflict.14 
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies 
The range of services that a private security company can provide is outlined in the respective laws on PSCs of 
the two entities in Bosnia.15 Both laws stipulate what forms of ‘physical protection’ can be provided to people and 
property, and what forms of ‘technical protection’ can be provided in the form of static security systems such as 
burglar alarms and surveillance equipment. The laws do not allow for street patrols by PSCs.16 PSCs are mainly 
employed to protect locations such as apartments, businesses and premises. It is quite rare for private citizens to 
employ PSCs for personal security and according to research conducted for this report only around five per cent of 
households employ PSCs for protection.17 The vast bulk of the industry is therefore directed at commercial or official 
premises, key employers being the banking sector, the manufacturing industry, the retail sector, international 
NGOs, local embassies and the entertainment industry.18 Embassies and the international agencies operating 
in Bosnia comprise the key international customers of private security companies. Embassies and international 
organizations known to employ private security companies include the embassies of Germany, Saudi Arabia, 
Norway, Poland, Greece, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the British Council, Hope International, SOROS 
and CRA. The Office of the High Representative, however, chooses to directly employ its own security staff.19
12 Data from the RS was only provided for 2003.
13 In 1989 there were 342,131 firearms registered in BiH. In 2003 there were 345,365. Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), July 2004, p 19 - 21. 
14 A senior representative of the FBiH Ministry of Interior stated that the number of illegal firearms in FBiH is likely to be three times that of 
legal firearms. Op cit BICC, p 23. Seizure patterns indicate a similar spread of ownership across the whole of BiH.
15 ‘Law on Agencies for Protection of People and Property and Private Detective Work’, Article 4, Official Gazette in Republic of Srpska No 
50/2002; and The ‘Law on Agencies of Protection of People and Property’ Article 4, Official Gazette in FBiH, Year IX, No 50, 14 October 
2002.
16 ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property in the FBiH’; ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property and private 
detective work in the RS’.
17 Interview with Mustafa Galijatovic, General Director of Gama and Security, 06 February 2005; op cit Buntić.
18 Interviews with Dragan Talić, Executive Director for the Security Sector, Banja Luka, 25 January 2005; Valdin Jazičić, Person in Charge of 
Alarm West Security, 10 February 2005; op cit Buntić; Jasarevic.
19 Interview with Admir Nezirović, former person in charge of Sword Security, 14 January 2005; op cit Buntić.;
20
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
Although employment of PSCs by international agencies and foreign embassies is significant, the vast bulk of the 
private security industry is employed by the commercial sector, and the financial sector in particular. Financial 
institutions employing PSCs include Central Profit Banka, CBS Bank, Universal Bank, Prokredit Bank, Nova Banka 
and Investicijska Banka FBiH. Other companies that also employ PSCs include ABD engineering, Alfa computers, 
ASA, Bata, Benetton, Coca-Cola HBC BH and Don cafe as well as shopping centres (VF, Merkator, Robot, Vistafon, 
Sam Shop). Private security agencies are also employed to provide security at sporting and cultural events in BiH, 
and cafés, bars nightclubs.20 Because of the industry’s client base, PSCs are primarily active in the larger towns 
and the urban areas of the country.
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
The majority of PSC staff working in BiH are either former members of the military or police services, and to this 
extent, links obviously exist between the two sectors.21  Working agreements of an informal nature have been 
reached in the past between PSCs and the police in cases where the police service has agreed to accompany 
valuable goods and money shipments on a contractual basis for the needs of legal persons and banks,22 (e.g. 
Zagrebačka banka BH D.D Tuzla, Univerzal banka D.D Sarajevo, Tuzlanska banka and others). Individual officers 
do not benefit personally from this type of arrangement, nor are there known cases of serving police officers 
working as security guards while off-duty.
The majority of those interviewed for this study refused to comment on whether more systematic links exist 
between PSCs and traditional security actors, making it difficult to establish the reality. Of those who were 
willing to discuss the issue, a number alleged that strong connections between PSCs and military or government 
officials do exist, in some cases offering up the apparent failure of the police to implement checks on some 
companies (see below) as evidence of the existence of such unofficial and illegal relationships.23 The existence 
of a connection between a PSC and the former director of the Federal Intelligence Agency and his deputy has, 
however, been publicly discussed and confirmed in interviews with PSC directors. The mode in which a number 
of PSCs were established during the 1990s, and the areas in which they were permitted to operate, is believed 
by several interviewees to provide further evidence of such connections. For example, the Sarajevo firm CIPOS 
was established with a remit to operate within those territories with a Bosniak majority, while IPON from Mostar 
was provided with a remit to operate in those territories with a Croat majority.24
4.2 Political affiliations
It was also alleged during interviews for this research that a number of security companies have connections with 
political parties in BiH, although at least in FBiH the law forbids PSCs offering services to political parties. It should 
however be noted that the source for some of these accusations were PSC directors whose accusations might be 
designed to damage the reputation of competitive PSCs. For example, the director of one company in Sarajevo 
claimed during an interview that there are connections between the agency PUMA–Buntic from Mostar, and 
the Croatian Democrat Union party (HDZ). The director of PUMA–Buntic denied these claims when interviewed, 
stressing that he personally asked the US embassy in BiH to check the establishment and work of this company. 
He further stated, ‘the case here is that some people are conspiring against me and my company’.25 A further 
example of the links between PSCs and traditional security structures was provided by ‘Redarstvenik’, a security 
20 Op cit Talić; Buntić; Jasarevic; Galijatovic; Jazičić.
21 Salary differentials between PSC staff and the police actually favor this transition. The average salary for a police officer in BiH is 500 KM, 
while the average salary of a junior Private Security Guard is anywhere between 550 and 600 KM and the salary for senior staff is between 
700 and 800 KM.
22 Information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Zenica-Doboj Canton, Letter No 08-02/3-04-12-450-1/05/MA, from 28 January 2005. 
Also correspondence with Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Tuzla Canton.
23 Op cit Galijatović.
24 Op cit Buntić.
25 Ibid.
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company that was created by the former Military Police of ‘Herzeg Bosna’ during the conflict.26 Employees of this 
company still wear the police uniforms that were formerly worn by the police of the former republic of ‘Herzeg 
Bosna’.27 In this case the company has chosen to be quite explicit about its political/ethnic ties and represents 
a worrying example of the establishment of a company along ethnic lines. 
4.3 Ethnic affiliations
As noted above, the contemporary structure of the private security market in BiH reflects the legal structure and 
workings of the country as a whole, the industry being regulated not at national, but only entity and cantonal level. 
This reflects the underlying ethnic division of the country at large, which was consolidated during the conflicts of 
the 1990s and remains largely intact. As a result, firms operate within one or other entity and typically employ 
a single-ethnicity workforce. While the regulatory system for PSCs is, like much else in the country, a reflection 
of the course of the conflicts of the 1990s, it can be argued that this division not only follows but also to some 
extent perpetuates an ethnic separation in the industry that stands in the way of more efficient and professional 
working practices and the consolidation and maturation of the industry.
4.4 Organised crime affiliations
Clearly in a situation of economic liberalisation, growth in private security provision, and weak state oversight, 
the private security sector represents an attractive target for organised criminal groups and networks. However, 
due to the sensitivity of this topic it is very difficult to find direct evidence of connections between private security 
companies and organised criminal groups and networks. Several interviewees, most of whom wished to remain 
anonymous, did allege that organised criminal groups have established PSCs in order to create a cover to assist 
them when running protection rackets and other illegal acts.28 Fears were also expressed that members of 
criminal groups could use PSC accreditation in order to obtain legal permission to carry weapons. Recently, a 
series of raids conducted by EUFOR across BiH uncovered illegal stores of firearms, ammunition, and explosives 
on the premises of several PSCs.29 Such stockpiles are clear indications that some PSCs possess significant 
quantities of material designed for criminal ends rather than security provision. 
5 Regulation and conduct of PSCs
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
As explained above, there is at present no national regulatory system for PSCs in Bosnia. Rather, regulation 
has been devolved to the Entity level and, in the case of FBiH, implementation of laws and regulations has 
been further devolved to the cantonal level. The two laws regulating private security companies in Bosnia are 
the ‘Law on Agencies for Protection of People and Property’ in FBiH30 and the ‘Law on the Protection of People 
and Property and Private Detective Work in RS’.31 Although the adoption of the respective laws in 2002 was a 
necessary and positive step in regulating the private security sector in both FBiH and RS, there are significant 
variations between the two laws, which means there is a strong argument for the introduction of national level 
regulations. The lack of a single over-arching law also causes problems when it comes to the carrying of weapons 
by security guards since, for example, an agency that has a weapon registered in the Sarajevo Canton, cannot 
legally carry that weapon into the territory of another canton.32
26 The short-lived statelet declared by Bosnian Croat nationalists during the war.
27 Interview with anonymous PSC director, Sarajevo, February 2005.
28 Interviews with current and former PSC staff, January 2005.
29 EUFOR searched three PSCs in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar on 28 July 2005; source: Dnevni Avaz, Nezavisine Novine, 29 July 
2005.
30 Official Gazette of the FBiH, Year IX, No 50, 14 October 2002.
31 Official Gazette of Republic of Srpska No 50/2002.
32 Interview with Elmedin Muratbegović, member of the commission for creating the Law for the Agencies for Protection of People and 
Property, as well as sub-legal provisions for implementing the Law; op cit Jazičić; Bajraktarević; Nezirović; Galijatovic; Buntić; Talić.
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In both FBiH and RS a company that intends to offer protection services to people and property can only be 
established by a legal domestic company or a Bosnian national. The restriction on non-Bosnian nationals working 
in PSCs would have to be removed if Bosnia were to enter the EU. In both FBiH and RS, those applying to 
establish a PSC must fulfil a number of requirements, such as: a minimum of five employees possessing valid 
licenses to perform security duties (FBiH only); the possession of suitable technical knowledge and equipment; 
and possessing business premises suitable for security work. Both founders and employees are also barred from 
this form of work if they are under criminal investigation,33 are convicted criminals, are medically unfit, have been 
prevented from joining the police force by the Commissar of the IPTF,34 or have been discharged from military 
service by COMSFOR/COMEUFOR.35 
The available evidence on the extent to which the laws and regulations governing PSCs in BiH are implemented 
is mixed at best. Some industry representatives argue that the low number of cases of public prosecutions 
against PSCs is evidence that companies are law-abiding.36 However, media reports indicate that this may not be 
the case. Most companies do not appear to have adequate premises or posses appropriate equipment such as 
the specialised armoured vehicles for money transportation that the laws require. For example, when a robbery 
occurred at the beginning of August 2004 in Godusa, resulting in the loss of �80,000 and 30,000KM from the 
Raiffeisen Bank under the protection of CIPOS 007, employees were found to have taken the cheaper option of 
transporting the money in a private vehicle from Teočak to Sapna.37 
There are also incidents on record where PSCs have operated in geographical areas outside the remit of their 
licenses. Most commonly this involves the transfer of money between FBiH and RS by companies that are 
only registered to operate in one of the two Entities. This is illegal as the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MIA) does not issue permits for companies to escort money between entities.38 For example on 01 December 
2004 2,047,000 KM was stolen from the Raiffaisen Bank in the largest robbery to have taken place in BiH. 
The money was at the time being transported in a bullet-proof vehicle owned by ‘Alarm West’ and ‘CIPOS 007’ 
from Sarajevo to Banja Luka.  Both these companies were registered in the FBiH, not RS. Further, a number of 
security companies apparently employ people without the appropriate legal certification from the police to work 
as security guards.39
5.2 Use of force and firearms
The use of force by PSC personnel in the FBiH is covered by Article 20 of the ‘Law on Protection of People and 
Property’,40 which states that one fifth of the personnel of a company that performs physical protection can carry 
short barrel firearms for self-protection. In RS the limitation of weaponry is regulated by Article 18 of the ‘Law on 
Agencies for Protection of People and Property and Private Detective Work’,41 which states that companies that 
perform physical protection duties are allowed to acquire approved short barrel firearms for up to 50 per cent of 
their employees. 
33 ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property in FBiH’; ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property and private 
detective work in the RS’.
34 IPTF- International Police Task Forces (OUN) - continuation of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM).
35 This request was regulated by the Law on Agencies for Protection of people and Property of FBiH, while the Law on Agencies for Protection 
of People and Property and Private Detective Work of RS does not have the same regulations. 
36 For example a case in which surplus ammunition was discovered in a check-up by carried out by the authorities was cited. Op cit 
Bajraktarević; Stupar.
37 Op cit Karić S and Muminović D. 
38 Ibid.
39 Op cit Buntić.
40 Official Gazette of FBiH, Year IX, No 50, 14 October 2002.
41 Official Gazette of Republic of Srpska No 50/2002.
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Guards are armed with 9mm weapons and the relevant laws prohibit the use of automatic weapons, bullet proof 
vests, incendiary or dum-dum bullets or silencers and state that firearms must have a barrel no longer than 
20cm.42 ‘Non-lethal’ weapons such as batons, shock guns and gas-sprays are not permitted. Guards cannot 
carry concealed firearms and all weapons have to be registered with the relevant authorities. The PSC is required 
to keep a record of the exact type of firearm being carried by each employee. Weapons are registered to the 
company and not the individual employee and when not in use should be securely stored in fireproof safes on the 
agency’s premises.43 Prior to each withdrawal or return of a weapon the employee is required to sign the weapon 
in or out of a company register. In FBiH this register is to be made available for inspection by the MIA.44 
The laws in both entities state that force is to be used only when absolutely necessary and when it is required in 
reaching the goals of law enforcement. The use of lethal force or firearms against a person by security guards is 
permitted only under the following circumstances: 45
n for the protection of life; 
n for the protection of themselves; 
n to protect the person or property that the guard is protecting from attack; 
n to prevent the escape of a person performing a criminal act against a property that the guard is protecting; or 
n if the guard is put in a critical life threatening situation. 
Prior to the use of a firearm security guards are required to warn the attacker of their intention to fire. When 
the firearm is in use the guard is responsible for the lives of other people that may be around at the time. PSCs 
are obliged to train their staff in applying the minimal use of force. The ‘Programme of Training for Acquiring a 
Certificate for Physical or Technical Protection of People or Property’ regulates such training in the FBiH.46 To date 
there have been no reported instances of this regulation being breached and excessive force used or human 
rights being abused.47 The official training programme for PSC personnel does not provide first aid training,48 but 
the agencies themselves claim to offer first aid training for their personnel. However, personnel are not equipped 
with first aid kits.49
5.3 Professionalism and training
The requirement for PSC personnel to be trained exists in both entities. In FBiH this is regulated by the handbook 
‘Training for the Acquirement of Certificate’.50 Training consists of 40 hours of theory and 10 hours of practical 
work. The Federal MIA, Faculty of Criminal Sciences and the Cantonal MIA implement the training. The final oral 
exam is based on the theoretical part of the training. As far as FBiH is concerned, it appears that the application 
of the exam is rather rigorous, with lecturers keeping track of participants’ attendance to ensure that candidates 
put in the set hours for both the theoretical and practical part of the programme.51 Persons who do not fulfil 
these requirements cannot take the exam and there have been no reported cases of cheating. Training in RS is 
42 ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property in the FBiH’; ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property and private 
detective work in the RS’.
43 Op cit Jazicic.
44 ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property in the FBiH’; ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property and private 
detective work in the RS’.
45 ‘Rulebook on the use of physical force and fire arms when performing physical protection of people and property’, Official Gazette FBIH No 
54, 02 November 2002; op cit Spahic; Vejnovic.
46 Official Gazette of FBIH No 54 from 02 November 2002 (Rulebooks).
47 Op cit Bajraktarevic; and Information given by programme coordinator Nuna Zvizdić, UG ‘Women to Women’, Sarajevo 26 January 2004.
48 ‘Programme of the training for acquiring a certificate for performing physical or technical protection of people and property’, Official 
Gazette FBiH No 54, 02 November 2002. (Rulebooks).
49 Op cit Talić; Marinko; Galijatovic; Jašarević.
50 ‘Rulebook on training for acquiring certificates for performing physical or technical protection of people or property’, Official Gazette, Year 
IX-No. 54, 02 November 2002.
51 Op cit Spahić.
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both theoretical and practical, and is provided by the MIA or persons legally authorised by the Ministry.52 Training 
in both entities covers the handling and use of firearms and restraint techniques and is based on the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.53
In FBiH internal regulation of PSCs is guided by a rulebook, the ‘Rule of Order and Behaviour of staff and workers 
from the companies’. This rulebook contains: working times, rules for behaviour, the borrowing and returning of 
weapons, arrival and departure from work, shifts timetable, the colour of the uniform, the internal set-up and 
the structure of personnel.54 International companies and embassies which engage local PSC personnel for their 
protection do not require that the personnel be trained according to any specific criteria as part of their contract 
tendering process.
A number of interviewees consulted for this research were of the opinion that PSC staff generally exhibit a 
good degree of professionalism in their work.55 One example of good conduct was offered to the research team 
by interviewees – the attempted theft of vehicles from the New Banja Luka Bank some months ago. Media 
reports of the incident state that, ‘workers56 were not in a panic state and were able to control the situation in a 
calm manner and asked other employees to activate the alarm and reported the incident to the Prijedor Police 
Station’.57 
5.4 Oversight
There are at present no provisions for Parliamentary oversight of PSCs in BiH, however within the Ministry 
of Security (MoS) there is now a Working Group considering legislative options for the regulation of PSCs.58 
Responsibility for PSCs currently resides with the Federal MIA and Cantonal MIA in FBiH.59 In the RS the Municipality 
Centres of Public Security are responsible for company registration while the MIA is responsible for monitoring 
implementation. Authorised officials of the FBiH MIA perform duties such as checking: the legality of the each 
PSC, the implementation of prescribed protection and security measures, the business premises, registration 
and business documentation, technical equipment and the management and safe keeping of firearms and 
ammunition.60 The Ministry also has oversight responsibilities with regard to PSCs’ use of firearms. If a security 
guard discharges a registered weapon, he is required to inform the closest police station. In addition the guard 
is required to write a written report and submit it to his superior at the agency. The agency subsequently submits 
the report to the authorized prosecutors office and the MIA.61 Police also have additional responsibilities in 
relation to contracts and commercial liability. All contracts between PSCs and their clients have to be submitted 
to the relevant police bodies that are responsible for monitoring compliance.62
Until recently there has been very little evidence that security personnel regard the supervision of PSCs as a 
priority. The 28 July 2005 raids on PSCs across BiH marked an important turning point as EUFOR took decisive 
action against PSCs engaged in illegal activities in both the Federation and the RS.63 Despite this encouraging 
52 Dr Vejnovic D and Sikman M, ‘Place and role of legal and sub-legal regulation of agencies for the safe keeping of people and property and 
private detective work’, Defendology, (Association of Defendologists of RS, May 2004), p 27.
53 Corrrespondence with Denis Hadzovic, Centre for Security Studies, 26 July 2005.
54 Op cit Talić; Jasarevic.
55 Interviews with Nuna Zvizdic, Programme Co-ordinator NGO ‘Women to Women’, 26 January 2005; Jasminko Đapo, Person in Charge of 
the Security Department HVB- Central profit banke, January 2005.
56 Interviews with PSC staff, January 2005.
57 Dnevni Avaz, 26 January 2005, p 27.
58 Correspondence with Vjekoslav Vukovic; Assistant Minister of Security, 29 July 2005
59 Individual Cantonal ministries take responsibility for registering companies.
60 ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property in the FBiH’ and ‘Law on agencies for protection of people and property and private 
detective work in the RS’. Op cit Jazičić; Bajraktarević;  Nezirović; Galijatovic; Buntić; Talić. 
61 ‘Law on Agencies for Protection of People and Property and Private Detective Work of RS’, Article 24. Also Law on agencies for protection 
of people and property in the FBiH and Law on agencies for protection of people and property and private detective work in the RS.
62 Op cit Galijatovic; Buntić; Talić; Đapo.
63 EUFOR searched three PSCs in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar on 28 July 2005; source: Dnevni Avaz, Nezavisine Novine, 29 July 
2005.
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and aggressive change in tactics, there remain a range of problems at all stages in the oversight process, 
from company registration, through to background checks and, at least until recently, the routine inspection of 
operators. For example, because of disagreements between the Sarajevo Cantonal MIA and the Federation MIA, 
the former has not issued an official ID for PSC personnel even though the law demands that the ID must be 
visible while private security guards are working. The MIA in RS has not as yet performed any certification of PSC 
personnel.64 A number of those interviewed also expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness of the police 
in carrying out background checks on PSC personnel. One source, who wished to remain anonymous, claimed 
that some ‘criminals’ can acquire certification of no prior criminal convictions from the police and that there have 
been cases where the mafia has gained such certification by using threats. It also appears that the performance 
checks which the new PSC laws require police to carry out are not being conducted routinely – for example, since 
the new PSC law was introduced in FBiH in 2002, Agency Puma has been inspected only once, in March 2004. 
Other agencies have yet to be inspected at all.65 
6 Conclusion and recommendations
This study has outlined a number of areas in which regulation and oversight of the private security sector is 
necessary in BiH. Firstly, it is vital that the laws governing the industry at the entity level are at a minimum 
harmonised, or better still, replaced by national laws. The existence of a BiH Working Group to consider legislative 
options for PSCs is a positive sign that the status quo will not be tolerated. There was virtual unanimity among those 
interviewed that at the moment the industry is not suitably regulated or overseen. The majority of PSC directors 
in both entities stressed that there is almost no regulation and that which is carried out is usually symbolic in 
nature. This lack of effective oversight enables many agencies to work illegally, including the employment by 
some agencies of staff with criminal records. 
In a context of ongoing police reform and downsizing, this means that the country’s 22,000 public sector security 
staff are faced with an ever larger private sector to oversee. Unfortunately there is still insufficient information 
about the industry. Many PSC staff approached for this research were suspicious and not willing to speak, while 
the general public and the media appear to have little interest in the topic. It seems that many government 
officials share this lack of interest, which accounts in part for the poor oversight of the sector.  As in most other 
countries in the region, no consideration has been given so far to further oversight of the industry by institutions 
such as the national parliament. The industry also has some way to go in terms of self-regulation, and the more 
forward-looking operators should themselves begin working towards agreement on a code of conduct. However, 
given the substantial powers that international actors possess in BiH, in a situation where the state is unwilling 
or unable to introduce a high level of accountability or scrutiny, the sector’s clients should be insisting on more 
professional standards among the agencies they employ.
6.1 Main recommendations
n The authorities in both Entities should step up their efforts with respect to PSC oversight, re-visiting the 
question of PSC registration and inspection. Where necessary, assistance should be sought from international 
sources in difficult cases.
n The RS authorities should undertake to complete the certification of all PSCs operating within their jurisdiction 
at the earliest opportunities, denying licenses to operators who do not meet entity and international standards 
wherever appropriate.
n There is a need to reform the current oversight procedure throughout the whole of BiH and ensure companies 
work in a lawful manner, particularly but not exclusively, in regard to the use of force and firearms. 
64 Interview with Taib Spahić, Police Academy of FBiH, 28 January 2005; op cit Galijatovic; Buntić; Talić; Jasarevic; Jazičić; Bajraktarević; 
Nezirović.
65 Ibid.
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• As a first step, an adequate legal framework for the regulation and oversight of PSCs should be put in 
place at the state level. Any such legislation should be harmonised with international standards and EU 
norms.
• This should be followed by a transfer of responsibility for oversight of the sector to the state-level MoS.
n The recent aggressive ‘search and seize’ operations conducted by EUFOR are a positive sign that operational 
oversight is being enhanced. While these operations are a good start, it is vital that local law enforcement 
agencies pursue a similar approach and that the judicial process is utilised to prosecute those who violate 
the law.
n The training curricula currently in use should be reviewed to ensure that adequate coverage is given to first 
aid.
n The PSC industry should itself create a professional code of conduct and an associated professional 
association in order to have greater but equal competition. Donors and clients should support any such 
efforts.
n The police and PSCs should sign legally binding working agreements to clearly distinguish their mutual roles 
during joint operations.
n Supplementary oversight methods, in particular the use of parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman’s 
office, should be established and supported.
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Bulgaria
1 Background to the privatization of security
With the end of the communist regime in 1990, Bulgaria began the long and 
sometimes painful process of establishing a market economy and liberal 
democratic political system. Many of the political and economic reforms that 
the transition required have proven difficult, particularly during the early to mid 
1990s when the economy, national administration and security sector were 
simultaneously being reformed. This resulted in a period of extended physical and 
economic insecurity for the country’s citizens caused by inflation, unemployment, 
corruption, high crime rates, and acute periods of political instability. 
From around 1998 however, the overall political and economic situation in Bulgaria gradually stabilised. Having 
successfully achieved NATO membership in 2003, Bulgaria is also firmly on a path towards EU integration. 
While accession is dependent on further consolidation of a market economy, democratic practices and the firm 
establishment of administrative and judicial capacities needed to enforce EU laws, with recent EU evaluation 
reports commending the reforms undertaken to date, accession is now expected in early 2007. Meanwhile, the 
country’s performance with respect to elections, the rule of law, the independence of the press, the quality of law 
making and the honesty of the public services continues to be closely monitored by the EU.
PSCs began operating in Bulgaria during the early 1990s at a time when the state was abdicating ever more 
responsibilities for the maintenance of public order in the face of budget shortages and privatization programmes 
which caused the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to withdraw protection from all manner of production and commercial 
facilities.1  For most of that decade the word ‘private security guard’ or ‘ohranitel’, had a negative connotation in 
Bulgaria, because of a perception that such companies were involved in extortion, racketeering, and organised 
crime. This image gradually changed after 1998, when a critical mass of legitimate companies started to 
dominate the sector. This was partly due to substantial staffing cuts in the Bulgarian military, following which 
many former officers started working in or set up their own private security firms.
An understanding of the period prior to 1998 is important in order to provide a context to subsequent developments. 
The history of private security provision in Bulgaria can be divided into four distinct periods. The first, between 
1990 -1994, was marked by the engagement of PSCs in racketeering and extortion activities, as well as various 
other organised crime businesses. During the second period when regulation was first introduced, between 
1994-1998, criminal PSCs were denied private security licences and consequently registered as insurance 
companies, through which they were able to continue racketeering and extortion activities.2 From 1998 - 2000, 
the majority of these ‘former-PSCs-turned-insurance-companies’ had their insurance company licenses revoked 
and gradually turned to other activities.3 The record since 2001 has been marked by the increased legitimacy of 
PSCs and the growth of public confidence in their operations. 
The industry is now extremely well developed with both nationally and internationally owned companies operating 
in Bulgaria.4 The vast majority of PSCs are, however, nationally owned. There are at least 1,000 firms working in 
Bulgaria providing some form of security coverage, employing around 130,000 personnel between them.5 The 
1 Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis Between the Security Sector and Organised Crime in South East Europe, Centre for Study of 
Democracy, Sofia, 2004, p13.
2 The first legislation covering the sector was introduced in 1994, Ordinance I-14 of the MoI. Correspondence with Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 
26 July 2005.
3 The Interior Minister, Bogomil Bonev, was behind the effort that led to the revocation of the insurance licences of all companies that used 
illegal means to impose their services on clients. ‘Bonev Bans the ‘Bad Guys’ from Insuring’, Capital, Issue 37, 1998.
4 For example, ‘Group 4 Securitas/Bulgaria’, a subsidiary of the company Group 4 Securicor, which is in turn owned by the Danish company 
Falk, the second largest security firm in the world.
5 MoI personnel have quoted figures of 1,500 - 1,600 in various public statements. However, the number 1,000 was supplied to the 
researchers in correspondence with Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 26 July 2005, based on statistics provided by the National Social Insurance 
Institute.
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number of staff employed by each PSC varies greatly from company to company, depending on the company’s 
range of activities and area of operation. For example, EGIDA-Sofia and Scorpio each have about 1,800 employees, 
while Pleven Security Group Ltd. has only 250 employees.6 The larger PSCs generally employ between 1,000 and 
3,000 staff, the mid-range companies between 300 and 700, while the small companies generally have fewer 
than 200 employees (a large number of small private security companies have less than 100 employees). The 
percentage of those staff that actually work as security guards varies depending on the amount of static-security 
or close protection services offered by the firm.
Group 4 Securitas/Bulgaria is the largest international 
company in the country with a well-established position in the 
market. The company has a higher level of professionalism 
than many small security companies and, unlike most of its 
Bulgarian competitors, its staff consist of individuals with 
similar backgrounds (police and military) and training. Indeed, 
most of the security guards working for Group 4 Securitas/ 
Bulgaria are former police officers.
In addition to private PSCs, there are a number of security 
companies in which the state has a controlling share. Various 
government agencies own these companies. Examples include EGIDA-Sofia, which is owned by the city of Sofia, 
and ‘MOBA’, which is owned by the Ministry of Defence. These security companies have the same operational 
licence as private security companies and comprise a very important part of Bulgaria’s security sector. 
Finally, though they are still rare in Bulgaria, PMCs have started to emerge. Bulgarian military and Special Forces 
personnel are increasingly attracted by the prospect of becoming mercenaries or working abroad. For example, 
the PMC ‘Salamander’ is known to recruit mercenaries while ‘Balkan Security’ is known to have bid for contracts 
to provide military services in Iraq.7 There is at present no special law regulating the activities of PMCs.
2 Contemporary security threats
The perception of insecurity is a significant problem in Bulgaria. Although crime surveys have shown that public 
perceptions of security do not necessarily reflect reality and have more to do with political crisis and instability 
than with actual experiences of crime, studies point to chronic feelings of insecurity among most Bulgarian 
citizens even if this perception is largely unfounded.8 This factor is key in explaining the growth of the private 
security sector, which has drawn upon the public’s fear of crime to increase its business from the early 1990s 
onwards.
According to the international crime victimisation survey (of 1,200 households) conducted in Bulgaria by UNICRI 
(United Nations Interregional Institute on Criminal Justice) in 2002, the burglary rate (2%) is lower than those 
in most developed Western countries, such as England and Wales (2.8%), Canada (2.3%), Belgium (2.8%), the 
Netherlands (2.7%).9 The number of businesses and commercial enterprises suffering from burglary is, however, 
considerably higher - 37% of respondents to a Gallup/UNICRI survey among 532 businesses in Sofia replied that 
burglary ‘was the most serious crime’ of which they were victims. About 32% of business in Bulgaria has had 
some sort of crime committed on their premises. The perception that burglary is the most serious crime explains 
the increase in employment of private security firms by Bulgarian business. ‘Theft by outsiders’ (14%) and ‘theft 
from vehicles’ (13%) are the two other most serious crimes of which businesses in Sofia have become victims. 
Only 9% of businesses believe that intimidation or extortion were common practices in their line of business 
(compared to 18% in Bucharest, and 7% in Budapest, 8% in Vilnius, or 17% in Zagreb). The most common type of 
intimidation is extortion for money - 69%. About 11% of business respondents think that ‘requests for protecting 
6 The Bulgarian Security portal, http://www.security-bg.com, accessed 15 February 2005.
7 ‘Balkan Security Enters in Iraq’, Monitor, 01 September 2003.
8 Bezlov T and Gounev P, Crime Trends in Bulgaria: Police Statistics and Victimization Surveys, Center for Study of Democracy, Sofia: 2005, 
p 20.
9  Op cit Bezlov and Gounev, p 20.
Uniformed security guards, Group 4 Securicor, 2005
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money’ are common in their line of business. About 18% of businesses in Sofia state that they have taken 
measures against crime, including burglar alarms or static protection. In this regard Sofia rates second only to 
Budapest, where 26% of businesses have taken such measures.10 
Table 1: Crime Rate in Bulgaria.11
ITEM 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of crimes 135,863 132,320 130,161 129,421
Crime rate 1,722 1,686 1,668 1,663
Crime victimization 17% N/A 14% N/A
While the available crime rate figures do not identify the rate of violent crime or crimes against the person in 
Bulgaria, they do seem to reflect a positive gradual downward trajectory in all crime. This is in keeping with the 
general stabilisation of the country following the dramatic economic changes of the 1990s. As the security 
industry has professionalised it has also helped guarantee this stabilisation in two ways. Firstly, as the efficiency 
of PSCs has increased they are better at protecting their client’s assets and in this way contributing to wider 
public safety. Secondly, as PSCs have become more professional so the number of PSCs involved in organised 
crime has decreased. 
3 The services provided by Private Security Companies
The companies interviewed offered a range of different services to their clients. The services that were commonly 
offered are:
n Personal security: Companies provide various forms of 
protection including close protection, static security (buildings, 
industrial sites, embassies etc.), security and stewarding at 
public events (concerts), transportation and processing of 
cash and valuable shipments, design, delivery, installation, 
maintenance and servicing of electronic fire alarm and CCTV 
monitoring systems; 
n Remote security: This is the fastest growing component 
of most PSCs’ business and involves the installation and 
monitoring of electronic alarms or CCTV monitoring systems 
(the Bulgarian National Police Service also offers this service, 
see below); 
n ‘Law enforcement‘ services: Some PSCs, especially but not 
exclusively those that are connected to organised criminal 
structures, are often used for semi-legal law-enforcement services. In one such ‘operation’ described 
in the media, former Deputy Prime Minister (1990) and former Defence Minister (1991 - 1992) Dimitar 
Ludjev, claimed possession of a rental property by hiring 30 bodyguards from a PSC named IN-80 and 
forcing the tenants out of an office building which he claimed they unlawfully occupied as the Sofia-region 
authorities leased the building to him.12 The lack of police presence in villages and small-towns also provides 
an opportunity for PSCs to offer policing-style services. In one village, ‘Varbitza’ where the police declined 
10 Ibid. & UNICRI and The Gallup Organization, International Crime in Business Survey, http://www.galluphu/Gallup/monitor/kutatas/ICBS-
2000en.ppt, accessed 01 March 2005.
11 Op cit Bezlov and Gounev.
12 Normally, expelling tenants from a building is the responsibility of the police following a court hearing. Instead, Mr. Ludjev hired bodyguards 
from IN-80, a company founded by a former Special Forces soldier. The police did nothing when they were called and the prosecution ordered 
a police investigation. In the next few days, the tenants decided to empty the premises. ‘Nov Izbor‘ - Took Over an Office Building the Old 
Way—with Former Berets’, Banker, 08 May 2004.
Physical security, armed security officers, 3S SOT Limited, 2005
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the mayor’s request for an increased presence, the community turned to a security firm based in nearby 
Dimitrovgrad. Every household in the village (with a population of 560) agreed to hire the firm and contribute 
one euro per month towards the €75 /month salary of bodyguards who now patrol the village at night.13 
n Debt collection: Bulgaria has quite an inefficient and slow system of debt collection and there is a backlog 
of 375 thousand debt claims worth US$ 1.1 billion. Banks and other financial institutions ‘use all other 
possible means to solve debt issues without [resorting to] the court system’.14
In the research for this report a wide range of different institutional and private employers felt the need to employ 
the services of a PSC. The customer base of the PSC market includes the following:
n Banks, both local and international (e.g. Bulbank, HVB, The Bulgarian-American Investment Fund, United 
Bulgarian Bank, First East International Bank);
n Embassies and residencies of diplomats (e.g. The Belgian Mission and Ambassador’s Residence, The British 
Embassy, The Embassy of the USA, The European Community Delegation);
n State and Public Institutions (e.g. the National Assembly Facilities, Ministries, Ports, Post Offices, the Regional 
Tax Directorate, the National Electric company, Ministry of Defence);
n International NGOs, organisations, businesses and corporations (e.g. the Centre for the Study of Democracy, 
Intracom, Nestle, The Swiss Institute for Development Research, the International Centre for Company 
Management, various international airline companies, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development); 
n Hotels (e.g. the ‘Golden Sands’ Black Sea Resort, the Hilton Hotel in Sofia etc.);
n Company Buildings and offices (e.g. the TSUM building, KPMG, Reuters Bulgaria, private radio stations);
n Industrial sites (‘Lukoil – Neftochim’ Bourgas and its pipelines, storage tanks and warehouses, Grand 
Bulgarian Mills, ‘Elchim-Iskra’ plant in the town of Pazardgik, the Arsenal arms factory in Kazanlak15);
n Gas stations (e.g. Shell, Lukoil);
n Sport halls and stadiums (e.g. Festivalna Hall, Universiada Hall);
n Private houses; and
n Port of Varna and Port of Burgas.
As both publicly and privately owned security companies presently operate in Bulgaria, the security industry has 
been divided into different segments, with public and private companies on the whole providing security services 
to different client bases. For their part public owned PSCs tend to have a specialised list of responsibilities. For 
13 According to the village mayor, since the start of patrols in January 2005, the number of recorded burglaries in the village has dropped 
significantly. Interview with Dencho Gilev, Mayor of the village of Varbitza, 08 March 2005.
14 Dimitrov M and Stanchev K, ‘A Law on Private Collection Judges should be Approved Before the Elections’, Institute for Market Economy, 
February 2005, http://ime-bg.org/pr_bg/213-3.htm. Concerns have been raised about the use of PSC staff as semi-official debt collectors. 
As one analyst recently put it, ‘with such slow and expensive procedures for debt collection it is not surprising that unofficial or semi-official 
debt-collectors (often muscular Mafioso look-alikes, or ‘mootra’) work to collect larger sums. With debts above 15,000 Euros their fee is 
usually 10 - 15% of the sum to be recovered’. Krasen Stanchev, Institute for Market Economics, quoted in Mara Georgieva, ‘Private Collection 
Judges will Compete with the Government Ones’, Capital, 26 February 2005.
15 Interestingly, private security guards who man the exterior of the Kazanlak weapons plant have been identified by former and current 
factory workers as ‘less competent, under-paid and often more corrupt than the police who formerly guarded the plant in the Communist era’ 
in a recent survey of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Bulgaria. Inadequate security at the plant is thought to be contributing to low-
level theft of firearms parts from the factory. Taming the Arsenal – Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bulgaria, SEESAC, March 2005, p 23. 
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instance, EGIDA-Sofia, a security company owned by the city of Sofia is in charge of the security in Sofia of all 
publicly owned schools, kindergartens, care homes, subways, parks, gardens and cemeteries.
There is a clear correlation between the number of operating PSCs and the crime rates in different regions of 
Bulgaria. Regions with high crime rates, such as Sofia, Pernik, Varna, or Pleven have some of largest concentration 
of PSCs. On the other hand, a few regions with low crime rates but high commercial activity, such as Sofia Region, 
Lovech and Gabrovo, also have quite a large concentration of PSCs. It could be inferred from these correlations 
that both high crime rates and the concentration of businesses are determining factors for the increased presence 
of PSCs in a given region.
 It is difficult to assess the impact of PSCs on the general crime rate. The available statistics on burglaries provide 
an example. Hiring a security guard or installing an alarm does seem to have a deterrent effect on potential 
burglars, as is shown by the concurrent decrease in thefts from businesses and increase in the use of private 
security services by those companies. Indeed, in the period 2001 – 2003, burglary victimisation rates have 
fallen. Yet the reasons for the fall in the number of burglaries committed are complex and it is difficult to assert 
that the presence of PSCs has been the most important contributing factor.
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
There seems to be quite a developed level of affiliation between PSCs and the public security services. PSC staff 
are very often retired or dismissed police and military officers, while present military and police officials have 
had interests in PSCs. For example, the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, General Boyko Borissov, 
was formerly an owner of IPON Security, one of the largest PSCs operating in Bulgaria. Such instances point 
towards the existence of informal connections between PSCs and MoI or Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials. In 
addition, as members of various business associations, PSCs are able to establish connections with officials from 
other government ministries and local authorities. Further, when PSCs are hired by local governments to provide 
security services, such as school security, they inevitably establish strong formal and informal relationships with 
their public sector clients. In order to facilitate cooperation between private and public security providers, the 
National Police Service has established a consultative group (‘Consulting/Advising Council’), which brings the 
police together with five industry associations to discuss joint working.16 
As mentioned above, public entities are also able to operate their own security firms. The Bulgarian Ministry of 
Defence has established its own security company, ‘MOBA’. Before MOBA was established, the military used 
to hire PSCs from the open market to guard their premises. MOBA is now responsible for security at all military 
depots, whereas PSCs are still employed to guard buildings and bases. Bulgaria also differs from other countries 
in the region in that the police offer a rapid response service to paying customers, in direct competition with PSCs. 
The ‘Security Police Division’ of the National Police service will, for a monthly fee, install an alarm system in one’s 
home, which is linked to vehicle patrols that respond to the alarm in case of a burglary. This practice is quite legal 
and is permitted under Article 60 of the MoI Act. 17 It poses two problems however. Firstly, competition between 
private and public security providers is bad in itself since it tends to discourage the cooperation between the two 
sectors that is necessary for effective law enforcement. Secondly, in devoting additional time to paying clients, 
Bulgaria’s public security forces are depriving other members of the public of a security resource that they have 
paid for in taxes. In providing this service they are likely contributing to a displacement of crime away from rich 
and into poor neighbourhoods.
16 Article 37 of the Law on Private Guarding Activity allows for such a group Correspondence with Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 26 July 2005. 
Statistics provided by the National Social Insurance Institute.
17 Correspondence with Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 26 July 2005.
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4.2 Political affiliations
In the early 1990s crime gangs posing as PSCs were able to exert a degree of political influence because the 
emerging political system was considerably weaker in its early transition period. As questionable PSCs were forced 
out of business in the late 1990s the level of political influence exercised by the sector dissipated. However, some 
companies continue to have political influence. For example the founder of AS Scorpio Ltd, Kamen Penkov, is on 
the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. As many individuals of the BSP political elite run successful 
businesses, this company has strong connections and guards various companies in the energy industry, including 
Bulgargaz, Union Miniere Pirdop Copper and Kazanluk Heating Company.
4.3 Organised crime affiliations
Bulgarian PSCs have a long history of involvement with organised crime activities. Although PSC involvement in 
organised criminal activities, especially in some companies created by former special forces personnel, continues 
to be a problem, as the industry has professionalised this involvement is fading. Licensing of PSCs by the Ministry 
of Interior began in 1994, during Reneta Indjova’s caretaker government. As a result, the most prominent firms 
suspected of being involved in criminal activities lost their right to carry out security activities and many re-
branded themselves by registering as insurance companies that served as a front for racketeering. This time 
instead of protection, they provided ‘insurance’ and their target markets were those most liable to risk – cars, 
shops and public places. In less than a year two major groups of so-called ‘power insurers’ were formed – VIS-2 
and SIC. The activities of these ‘insurance’ companies impacted directly on a large proportion of the population 
since most Bulgarians owned a car. Although the ‘power insurers’ pushed petty crime down, conflict between 
their own local structures became common.18
5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
The ‘Law on Private Guarding Activities’ (LPGA),19 which governs PSCs has been in operation for approximately 
one year. Unlike some other laws developed as a result of EU influence, the LPGA was developed indigenously 
with the active participation of a board of private security firms. This attempted to ensure that the law does not 
include provisions that are unrealistic and that the provisions are in correspondence with existing private security 
practices.
The law, which came into force on 24 February 2004, governs the activities of PSCs in Bulgaria, requiring 
companies wishing to carry out private security services to register with the police. According to the LPGA, ‘Private 
guarding activity shall be carried out only upon obtaining a licence or registration by the order of this law’20 and 
‘Licenses for carrying out private guarding activity shall be issued by the Director of National Police Service or by 
persons authorised by him’.21 The Director (or those authorised by him) has the right to issue or refuse a licence 
within one month from the date of application.22 When applying for a licence, the owners of the applicant PSC 
– ‘individuals registered as sole entrepreneurs, the members of the management body of the trade company, as 
well as the unlimited liable partners of a limited joint stock company or general partnership’ – need to provide 
the following information: a certificate issued by the National Investigation Service certifying that the applicants 
are not subject to any criminal proceedings ‘for a deliberate crime of a general nature’, and a declaration by the 
persons stating the same, (Article 15, Paragraph 3 of the LPGA). Individual guards may only take up employment 
with a company on successful completion of a training course run by the MoI, (see below), which serves to 
18 Conflict Vulnerability Assessment, Conflict Management Group and Centre for the Study of Democracy, March 2002, http://www.dec.
org/pdf_docs/PNACP411.pdf.
19  ‘Law on Private Guarding Activities’, State Gazette No. 15/24, 24 February 2005.
20  Ibid, Article 4, Paragraph 1.
21  Ibid, Article 14.
22  Ibid, Article 17.
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register them with the authorities. There is no legal requirement for background checks to be carried out either 
by the police or companies themselves. 
Article 40 of the LPGA foresees the creation of a ‘Single Automatic Central Register’ for all licences and 
registrations issued to PSCs, which will also contain data on the number of weapons used in guarding activities 
as well as the number of guards used to guard each site. At the time of writing the register is still not functioning, 
and according to the MoI, this ‘impedes the activities of the police authorities’.23
As of 25 February 2005, about 550 PSCs have been registered under the LPGA. Of these, 140 are licensed to 
operate throughout the country, whereas the rest are licensed to operate in the area of one or more regions 
of the country. Companies licensed under the preceding Ordinance I-79 (revoked with the entry into force of 
LPGA), usually for a 3-year period, need to register in accordance with the new law when their present license 
expires. Thus, in the next two years these licences will expire and all PSCs will register in accordance with the 
new LPGA.
Although PSCs need to be licensed in order to operate, Article 5.1.5 of the LPGA allows private companies to 
establish in-house ‘self guarding’ security departments for the protection of company facilities. Article 5.1.5 has 
been interpreted to mean that in order to set up a protection unit, the applicant company (for example a bank, 
or a company that has a few factories), simply needs to notify the Director of the Regional Police Department in 
writing of the location of the proposed site and the names of the guards, providing:
n A description of the self-guarding activity;
n The type of guarding activity (armed or unarmed);
n A list of all personnel that would be carrying out the guarding activity, and in the cases of armed guards 
copies of the their firearm permits; and 
n Samples of their badges, or company ID cards and uniforms.
Article 5.1.5 is considered by some private security companies to be a loophole in the law. It is exploited by a 
number of organised crime figures who are said to move bodyguards around between locations by registering a 
company, and then a self-guarding unit for that company, with the police, instead of obtaining a license for ‘close 
protection’ as required by Article 5.1 and Article 13 of the LPGA. Some big companies and banks also avoid the 
licensing process or hiring PSCs by registering self-guarding units.24
5.2 Use of force and firearms
Article 34 of the ‘Law on Private Guarding Activities’ regulates the right of private security guards to use force, as 
well as the situations when the use of force is prohibited. Specifically, it states that: 
n Guards shall have the right to use physical force and auxiliary devices – handcuffs, rubber and plastic 
truncheons – where it is impossible to fulfil their official duties in any other way, taking into account the 
concrete situation, the nature of the violation of the public peace and the personality of the offender;
n Physical force and auxiliary devices may be used after an obligatory warning, with exception in cases of 
sudden attack;
n In using physical force and auxiliary devices guards are obliged to protect the life and the health of the 
persons against whom they are directed;
n The use of physical force and auxiliary devices should cease immediately after the achievement of the 
objective of the applied measure; and 
23 Correspondence with Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 26 July 2005. Statistics provided by the National Social Insurance Institute.
24 Boyan Boyanov comments at a Press Conference of the National Association of the Persons and Association Performing Protective Activity 
(NAPAPPA), 23 February 2005.
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n The use of physical force and auxiliary devices against minors and pregnant women is prohibited (‘Law on 
the Private Guarding Activities’. Article 34).
However the use of firearms by PSC staff is regulated under the separate ‘Law for Control over Explosives, 
Firearms, and Munitions (LCEFM). In order to use firearms at work legally, guards must obtain two permits, one to 
own and one to carry a weapon. Many private security guards are not licensed to carry firearms and do not do so. 
However, the law also allows guards to use their privately owned weapons at work, provided that records of the 
weapons in use are kept at the site being guarded, and many apparently do so, with companies relying heavily on 
this.25 The LCEFM generally restricts self-defence weapons to pistols and revolvers,26 the types of weapons used 
by most private guards. Private security guards are further permitted to use automatic firearms when ‘carrying 
out guarding activity with a high degree of danger for the guarded site and the guards’, though it was not clear 
from this research whether any objective criteria are used to determine levels of threat.27 Firearms acquired by 
corporate bodies and persons registered as sole entrepreneurs for guarding can only be carried while engaged in 
guarding activity. When not in use firearms are required to be stored in ‘metal safes, permanently fixed, supplied 
with combination locks and provided with armed physical guarding’.28 Corporate bodies and entrepreneurs can 
acquire guns and revolvers with a barrel length of up to 300mm, smooth barrel rifles with a barrel length from 
300 to 510mm and up to 50 firearms of each calibre and model.29 Companies can also acquire up to 50 rounds 
of ammunition for each firearm as well as an additional 50 rounds per gun and revolver and 200 pieces for 
smooth barrel rifles for training purposes.
Each case of the use of force or firearm by a PSC employee while fulfilling his duty is further regulated by Article 
35 of the ‘Law on Private Guarding Activities’ according to which ‘for each case of detention, using of physical 
force, auxiliary devices and firearms the guard shall prepare a written report to his chief, a copy of which shall 
immediately be submitted to the respective police bodies’.
Unfortunately this research was unable to examine the consistency with which the laws and procedures on the 
use of force and firearms are implemented in any detail and further work is needed to assess this. Certainly there 
were frequent incidents of human rights abuses by PSC staff during the early 1990s. For example, the 1994 
Annual Report of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee stated that representatives of a security company attacked 
the homes of members of the Roma minority using firearms.30 Although the frequency of such incidents has 
been markedly reduced since 2001, there have continued to be occasional reports of firearms misuse by PSC 
personnel. For example, on 22 September 2004, a security guard from the company ‘Kentavr’ shot at a Tanzanian 
refugee outside the shelter of the State Agency for refugees. Witnesses stated that the refugee did nothing to 
provoke this response and that the guard was obviously drunk.31 Further, on the 03 April 2005, a private security 
guard shot a 17 year old Roma boy who was trying to steal some iron scrap from the yard of a former military 
school in Sofia in the back. The incident sparked protests from the local Roma community and questions were 
subsequently raised in the media about the background of private security guards, most of who have military, 
and in some cases mafia backgrounds, racism among their ranks, and about the training they receive.32
5.3 Professionalism and training
Article 28, Paragraph 3 of the ‘Law for the Private Guarding Activities’ specifies that the staff of successful 
applicant private security companies must undergo a basic training programme (the ‘Minimum Programme’), 
25 ‘Law for Control over the Explosives, Firearms and Munitions’, Article 14.4, in Taming the Arsenal – Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
Bulgaria, SEESAC, March 2005, p 6.
26 ‘ Law for Control over the Explosives, Firearms and Munitions’, Article 5.3.1.
27 Ibid, Article 5, Paragraph 4.3.
28 Ibid, Article 14, Paragraph 3.
29 Ibid, Article 57.
30 Human Rights in Bulgaria: Annual Report of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Sofia, 1994, http://www.
bghelsinki.org/annual/en/1994.html.
31 ‘Security Guard fires against refugee in front of shelter’, NOVINAR, 24 September 2004.
32 The MoI Quickly Solves the Murder of a Roma, Dnevnik, 05 April 2005. (Also Without Responsibility), Dnevnik, 05 April 2005.
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organised by the Academy of the MoI and approved by the Director of the National Police Service. The training 
programme lasts six days and consists of lectures and practical sessions. The curriculum must cover: 
n The legal regulations on private security activities; 
n Legal training on how to handle different circumstances;
n The rights and obligations of the guards;
n Relations with the citizens;
n Self-defence techniques (including non-lethal restraint); and
n Medical assistance. 
Firearms handling is not covered on the Minimum Programme, and those guards wishing to carry firearms at 
work must first pass through a standard Firearm Training Programme which applies to all citizens, and they must 
obtain permits to own and carry weapons (see above). According to the law, at the end of the training programme, 
practical training has to be organised for a period of no less that five days for those security guards who do not 
have any professional experience. Many companies, including but not limited to EGIDA-Sofia IN-80, Force-Delta 
and Balkan Security, have their own additional training programmes. 
In the light of the reported cases of misuse of force and poor conduct by Bulgarian private security guards cited 
above, the effectiveness of the current training regime in ensuring the minimal use of force by PSC staff must be 
questioned. Further, although newly recruited guards now attend these programmes, it was not clear from this 
research whether the many thousands of existing PSC staff, some with years of experience, have obtained the 
required training certificates. 
5.4 Oversight
Under the present regulatory system, the MoI and its agencies provide the only real external oversight of PSCs 
in Bulgaria. Other institutions such as the National Parliament and Ombudsman’s office have legal powers of 
oversight but no real capacity to do so.33 Until recently, although all the necessary provisions and penalties for 
effective regulation of the private security sector by the MoI are presently in place, these provisions have not 
been applied fully by the relevant government authorities. At the time this research was conducted in February 
- March 2005, only one administrative sanction was on record as having been applied since the LPGA entered 
into force in 2004 (as mandated by Article 42.1.2 of the LPGA) – a fine of between €5,000 and €25,000 was 
imposed on a company that provided security services without a licence. In November 2004 a company called 
VTA had its licence revoked. VTA is widely known to have provided security to one of the biggest figures in 
organised crime in Bulgaria, Dmitry Minev, a.k.a ‘The Russian’. Following his assassination, VTA provided security 
at Minev’s funeral in October 2004, refusing anyone entrance to Sofia’s Central Cemetery, and assaulting some 
photo-journalists who were taking pictures of the house of the murdered crime figure. According to media reports, 
during the funeral the Sofia City Security Company ‘Egida’ and the police force were notable for their absence, 
and the company’s conduct caused a public outcry.34 However, since VTA’s cars and advertising billboards are 
still highly visible in Sofia, the research team conclude that the company is still operating.35
In June 2005 the police launched a nation-wide inspection of all PSCs, threatening to revoke the licences of all 
companies that had not met the requirements laid down in the LPGA in an effort to ensure compliance.36 The 
33 For example the National Ombudsman was appointed in 2005. It handles complaints about the public administration and so has 
competency to oversee the work of city or state-owned security firms. However, the Ombudsman is a single individual with no staff, and the 
office therefore functions poorly.  ‘Law on the Ombudsman’, State Gazette No 48 of 23 May 2003, in force since 01 January 2004.
34 ‘The Guards of Dimata Rusnaka Left without a License’, Banker, 06 November 2004. MOI sources state that despite the media coverage, 
officers from the local police station ‘took the necessary organizational measures against possible infringements of the public order’.  An 
appeal is currently underway against the Director of the National Police Service’s decision to revoke VTA’s licence.  Correspondence with 
Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 26 July 2005. Also, Ministry of Interior written communication to Centre for Study of Democracy, 11 February 2005.
35 Correspondence with Centre for Study of Democracy, 27 July 2005.
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operation coincided with the deadline for PSCs to train their personnel, as required by the law. Inspections were 
apparently conducted according to 25 different criteria which included training of personnel, security plans for 
guarded sites, lists of the guards employed by the firm, guarding regime regulations, background checks on 
guards, psychiatrist’s affidavits for guards, firearm permits, and vehicle-inspection permits. 
Oversight of the operations of PSCs in Bulgaria is helped by the existence of two trade associations, the National 
Association of Industrial Security Companies,37 and the National Association of the Persons and Associations 
Performing Protective Activities.38 These associations were established to undertake lobbying and public relations 
work on behalf of an industry whose image had been seriously damaged during the 1990s by accusations of 
their involvement with organised criminal structures. Both associations are members of larger trade associations, 
such as the Employers Association of Bulgaria. The National Association of Industrial Security Companies (NAISC) 
has 29 members employing 13,000 individuals. In their Code of Ethical Conduct the NAISC members pledge to 
adhere to all rules and norms set by the existing laws in the country. They pledge to sign contracts that are in 
accordance with such laws, to cooperate with the police, to provide only those security services for which they 
have been licensed by the police, to provide the highest quality service to their clients, to ensure that their 
employees are exemplary citizens and to report to the NAISC board or to the media unethical or unlawful conduct 
by other security companies.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
According to the Bulgarian MoI, the number of companies that claim to offer security services is gradually 
increasing, but the number of operators is likely to eventually level off as the market appears to be reaching 
saturation point. It is more likely that existing firms will consolidate into fewer, larger companies in the near future. 
The demand for the PSC industry is, however, likely to increase as the use of company security, particularly CCTV 
cameras and burglar alarms, is becoming increasingly common. While the industry had a deserved bad reputation 
in the 1990s, there are significant indications that it is making steps to clean up its act by both improving the 
quality of the services it provides and introducing an element of self-regulation. These industry initiatives have 
been supplemented by increased oversight activity on the part of the government and its institutions from the 
late 1990s onwards. Salaries are also reported to be on the rise, which may have additional benefits in terms of 
professionalism and the quality of staff recruited.39
However, concerns still exist, especially with regard to the occasional excessive use of force and the illegal use 
of firearms by PSC employees. Further, organised criminal structures may maintain a degree of influence on 
some PSCs. The strong political links of some in the industry are also a potential cause for concern since it may 
undermine efforts at regulation. Additionally there are indications that the salaries of the private security sector 
personnel are not high enough to secure high professional standards. An increase in their salaries might help to 
surpass any tendencies towards corruption that could still exist. It is also disturbing that prosecutions of PSCs for 
legal violations only appear to have occurred as a result of media pressure.
Finally, the development of a private military sector in Bulgaria is a reflection of the growing global trend towards 
the use of PSCs and PMCs instead of the conventional military. If it continues, Bulgaria should consider regulating 
the provision of military services for export in much the same way that weapon exports are regulated. However, 
the development of the industry is generally positive with a gradual increase in professionalism. As such Bulgaria 
is an example to other countries in the region that it is relatively easy to reform the industry through improved 
regulation and oversight. It is important though to say that the situation in Bulgaria needs to be monitored in 
order to ensure that these positive steps are well concretised. 
36 Angarev P, ‘The Police Checks on Security Companies’, Dnevnik, 13 June 2005.
37 http://www.naftso.org/en/index.htm.
38 http://www.nalsicod-bg.com/.
39 Correspondence with Snejana Maleeva, MoI, 26 July 2005.
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6.1 Main recommendations 
n Although the laws governing PSCs currently require companies to be licensed, the legal framework should be 
strengthened so that background checks and licensing for individual guards is also required.
n ‘Self-guarding’ units in private companies should also be subject to licensing.
n The use of military-style weapons should be phased out.
n The regulatory authorities should be more proactive in investigating complaints against PSC firms and 
ensuring that effective action is taken against operators proven to have indulged in malpractice.
n The content and delivery of the training curriculum currently used to educate private security guards should 
be re-examined to ensure that sufficient emphasis is placed on the minimal use of force and firearms in 
accordance with international standards. Given that PSC personnel have most often misused force against 
the Roma community in the past, the training curricula should cover minority-policing issues. Consideration 
should be given to re-training serving PSC personnel.
n The National Police Service should discontinue its rapid response service, which is likely to hinder cooperation 
with private security providers and drain resources from routine policing.
n The MoI should establish its envisaged Single Automatic Central Register of PSC guards and SALW as soon 
as possible.
n Bulgaria should consider regulating those PMCs that are based in, or recruit in the country. It should also 
work with other European countries in establishing common European criteria through which these firms can 
operate.
n Private security guards whose work in the sector predates the introduction of legal requirements for training 
should be required to undergo the same training as new recruits to the industry.
n Support should be provided to existing institutions such as the Ombudsman and parliamentary committees, 
to enhance their ability to provide effective external oversight of the sector.
38
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
39
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
Croatia
1 Background to the privatization of security
The Republic of Croatia became independent of the former Socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia in 1991 after a bloody conflict that pitted Croats first against 
Yugoslav, and later Serbian and Bosnian forces. Many thousands were killed 
and forcibly displaced before the end of conflict in 1995. A decade after the 
wars that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia is now a stable 
country whose citizens have seen a normalisation and development process 
second only to that of Slovenia among former SFRY states. 
Euro-Atlantic integration and socio-economic development are now the country’s key concerns, though a number 
of areas such as refugee return, minority rights, judicial reform, the prosecution of war criminals and media freedom 
require continuing attention if the country is to meet its target for EU accession in 2007.1 NATO membership is 
the country’s second foreign policy priority. Under the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Croatia has prepared a draft 
plan for military downsizing that will see a 17,000 reduction of military personnel to 25,000 by the end of 
2005.2 The Croatian police have also been a key target for reform given the militarization experienced by the 
service in the course of the 1991 - 1995 conflict. Police reform programmes have been funded or overseen by 
EU governments, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Criminal 
Investigative Assistance Training Program (ICITAP).3 
The current private security industry in Croatia dates from 1991 with 
the reintroduction of capitalism and private ownership.4 During the 
communist period (1945 - 1990), when only state ownership existed, 
protection services were almost exclusively provided by the police. Since 
the reintroduction of the market economy, outsourcing of protection has 
increasingly become the norm with most of the protection services for 
businesses and institutions being taken over by PSCs.5 
As of February 2005, it is estimated that there are between 160 and 180 
registered PSCs of all types, only half of which are operating.6 In 2001 
there were 12,000 licensed security guards and agents. This number 
included PSCs’ staff and personnel who were employees of other companies’ own internal guard services.7 As of 
February 2005, estimates of the number of licensed security guards and agents in Croatia range from 12,000 to 
1 South Eastern Europe Small Arms and Light Weapons Monitor, 2005, UNDP, June 2005.
2 Statement by Vice Skracic, Head of Section for Arms Control and Disarmament, First Committee, UN General Assembly Fifty-Seventh 
Session, 03 October 2002. According to a public statement by the Assistant Defence Minister, 3,089 active military staff were laid off in 
2004. ‘Croatian Government Announces Further Army Reforms’, South East European Times, HRT, 09 November 2004.
3 OSCE assistance includes sponsoring exchange visits for Croatian police personnel to EU countries ‘OSCE Mission sponsors a visit by 
Croatian police to Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt in Germany’, OSCE Mission to Croatia News in Brief, 13 - 26 October 2004, and supporting 
community policing projects in towns such as Vukovar, Newsletter of the OSCE Mission to Croatia, No 116, Winter 2004 - 2005. For its part 
ICITAP concentrates heavily on training for officers, including on firearms safety. http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/croatia.html accessed 
04 May 2005.
4 The privatization of security in Croatia has a long and complex history involving the emergence of militias, village guards, émigré and 
mercenary groups as well as private military and security companies. A detailed account is provided in Vankovska B ‘Privatization of Security 
and Security Sector Reform in Croatia’, in Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatization of Security, Eds Lilly 
and von Tangen Page, International Alert, London, 2002, p 65 - 75.
5 Interview, Đurica Franjo, Director, ‘Sigurnost Franjo K.D’. (Private Security Company), Zagreb, 08 February 2005; Interview, Neven Martić, 
General Manager, ‘AKD-Zaštita d.o.o’. (Private Security Company), Zagreb, 15 February 2005.
6 Interview, Frano Marušić, Vice-President, Council of the Association of Detective and Private Security Sector, and also Director, ‘Tehnozavod-
Marušić’ (Private Security Company – Technical Surveillance), Zagreb, 16 February 2005; Interview, Ankica Vrbanc, President, Association 
of Security Services (with Croatian Employers’ Association), and also Director, ‘Zagreb-Štit Vrbanc’ (Private Security Company), Zagreb, 17 
February 2005; Op cit Franjo.
7 Kričančić M and Delišimunović D, Zaštita i sigurnost financijskih institucija. Priručnik za zaštitu banaka i drugih financijskih institucija, 
Tectus, Zagreb, 2001.
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15,000.8 The largest firms in Croatia are currently AKD-Zaštita, Sokol Marić, Zvonimir Security, Borbaš Security, 
Zagreb and Štit Vrbanc. Only two of these firms have more than 1,000 staff: Sokol Marić (1,600) and AKD-Zaštita 
(1,200). A second tier of five companies have around 500 staff, another five 200-300, with the rest employing 
less than 100 each.9 Many of these firms employ only a few dozen employees and some have as few as four. 
Zagreb, being the capital of the country and seat of many important institutions and businesses that use PSC 
services, is the region where most PSCs operate. Some 60 percent of personnel in the sector operate in Zagreb. 
Slavonia, being Croatia’s least developed region, has the least coverage.
The vast majority of contemporary PSCs in Croatia were established after 
1991. Nevertheless, a small number of companies do claim continuity from the 
communist era. Prior to 1990 there were several state-owned security ‘companies’ 
that performed rudimentary physical protection services for other state-owned 
‘companies’. Examples include the company Tehnozavod-Marušić d.d of Zagreb 
which claims to have been established in 1970,10 and Protect, Rijeka, tracing its 
origins back to 1964 as Sigurnost. These companies were privatised in the course 
of transition (Protect was privatised in 1992). 
Most firms are now privately owned, but there is also a state owned company, 
AKD-Zaštita. Ownership is still overwhelmingly national though, with international 
firms tending to have only minor facility service contracts (cleaning, maintenance 
etc). This is largely a result of a law dating from 1996, which effectively prohibited 
foreign firms from operating in the country.11 The new law of 2003 regulating the 
private security sector allows internationally owned PSCs to operate in Croatia (see 
below). For the past few years the sector has been expanding at around 10% per 
annum – in 2001, there were 105 licensed PSCs12; by January 2003 the number 
had risen to 114 PSCs.13 Therefore, provided the Croatian economy continues to 
grow, the PSC sector can reasonably be expected to grow with it.
2 Contemporary security threats
In the late 1990s crime levels in Croatia – especially those crimes that PSCs are intended to protect against 
– were low. For example during that period Croatia had the lowest burglary rate and the second lowest robbery 
rates among 20 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Though rising, crime levels remain relatively 
low for the region; MOI statistics for 2004 show a total of 981 armed crimes including only 66 murders or 
attempted murders.14 Yet by the end of 2004, the Croatian media were reporting an upsurge in the demand for 
protection and security services. One of the main factors behind the growing demand was the increasing cash 
flow generated by a consumer boom and a corresponding growth in the number of chain store robberies, (some 
stores stated publicly that they would increase the number of guards they used by 50 percent).15 
Against this backdrop, the call for private protection services grew rapidly. At one point PSCs were reporting that 
the demand for their services outstripped their capacity by a significant margin.16 It is impossible to say whether 
8 Op cit Marušić.
9 Op cit Martić.
10 ‘Tehnozavod-Marušić K.D,’ CroatiaBiz, http://www.croatiabiz.com/poslovni_imenik/members.php?!D=1844&lang=hr, 25 February 
2005.
11 One of the most important differences between the new and old laws governing PSCs (see below), is that under the old law PSCs had to 
be organized either as publicly owned companies (i.e. state-owned) or as a private company of persons (where the company’s legal existence 
is not separated from the persons who own the company). As a result, foreign capital could not enter the sector directly and openly, but only 
via intermediaries.
12 Op cit Kričančić M and Delišimunović D. 
13 ‘Zaštitari protiv monopola ‘Zaštite’. Slobodna Dalmacija, Croatian daily newspaper. 20 January 2003.
14 Correspondence obtained via the Croatian National Focal Point for SALW on 18 March 2005, from Mr Zlatko Mehun, Spokesperson for 
the Croatian Ministry of Interior.
15 Op cit Martić.
16 Bratonja Martinović L, ‘Zaštitari i alarmi najtraženija roba’, Novi List, 22 December 2004.
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the growth in commercial activity or an increase in security threats was the main factor driving demand for PSCs 
at this time. Additional factors were also in play. For example the sector received an additional boost in 2003 
when it was made mandatory for financial institutions such as banks and bureaus de change to employ physical 
and technical protection when transporting money and valuables, services normally performed by PSCs.17 It is 
also now routine for insurance companies to give lower premiums to businesses that employ PSCs to protect their 
premises and goods, which obviously provides the industry with an additional spur.18
The increased use of PSCs appears to have had mixed effects. Crime rates for 
certain offences do appear to have dropped because of the increased use of 
protection, surveillance and PSCs. For example, petrol stations, which were 
experiencing daily attacks in the recent past, are no longer subject to criminal 
attack having introduced protective measures (surveillance, central alarm 
systems, delayed action safes etc).19 However, overall levels of crime in Croatia 
are on the rise. The occurrence of some other types of crimes – especially violent 
crimes like armed robbery – appears to be on the rise. With guards and agents 
and alarms in place, simple theft and burglary have given way to armed robbery, 
which is now becoming a standard crime against financial institutions.20 
3 Services provided by security companies
The types of clients listed in the promotional material 
produced by Croatian PSCs include variously: government 
institutions and offices, museums and other cultural 
institutions, banks, betting shops, chain stores, shops 
and businesses dealing with valuable goods (goldsmiths, 
jewellers, watch shops, electronic shops and expensive 
clothing shops), corporation headquarters, politicians and 
a few other public figures. The service most commonly 
offered by PSCs is that of physical protection by guards, 
physical entry and access control and technical surveillance 
and protection. Another very common service is securing 
cash and valuables during transportation (using armoured 
vehicles). Technical surveillance services, in which anti-
burglar, anti-hold-up, alarm and fire prevention systems 
are connected to central monitoring systems, are also available. Rapid response teams are also on offer and 
PSCs are obliged by law to have a rapid response team if they maintain a centralized monitoring service. Close 
protection is seldom offered by the private security sector in Croatia and usage tends to be short-term (e.g. for a 
wedding), or very rarely, as in the case of a well-known bank director and a media tycoon, in response to actual 
physical attack.21 
There is in addition an illegal market for surveillance and eavesdropping devices, bought and used by private 
citizens and companies. For example, the management of some transportation companies are known to monitor 
the mobile phone conversations of their lorry drivers because of a fear that staff may be involved in smuggling. 
It is not known whether PSCs offer such illegal services, and no media reports have appeared on the subject. In 
Croatia, eavesdropping is forbidden by law and may only be carried out by police and state intelligence/security 
services, provided that there is a warrant issued by the court. 22
17 Minimal Protection Measures in Operations Involving Cash and Valuables Act of 2003 (Zakon o minimalnim mjerama zaštite u poslovanju 
s gotovim novcem i vrijednostima), Narodne Novine, 173/2003, 31 October 2003.
18 Op cit Franjo, Vrbanc; Interview, Darko Starčević, Legal and Development Adviser, ‘Zagreb-Štit Vrbanc’ (Private Security Company); Zagreb, 
17 February 2005.
19 Op cit Martić. 
20 Op cit Franjo, Starčević.
21 Adriatic Security – Zadar. ‘Referentna lista’. http://www.adriatic-security.com; Gradska sigurnost – Split. ‘Naši klijenti’. http://www.gradska-
sigurnost.hr; Sokol Marić Security – Zagreb. ‘About us’.  http://www.sokol-maric.hr/english/about_us.htm; Op cit Franjo, Martić.
22 Interview with anonymous source, formerly of MoI.
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4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
Informal connections between the police and private security industry appear to be common in Croatia, with 
owners, Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and senior PSC staff frequently coming from a police background.23 One 
PSC director interviewed for this research noted that this is almost inevitable, since the industry attracts people 
with such a background.24 Interestingly however, the military as an institution appears to have little to do with 
PSCs in Croatia, and in contrast to the immediate post-war years, very few former military personnel are nowadays 
engaged in the private security sector, either as owners or staff. 
Informal connections between business, politics and the security 
industries are of course to be expected in small transition societies 
where elites constantly switch between the private and public 
sector.  The notable career of Croatian President Stipe Mesic’s 
National Security Adviser, who moved between government and the 
private sector four times in almost as many years, illustrates the 
point well.25 
More striking perhaps than any informal links between the security 
sector and private security industry in Croatia is the possibility of 
rivalry between the police and PSCs. The Croatian police service, 
having expanded greatly to take on a national defence role during 
the ‘Homeland War’ of 1991 - 1995, has since seen gradual lay-offs intended to eliminate surplus manpower 
and return the service to a peace-time role.26 The progressive downsizing of the service has corresponded with 
the expansion of the PSC sector, which has taken on some functions previously carried out by the police. During 
interviews for this research, some antagonism was detected between staff from the public and private security 
sectors, and the impression was given that at least some police personnel resent the loss of their former monopoly 
on security and see the increase in demand for PSCs’ services as a cause of police job losses.
4.2 Ethnic affiliations
There are no real indications of ethnicity being an issue in Croatia, either in PSC conduct or formation. It should 
be noted of course that a large section of the Republic’s minority population was either expelled or fled during 
the 1991-1995 conflict, thereby in a sense reducing the significance of ethnic questions.27 During interviews 
23 Op cit Vrbanc, Starčević.
24 Op cit Martić.
25 One of the founders of the HDZ (ruling party in Croatia 1990 - 2000, and from 2003 onwards) became the Zagreb Chief of Police in 
the early nineties. After a brief spell in the private sector, he served from 1999 - 2000 as Chief of Staff in the election campaign of future 
President Stipe Mesić. In 2000, he became the President’s National Security Adviser and Head of the Office for National Security. After two 
years he resigned from this post and set up a private security (and allegedly business intelligence) company that soon won a major contract 
with the biggest Croatian media corporation. In 2004, he became Director of the Counterintelligence Agency (Protuobavještajna agencija, 
POA), switching for the fourth time between state and private business. Lušić B and Pavelić N, ‘Šef UNS-a Karamarko postaje šef tehničke 
zaštite u Pavićevu EPH?’ Slobodna Dalmacija, 28 February 2002; Peratović Ž,  ‘Saborski odbor dao pozitivno mišljenje o Karamarku,’ Vjesnik, 
15 December 2004; Mesić S, ‘Dobit ćemo uvjetovani datum početka pregovora s EU’, http://www.stipemesic.net/indexd1.php?id=4, 15 
December 2004.
26 State-owned AKD-Zaštita was meant to be the solution for ‘surplus’ police personnel, but this was only partially achieved. Op cit Franjo, 
Martić, Vrbanc, Starčević.
27 From August to November 1995, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs resident in Croatia were expelled or fled during and after 
‘Operation Storm’, in which the Croatian Army gained control of western Slavonia and Krajina. Estimates of the total number of displaced 
ethnic Serbs vary, with some commentators claiming that Croatia’s pre-war ethnic Serb population fell by around half. The US-based NGO 
Human Rights Watch puts the figure at approximately 150,000 in ‘Second Class Citizens, the Serbs of Croatia’, Volume 11, No 3, March 
1999, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/croatia/. The International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia estimates that between 
150,000 and 200,000 Serbs were deported or displaced. See ICTY Case No. IT-01-45-I, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Ante Gotovina, 
Indictment, http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/got-ii010608e.htm; also Vankovska B ‘Privatization of Security and Security Sector 
Reform in Croatia’, in Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatization of Security, Eds Lilly and von Tangen 
Page, (International Alert, London: 2002), p 58.
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however, the impression was also gained that the industry is sufficiently mature for ethnicity to play little part in 
the work of PSCs who appear focussed on profit more than anything else.28 The research was not comprehensive 
enough to consider the effects in terms of ethnic composition of the industry that the requirement for all PSC 
staff to read latin script (introduced as part of the Private Security Act) has had in areas still populated by ethnic 
Serbs.29 In countries with ethnic minorities, the ideal situation is probably that PSC staff be well-versed both in 
the local script – to enable them to communicate effectively with local people – and any national script, to allow 
for effective communication with other state agencies, regardless of their place of work. 
4.3 Political affiliations
With part of the sector government-owned (see above), formal links between companies and the state obviously 
exist. The best example of this is the position of the Deputy Minister of the Interior who serves on the board of 
the state-owned security company AKD-Zaštita.30
Reference to informal (and inappropriate) links between PSCs and the political sphere have been made in a 
previous report on the privatization of security in Croatia, which claimed that ‘…competition between firms is not 
based on professionalism, but on various forms of personal and even political nepotism. There is evidence that 
people get their licences to operate because of their close relationship with politicians or their party membership’. 
While this may be the case, no legally proven case of such malpractice could be found on record during this 
research.31 This has not prevented allegations emerging, including those from inside the sector itself – several 
privately owned PSCs complain that the state-owned firm AKD-Zaštita is in a privileged position on the market, 
getting the best contracts for the protection of government institutions (e.g. ministries, government offices etc). 
Another potential area for links between PSCs and the political sphere arises with the apparently regular practice 
of PSCs making financial contributions to election campaigns in the hope of political favours.32 If PSCs that 
provided campaign funds were subsequently awarded contracts following the success of a political party, 
procurement procedures would obviously be called into question. Once again, there is no hard evidence that 
such contributions have given PSCs undue influence. While most political systems do not prohibit donations from 
particular economic sectors, cases have come to light elsewhere of PSCs apparently obtaining undue influence 
in this way.33 This issue may warrant special attention in a country that faced significant challenges establishing 
control over politically connected paramilitary groups in a post-war context.
A final area in which PSCs have been suspected of being too closely linked with the political process involves the 
use of PSCs during election rallies. In one hotly debated case, two factions within the HDZ party disputed the use 
made by one side of staff of Borbaš security at the 2002 party congress, with allegations being made by their 
opponents that security guards, (who wore plain clothes in contravention of the law), were used for intimidation.34 
There are however no similar cases on record.
28 Op cit Franjo, Martic, Starcevic. 
29 The use of Latin or Cyrillic scripts is one of the main defining features of ethnic-Croat and ethnic-Serbs in Croatia.
30 The Croatian MoI is at pains to stress that even though the AKD-Zaštita security company is state-owned, and that the president of the 
supervisory board is Minister’s Assistant of the Ministry of the Interior, there is no influence on the professionalism of the mentioned company, 
since this appointment is for oversight purposes with contracts being awarded competitively. Correspondence with Drazen Krtanjek, Head 
of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior, 26 July 2005.
31 Op cit Martic, Vrbanc, Starčević.
32 Op cit Martić, Starčević.
33 Lobbying and political campaign donations on the part of PSCs have been shown to have a bearing on the awarding of contracts in the US. 
One source estimates that only 40 per cent of US DOD contracts between financial years 1998 and 2003 were awarded on the basis of ‘full 
and open competition’. Isenberg, D, ‘Security for Sale in Afghanistan’, Asia Times Online, 04 January 2003, URL http://www.atimes.com. The 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) estimates that private contractors in Iraq donated more than $500,000 to George 
W. Bush’s 2004 presidential campaign. See ‘Windfalls of War’, URL http://www.publicintegrity.org/icij.
34 Two years later, during a local election campaign, and apparently alluding to the circumstances of the HDZ 2002 congress, some political 
parties accused HDZ of introducing ‘Borbaš-democracy’. Drago H ‘Josi Škari su prijetili likvidacijom djece,’ Feral Tribune, 04 May 2002; 
Ljubičić M, ‘SDP-HNS-Libra: S HDZ-om se na velika vrata vraća ‘Borbaš’ demokracija,’ Vjesnik, 16 January 2004.
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4.4 Organised crime affiliations
Following the emergence of the private security sector in Croatia in the early nineties, cases came to light in which 
known criminals (including former combatants) were found to be working for PSCs. With the end of the war (1991 
- 1995) and with the introduction of the first legislation regulating the sector in 1996, such cases began to occur 
far less frequently.35 Interviews carried out for this research indicate that in a few cases PSCs have continued 
to serve as a cover for racketeering. In one reported case, which is not believed to be isolated, the owner of a 
vehicle repair shop was approached by a certain PSC and told that he needed protection. The owner declined, 
and next morning the cars in his shop were found damaged. It has also been alleged that some organized crime 
groups are trying to legalize their operations through becoming PSCs.36 For its part the Croatian Ministry of 
Interior (MoI) stresses that action has been taken in all cases where there is a suspicion of illegal conduct either 
by individuals applying for PSC licences or companies conducting such business and that no information is on 
record concerning the misuse of PSCs by organised criminal gangs.37 Certainly the regulatory authorities should 
continue to monitor PSCs on an ongoing basis, but further research may be required to determine the extent of 
this problem.
5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
As of 30 December 2004 there were 64 laws and 68 regulations governing the operations of PSCs. The key legal 
instruments are listed below:
n There is a special law regulating the private security sector: Private Protection Act of 22 April 2003.38 
n The previous legislation regulating this sector was the Protection of Persons and Property Act of 8 October 
1996.39
There are also dozens of bylaws regulating specific aspects of the private security sector and work of PSCs and 
related institutions. The most important of these are:
n Education, Training and Professional Examination of Private Security Agents and Guards Regulation of 26 
July 2004, (for physical protection positions).40
n Conditions, Ways of Examination, and Program of the Professional Examinations for Private Security Agents-
Technicians Regulation of 18 November 2004, (for technical surveillance positions).41
n Ways of Establishing General and Specific Health Ability of Guards and Private Security Agents Regulation 
of 24 March 2004.42
n Physical Protection Regulation of 7 November 1997.43
n Technical Protection Regulation of 2003.44
n Private Security Guard and Private Security Agent Identity Card Regulation of December 2003.45
35 Correspondence, Professor Ozren Zunec, University of Zagreb, 22 February 2005.
36 Interview, PSC owner, February 2005.
37 Correspondence with Drazen Krtanjek, Head of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior, 26 July 2005.
38 ‘Zakon o privatnoj zaštiti,’ Narodne Novine 68/2003.
39 ‘Zakon o zaštiti osoba i imovine,’ Narodne Novine, 83/1996.
40 ‘Pravilnik o izobrazbi i stručnom ispitu za zaštitare i čuvare,’ Narodne Novine 103/2004.
41 ‘Pravilnik o uvjetima i načinu polaganja te programu stručnog ispita za zaštitara – tehničara,’ Narodne Novine, 161/2004.
42 ‘Pravilnik o načinu utvrđivanja opće i posebne zdravstvene sposobnosti čuvara i zaštitara u privatnoj zaštiti,’ Narodne Novine 38/2004.
43 ‘Pravilnik o obavljanju poslova tjelesne zaštite,’ Narodne Novine, 119/1997.
44 ‘Pravilnik o uvjetima i načinima provedbe tehničke zaštite,’ Narodne Novine, 198/2003.
45 ‘Pravilnik o čuvarskoj i zaštitarskoj iskaznici,’ Narodne Novine, 202/2003.
45
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
n Documentation and Evidence of Weapons and Ammunition Regulation of 1999.46
n Spatial and Technical Conditions of the Private Security and Private Detective Company’s Premises Regulation 
of 1997.47
n There is a law that stipulates mandatory protection/security measures in financial institutions, a service 
normally provided by PSCs: Minimal Protection Measures in Operations Involving Cash and Valuables Act, of 
31 October 2003.48
The key ramifications of these laws are discussed in the following sections. It is however worth noting that some 
of the byelaws that apply to PSCs are not in compliance with the Private Protection Act of 2003, but in compliance 
with the old Protection of Persons and Property Act of 1996, leaving the legal framework unclear or contradictory 
in places.49
5.2 Use of force and firearms
Some PSCs in Croatia are armed. The company must own these weapons and the use of private weapons by 
security guards when on duty is forbidden.50 There are two types of PSC personnel: guards (lower ranking) and 
private security agents (higher rank). Guards are not allowed to carry firearms, but private security agents are.51 
Private security guards can be armed only if they are authorized to carry arms according to the Firearms Act 
(general regulation).52
Private security agents can use only small arms (pistols and revolvers), of calibre 9 mm or greater.53 Military 
weapons are not allowed. They can also use dogs and physical force. There are several restrictions on the use 
of firearms, dogs, physical force, and other procedures. Private security agents can be armed, but only in the 
following circumstances: 1) if protecting financial institutions; 2) if serving as bodyguards; 3) if protecting objects 
containing radioactive material and other harmful substances; 4) if protecting money that is being transported; 
or 5) if protecting national defence facilities/objects. 54
On the premises that they protect, private security guards and agents are allowed to do the following: 
a) Check the identity of the person entering/exiting the premises;
b) Give warnings;
c) Temporarily halt persons only if they are about to commit a crime if this is necessary for apprehending 
the person or if this is necessary for securing the crime scene, witnesses and similar;
d) Search persons, vehicles and objects entering the facility they protect. The search of the person is 
limited to clothing and footwear (body cavities excluded). If the person refuses to be searched and if 
there is suspicion that he or she carries an object that could be used as evidence in penal procedures, 
the guard/agent can halt the person but must then call the police;
e) Secure a crime scene or scene of other events before the police arrive;
46 ‘Pravilnik o obrascima isprava i načinu vođenja evidencija o oružju i streljivu,’ Narodne Novine 118/1999; amended in 45/2001; 17/2002; 
148/2002; 29/2003; 173/2003.
47 ‘Pravilnik o prostornim i tehničkim uvjetima koje mora ispunjavati prostor u kojem se obavlja zaštitarska ili detektivska djelatnost,’ Narodne 
Novine, 40/1997; amended in 107/2002.
48 ‘Zakon o minimalnim mjerama zaštite u poslovanju s gotovim novcem i vrijednostima,’ Narodne Novine, 173/2003.
49 Op cit Starčević.
50 ‘Private Protection Act’ (‘Zakon o privatnoj zaštiti’), Narodne Novine, 68/2003, Article 40, Subsection 2.
51 Ibid, Article 40.
52 Ibid, Article 23/1.
53 Ibid, Articles 41 - 42.
54 Ibid, Article 40.
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f) Agents (not guards) can use dogs. There are restrictions of usage: dogs can be used only on protected 
premises and they cannot be used in open spaces. The only exception is the protection of natural sites, 
at which the dogs can be used in the open. Dogs can be used for attack/defence only if the conditions 
for the use of physical force or firearms exist;
g) Use of physical force is limited to cases where there is a clear illegal assault on the agents or the persons 
they protect, or where an assault on the property they protect is underway. Under these circumstances 
force may be used if the commands or warnings of PSC staff are not obeyed, or if suspects attempt to 
escape; and
h) Agents (not guards) can use firearms only if they are engaged in the protection of financial institutions, 
if they are serving as bodyguards (close protection) and in other circumstances described above. Agents 
may legally discharge their weapon only where there is no other way to protect persons and objects. 
Before firing, an agent must give two clear warnings that he intends to shoot if the person does not 
obey. If firing, the first round must be fired into the air. Firearms cannot be used against persons under 
the age of 18. If firing, agents must take care not to inflict lethal wounds and to inflict the least possible 
damage. If they have applied measures under points c, e, f, g and h above, agents must inform the 
responsible person in the PSC not later than eight hours after the measure has been applied. The 
responsible person must then inform the police in writing, not later than 24 hours after the measure 
has been applied. The police are then required to review the report, investigate the circumstances and 
decide whether the measures deployed were legal and justified. 
Every PSC must have an armoury that conforms to certain specifications (e.g. it 
must be fireproof for several hours, be alarmed etc).55 The MoI issues a register of 
weapons and ammunition to each workplace that is licensed to retain firearms. This 
is to be kept on the company premises. A similar register is required at the facilities, 
which PSCs have applied to guard using firearms, and on arrival and departure at the 
site, agents are required to sign in and out. 56
Although the evidence gathered during the course of this research did not point 
to any conclusive evidence that force or firearms are routinely being misused by 
personnel employed in the sector, one of the human rights organisations contacted 
knew of six or seven such cases as having been publicly reported during the past 
five years.57 It appears however that in each of these cases, the guards or agents 
accused of excessive use of force were ultimately cleared.58 When interviewed for 
this research report, the Association of Security Services complained that private 
security agents are not allowed to use weapons other than firearms. While wanting to retain the option to use 
firearms, they argued that the additional use of less-lethal weapons (sticks, electric shock devices etc.) would 
provide a better solution to the problems PSC staff face. The legal prohibition on PSC staff using handcuffs when 
apprehending a suspect was also commented on, and cited as counter-productive since it encourages the use of 
other, less ‘elegant’ methods of restraint by guards while they await the arrival of the police.59
5.1 Oversight
A specialised ‘Private Protection Sector’ within the Inspectorate of the MoI conducts oversight of PSCs, including 
the registration and licensing of firms, licensing of guards and agents, registration of firearms and monitoring of 
55 ‘Spatial and Technical Conditions of the Private Security and Private Detective Company’s Premises Regulation’ (Pravilnik o prostornim 
i tehničkim uvjetima koje mora ispunjavati prostor u kojem se obavlja zaštitarska ili detektivska djelatnost), Narodne Novine, 40/1997; 
amended in 107/2002.
56 Op cit Martic.
57 Interview, Neva Tölle, Co-ordinator, Autonomous Women’s House Zagreb (Human rights group; inter alia maintaining a shelter for abused 
women). Zagreb, 14 February 2005. In contrast the interviewee from ‘AKD-Zaštita’, did not know of a single event where a firearm had been 
used by PSC staff in the last seven years. Op cit Martic.
58 Op cit Franjo. Interview, Koraljka Dilić, Project Manager, Media Net Project, ‘Zamir Net’ (Human rights group), Zagreb, 09 February 2005.
59 Op cit Vrbanc.
Security Guard,
 AKD - Zastita d.o.o, 2005
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 A
K
D
-Z
as
tit
a 
d.
o.
o,
 2
0
0
5
47
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
their conduct.60 The oversight and control of the sector by the MoI appears to be strict and detailed. Companies 
are required to inform the Ministry about significant events, such as a search by a guard, within 24 hours. The 
MoI then decides if the action taken by the guard or agent was lawful and issues a decision.61 To be registered as 
a PSC in the first place, the company must fulfil the following requirements:
‘The company must be registered with the Trade Court; the ‘responsible person’ of the company must 
be registered; a list of positions with responsibilities within the company must be established and 
registered; the company must have a registered trade mark (armoury); the design of uniforms of the 
employees must be registered; the company must have premises that fulfil requirements (inter alia, for 
storing weapons)’. 
To work for a security company one must live in Croatia, be above 18 years of age, have a college education, 
be in good health, have no criminal record for crimes that require mandatory prosecution, not be under criminal 
investigation or have been sentenced for petty offences (misdemeanours) involving violence in the last three 
years, pass a security background check by the state security agency, speak Croatian and be able to write in the 
Latin script.62  With the exception of those taking legal responsibility for the firm (‘responsible persons’) who are 
vetted by the state security agency, background checks for employees are carried out by the police.63 
There are a number of industry trade associations. For example in the Croatian Chamber of Commerce there is 
an Association of the Detective and Private Security Sector, membership of which is mandatory under law.64 The 
Croatian Employers’ Association also has an Association of Security Services with more limited membership. 
Other relevant industry bodies include the Private Protection Guild and the Trade Union of Private Protection 
Personnel. The industry has not however agreed on any codes of conduct, though members of the Association of 
Detective and Private Security Sector debated the idea in the past.65
5.2 Professionalism and training
The law requires that PSC personnel must undergo training and pass an exam in an authorised institution.66 
However, persons formally employed by the police, military police, state security services, former court and prison 
guards and prosecution officers are exempt from the exam provided they have three years’ work experience.67 
There is a twin-track system of education for private security agents and private security technicians. Firstly, 
if a candidate does not have a secondary school education, he/she must first complete his schooling – three 
years being required for agents, and four years for technicians. Three specialised schools offer a programme for 
PSC staff, in Zagreb, Pula and Rijeka.68 Alternatively, candidates who have already obtained a secondary school 
education need only undergo short courses of 40 hours in the case of guards and 80 hours for agents.69 Training 
courses are designed to reflect the legal requirements detailed above, and trainees are therefore taught to apply 
minimum force, and provide medical assistance if injuries have been inflicted during their work.70
60 Op cit Private Protection Act, Articles 55 - 57.
61 Ibid, Articles 41 - 43.
62 Ibid, Article 18.
63 Ibid, Article 18/4, 20/4, ‘Ways of Establishing General and Specific Health Ability of Guards and Private Security Agents Regulation’ 
(Pravilnik o načinu utvrđivanja opće i posebne zdravstvene sposobnosti čuvara i zaštitara u privatnoj zaštiti), Narodne Novine, 38/2004, 24 
March 2004.
64 Op cit Martić, Marušić, Vrbanc.
65 Op cit Martić.
66 Op cit Private Protection Act, Article 18/4, 20/4; ‘Ways of Establishing General and Specific Health Ability of Guards and Private Security 
Agents Regulation,’ 2004.
67 Op cit Private Protection Act, Article 21.
68 D Vodič kroz zanimanja, elektronsko izdanje. ‘Zaštitari osoba i imovine’. http://mrav.ffzg.hr/zanimanja/book/part2/node3704.htm.
69 Op cit Franjo.
70 Op cit Franjo and Martic.
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6 Conclusion and recommendations
The industry in Croatia seems to be well-regulated and undergoing a process of steady expansion as the economy 
improves. The industry will probably professionalise further as it is highly likely that international security 
companies will enter this market due to recent legal changes.
There are however a number of concerns. These principally revolve around two issues. Firstly, there is the 
perception of competition between the public security sector (the police and a state-owned security company) 
and the private security sector. Such competition can sour relations between the two parts of the sector and could 
undermine strong professional working relationships. Secondly, there have emerged a number of allegations of 
connections between a minority of PSCs and organised crime. While it has not been possible to verify these 
allegations this is an area of some concern that needs to be addressed by both regulatory bodies and the 
industry itself – self-regulation could play a particularly important role in improving the reputation of the industry 
as a whole.
6.1 Main recommendations
n The current legal framework should be rationalised so as to bring old or problematic laws into line with the 
Private Protection Act of 2003.
n Consideration should be given to monitoring selected PSCs on the basis of risk profiling, to minimise the 
danger of PSCs being misused by organised crime syndicates in future.
n Consideration should be given to the possibility of prohibiting security companies from making political 
donations, and at a minimum, full transparency over donations should be required, and such practices 
closely monitored.
n The MoI and police should take steps to close down the burgeoning illegal surveillance market.
n The better-established PSCs should come together to agree a progressive code of conduct and promote its 
adoption throughout the industry. Government and clients should encourage this.
n Oversight should be improved by empowering parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman to scrutinise 
the conduct of PSCs and handle public complaints.
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Macedonia1
1 Background to the privatization of security
Through the 1990s while the neighbouring former republics of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were mired in conflict, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia) was a relative bastion of 
calm, much vaunted by the international community for its stability. By 1999 
however, the pressures created by conflict in Kosovo exacerbated tensions 
between Macedonia’s two major communities – ethnic Macedonians and 
ethnic Albanians – to the point where armed conflict occurred in 2001. A set 
of common factors were apparent as underlying causes of this conflict, most 
of them common to Macedonia’s western neighbours. These included a poorly 
functioning economy, links between politics and the criminal underworld, social division and political exclusion, 
particularly of the ethnic Albanian community. Nevertheless, a massive influx of ethnic Albanian refugees and the 
fighting in Kosovo itself were the primary triggers for violent responses from ethnic Macedonians and Albanians 
respectively. In one respect at least the connection between the conflicts in Macedonia and Kosovo was highly 
direct – many of the recruits who joined the main rebel faction in Macedonia, the National Liberation Army, were 
actually ex-KLA fighters.2 The conflict between the Government of Macedonia and the main rebel group, the NLA 
was minor by regional standards, leading to some 70 deaths and 170,000 displaced persons in seven months. 
As in other parts of the region, the ready availability of SALW facilitated the resort to violence.3
Fresh from an intervention in Kosovo, the international community became quickly engaged in the Macedonian 
conflict, brokering a comprehensive peace agreement in August 2001 – the Framework Agreement – that sought 
to address the underlying causes of conflict and reconstitute Macedonia as a truly multi-ethnic state.4 Despite 
ongoing difficulties, the implementation of the Agreement has progressed, and Macedonia’s prospects have 
improved greatly since 2001 with a remarkable turnaround in the quality of governance. Meanwhile the continued 
presence of international peacekeepers and monitors, first NATO and then the EU, serves as a guarantee of 
security and a confidence-building measure to marginalised groups.
Progress at the macro level is nevertheless offset by difficulties on the ground and the security situation remains 
difficult in places. At community level in some areas, ethnic division spills over into low-level cleansing, and 
population transfers have been taking place, particularly in the border areas. As a result, segregation and mistrust 
has grown in some parts of the country, despite the existence of a national level peace agreement. The country’s 
numerous security forces have not, at least until recently, enjoyed the complete public trust, and several security 
agencies have required reform or dissolution, including: the ‘Tigers’ – a special anti-terrorist police unit charged 
with combating organised crime; the ‘Lions’ – an extremely controversial paramilitary formation of reserve police 
closely linked to the VMRO government during the 2001 crisis; and some tens of thousands of police reservists, 
now demobilised. One of the ways this situation has been addressed is through the deployment of a multi-ethnic 
police (MEP), created and trained with the backing of the OSCE and the European Agency for Reconstruction 
(EAR).
There are presently between 55 and 60 registered private security providers in Macedonia although not all are 
active. Some 3,000 - 6,000 individuals are licensed to work as security guards although some are employed 
by firms or legal entities and provide security directly for the companies’ personnel and installations rather 
1 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
2 After the Ohrid Agreement and the de facto inclusion of the NLA into the legitimate political process in exchange for laying down arms, 
more extreme but ultimately less significant groups appeared, most notably the Albanian National Army (ANA – Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare 
(AKSh) in Albanian). 
3 Reports also suggest that the availability of SALW was a source of tension in itself, with ethnic Macedonians perceiving Albanians as heavily 
armed, and ethnic Albanians resenting the arming of ethnic Macedonians by the state.
4 A highly technical document, among other things the Agreement made provisions for Albanian armed groups to surrender weapons to 
NATO peacekeepers, and the Macedonian Government to institute a process of decentralization, recognising Albanian language educational 
institutions and establishing proportionate representation in government.
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than to external clients.5 All PSCs operating in Macedonia are locally owned and permitted to employ armed 
security guards. While the industry dates itself from around the attainment of independence, a large number 
of Macedonian PSCs are comparatively new, having been formed in the last couple of years during a period of 
growing insecurity. The PSC MBI, founded in 1994, claims to be the first Macedonian Private Security Agency. 
Several of the larger PSCs were established after MBI but before the ‘Law on Security’, adopted in 1999,6 which 
introduced legislation regulating the industry.  The industry is presently going through a period of expansion as a 
result of a fear of crime and ethnic mistrust between the ethnic Macedonian population and the ethnic Albanian 
minority. The more prominent PSCs operating in Macedonia are:7
n Nikob Security, Skopje – founded in 1998 with more than 200 trained professionals working in their Guard 
Service;
n Bastion Security, Strumica – founded in 2000 with 10 employees, in 2003 employed 40 individuals in 
physical and technical security;
n Kometa No.1 Security, Skopje – founded in 1998, in 2003 employed 350 individuals;
n Piton Security & Detective Agency, Ohrid – founded in 2003, in 2003 employed 14 people who have Security 
Authorisation cards; 
n Protekt Security, Bitola – founded in 1999, in 2003 employed 100 people, of which 55 have Security 
Authorisation Cards;
n Rote Security, Skopje – founded in 2003, in 2003 employed 20 employees; 
n SMS Security, Kavadarci and Tetovo – founded in 2003, in 2003 employed 55 employees, from which 15 
have obtained the Security Licence and 10 employees have Authorisation Cards for security worker; 
n TIM Security, Skopje – founded in 2000 with 10 people;
n Nestor Garda Security, Strumica – founded in 2001, in 2003 employed 17 people; and
n MBI Security, Skopje – founded in 1994, approximately 50 employees.
As the above list demonstrates, there are comparatively few large PSCs in the country. 
According to the Macedonian Chamber of Security whose main responsibility is 
the registration and licensing of security guards, a good number of smaller firms 
such as Guard Security, Imperator Security, Konzul Security, Lupus Security, OSA 
Security and Professional PSN have less than ten employees. Although the law 
prohibits this, many firms are alleged to operate with less than five employees.8 
In addition, some of the larger firms in Macedonia, (e.g. public utilities), have their 
own security departments. The guards employed by these departments are subject 
to the same controls as those employed by regular PSCs.
A number of the interviewees for this report mentioned that some of the smaller 
companies were struggling, suggesting that the market is currently going through 
a process of consolidation. If Macedonia opens its market up to international PSCs (as it will have to under EU 
accession criteria), it is likely that the process of rationalisation will accelerate. The existence of smaller PSCs 
5 Macedonia’s most recent report on implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW cites 55 registered security companies. 
Macedonian Report on the Implementation of the POA, p 11. Another estimate is given in Dejan Andonov in ‘Do Security Agencies become 
Parallel Police?’ A1 News, 13 February 2005.
6 Atansova F, Physical Security, Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for Security of People and Property, Skopje, 2003.
7 Nikob Website http://www.nikob.com.mk/default01En.asp; Interview with EAR Security, 23 February 2005; Interview with Tihomir 
Nikolovski, Chairman of Chamber for Security of People and Property, 28 February 2005; op cit Atansova.
8 Op cit Tihomir Nikolovski.
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may partly be a reflection of the segregated nature of Macedonian society, and this may also play its part in the 
operation of unregistered firms, as commented on by several interviewees. This problem is thought to be more 
pronounced in ethnic Albanian areas where the economy is less formalised, and parallel social services were 
established in recent times in an attempt to side-step an exclusionary state. 
2 Contemporary security threats
Contemporary Macedonian society exhibits a number of factors that typically serve to drive growth in the private 
security sector including ethnic segregation, a history of recent conflict, rising rates of petty crime (particularly 
in Skopje) and relatively ineffective policing. Although official statistics point to a gradual rise in violent crime, 
unsolved and unreported crimes, of which there are many, must also be taken into account.
Table 1: Violent Crime in FYROM9
CRIME 1995 1998 2002
Homicide 73 108 133
Sex Offences 127 99 132
Rape 49 37 36
Aggravated Theft 9,040 11,116 8,370
Robbery/ Violent Theft 152 217 463
Although Macedonia is generally regarded as a transitional society that has moved beyond its conflict phase, 
serious crimes of a quasi-political nature - including kidnappings, bombings, murders and armed robbery - still 
occur intermittently in former crisis areas of the country with comparatively few prosecutions resulting. A good 
number of groups whose members previously acquired arms from the state, including party activists and self-
defence units but also criminal gangs and ordinary citizens, continue to operate in the country.
A fractious political system and relatively weak state institutions only add to these difficulties. In Macedonia, 
adherence to a party reflects deep social affiliations, such as regional, family and clan loyalties, with parties playing 
a paternalistic role looking after their supporters. Though it is often assumed that the main division in the country 
is along ethnic lines, both the Macedonian and Albanian communities are equally divided within themselves, 
each represented by a number of parties that are constantly locked in bitter struggles with one another.10 With 
an immature private security sector operating in this context, those monitoring the sector should be vigilant in 
case PSCs come to serve the ends of political parties, particularly in case there should ever be a resumption 
of conflict. As past experience has shown, security in Macedonia depends on preventing the recurrence of past 
events such as conflict in Kosovo, weapons trafficking from Albania, and population displacement.
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
The customer base for Macedonian PSCs includes foreign embassies and delegations, UN Agencies, 
manufacturing industry and the financial sector. Services currently being offered by the sector include guard 
service to the banking/finance industry, residential security, security at entertainment events, commercial 
security, industry/manufacturing security, healthcare security, escort services, local security and reception 
service. Several companies also offer a monitoring and alarm service, which includes mobile patrols, alarm 
systems, fire alarm/protection, CCTV/video monitoring, electronic article surveillance and access controls. 
They also offer transportation and cash handling services and consulting, security assessment and security 
planning. A very small segment of the market offers VIP or bodyguard services, and transport and protection of 
tourists or groups throughout country. Some companies also provide private detective services alongside their 
core business. This can include ‘operative research services’ – searching for missing people/objects, searching 
9 International Crime Statistics, 1995, 1998 and 2002, Interpol.
10 Macedonia: Guns, Policing and Ethnic Division, Saferworld and Bonn International Center for Conversion, October 2003, p 16.
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for perpetrators of crimes, searching for convicted or sentenced persons, 
finding proof for divorce/other legal procedures and revealing indemnity 
of a company/financial situation of an individual.11 It is interesting to note 
that a significant number of companies who offer services are offering client 
protection in one form or another, suggesting that despite the relatively low 
levels of crime in the country the fear of crime (or other communities) seems 
relatively high. 
4 Affiliation between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
The majority of security guards employed by PSCs have a former police or military background. This can be 
explained by a number of factors. After the inter ethnic fighting in 2001, Macedonia went through a process 
of police restructuring which led to a number of redundancies amongst ethnic Macedonian policemen, which 
provided a pool of experienced security personnel for PSCs. Additional incentive for military and police personnel 
to join PSC is provided by the higher average wage in the private security sector. While the average salary for a 
junior policeman is just €100-€200 per month, the average salary for a junior private security guard is €200-
300 per month. These former police/military personnel have a range of informal links with the state security 
structures. There are instances of more overt connections between state security structures and the private 
security sector. For example, the PSC ‘Lupus Security’ was alleged by one interviewee to be linked to former 
members of the Army’s elite Special Forces unit, the ‘Wolves’, (hence the name ‘Lupus’, which means ’Wolf’).12 
The preponderance of former state security personnel in the private security sector, while almost inevitable, 
is worrying due to the potential for the private security industry to become a ‘third force’. The existence of any 
specific affiliations needs to be addressed with some concern. In contrast to several other countries in the 
region however, this research found no evidence of serving police officers working for PSCs while off-duty. (The 
Macedonian laws prohibit those who have worked for the security forces from taking up employment with PSCs 
for a minimum of two years after the termination of their employment).
4.2 Ethnic affiliations
Macedonian society is highly segregated, with clearly defined ethnic areas. As the private security industry 
tends to mirror the wider society where it operates, ethnic Albanian PSCs tend to operate in areas with an 
ethnic Albanian majority, while not in those with an ethnic Macedonian majority and vice versa. The Chamber 
for Security claims that, since the end of the 2001 crisis, three to four agencies owned and operated by ethnic 
Albanians have registered with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for security work. There has also been a 
recent increase in the number of individuals from the ethnic Albanian community applying to take the State 
Examination for Security Workers. The Chairman of the Chamber views this as a positive development, since prior 
to the 2001 crisis the Chamber had no information on the PSCs owned or operated by ethnic Albanians.13 These 
developments could, however, also be interpreted as ethnic Albanians taking measures to ensure that they have 
their own armed guards and security providers.
There have also been allegations that some PSCs are associated with specific groups that were involved in the 
ethnic conflict in 2001. In addition to the connections with the Wolves unit described above, it has also been 
claimed that a large number of former members of the Lions Unit have now found employment in the Kometa 
No.1 Security Agency.14
11 This list comes from an analysis of the activities of three different firms’ work. Interviews with Bogdan Ugrinovski, Director, MBI Security, 
01 March 2005; and Filip Nikolovski, Nikob Security, 01 February 2005; op cit Atansova.
12 Interview with anonymous PSC employee, February 2005.
13 Op cit Tihomir Nikolovski.
14 Op cit Ugrinovski; Interviews with Lupcho Siljanovski, former security guard, 04 Feb 2005; and Henry Bolton, Security Advisor, UK Embassy, 
26 February 2005; op cit Andonov. 
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4.3 Political affiliations
Affiliation between PSCs and the various political parties is perhaps the greatest source of concern regarding 
the operation of the private security sector in Macedonia. As long as PSCs remain linked to political parties, 
there remains the potential for the existence of parallel security forces, which are inherently less accountable 
and transparent and therefore more susceptible to misuse. The linkage between government officials, political 
parties and the private security industry is quite clear. For instance Branko Bojcevski, the former Director of 
OSA Security is currently Director of Public Safety in MIA. Under the previous SDSM government (1991 - 1998) 
Branko Bojcevski was also appointed to Chief of Traffic at the MIA in 1995.15 He also worked as Head of Security 
at Komercijalna Banka (Commercial Bank), while Hari Kostov was president of the bank.16 Kostov was appointed 
Interior Minister under the 2002 SDSM government and shortly later served as SDSM Prime Minister in 2004. 
Another example is Rote Zaovski the founder of Rote Security who was appointed chief of sector for economic 
crimes in the MIA in 1995.17
Given the importance of patronage in the Macedonian political system, where it is commonplace for government 
officials to award supporters with jobs and contracts, it is quite reasonable to expect favouritism to influence the 
awarding of security contracts. Several interviewees remarked on the workings of the VMRO-DPMNE government 
of 1998 - 2002, alleging that Kometa No.1 security agency was given preferential treatment during this period 
in applying for government contracts to provide security at buildings or public events. According to the same 
interviewees, when the SDSM government returned to power in 2002, newly appointed civil servants gave OSA 
security agency contracts, and in some cases appointed its staff to the MIA.18
Further, some PSCs allegedly have direct links to certain political parties. In particular the Kometa No1 Security 
Agency has close links to the VMRO-DPMNE party and the OSA Security Agency has close links to the SDSM 
party. Early in 2005 the owner, Zoran Jovanovski, and employees of Kometa No1 Security Agency participated 
in a political demonstration in front of the courthouse where the ‘Rastanski Lozja’ case is being tried.19 The 
demonstration was to show support to the defendants and former VMRO-DPMNE Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski. 
Daily newspapers claim that in addition to Kometa Security Staff, former members of the now disbanded Lions 
Unit and a group calling itself the ‘Macedonian United Force’ (dressed in black uniforms) participated in the 
political demonstration.20 Further, the wives of the defendants in the ‘Rastanski Lozja’ case claim that their 
husbands were not arrested by police, but rather OSA personnel and that they were driven away in vehicles with 
no licence plates. They claim these arrests were politically motivated as the OSA Security agencies have close 
connections to the SDSM government.21 The ‘Rashtanski Lozja’ trial is a politically charged court case due to its 
links to the previous VMRO-DPMNE government and allegations of revenge by the current SDSM government.
4.4 Organised crime affiliations
Although a recent study has claimed that some PSCs or their employees are ‘linked to organised crime’,22 evidence 
of systematic links was not found during this research. Individual cases of criminal activity are certainly on 
record, such as the case of a PSC employee recently convicted of extortion and attempted blackmail.  There are 
also unconfirmed accounts of PSC involvement in political and business corruption provided by interviewees for 
this research. In particular it has been alleged that a PSC was involved in threatening small shop owners at the 
city’s main shopping centre in an attempt to get the shop owners to close their businesses and move to a newly 
15 ‘Interior Ministry: a number of Chiefs replaced’, Nova Makedonija, 20 October 1995. English translation by Macedonian Information Center 
(MIC).
16 ‘Private Agency OSA conducted the arrests by Holding a gun to a child’s head’, Dnevnik Daily Newspaper No 2659, 17 January 2005.
17 Op cit Nova Makedonija. 
18 Op cit Ugrinovski, Siljanovski, Bolton. Also, op cit Andonov.
19 Ibid.
20 ‘Threats and Protests During ‘Rastanski Lozja’ Continued Trail’, originally reported by local print media: Dnevnik, Utrinski Vesnik, Madedonija 
Denes, Vreme, Vest, Vecer, Nova Madedonija, 19 January 2005. English translation of local media in Skopje Diem.
21 ‘Wives of Rostanski Lozja Defendants swear OSA arrested at gunpoint’, Dnevnik Daily Newspaper, 19 January 2005.
22 Op cit ‘Macedonia: Guns, Policing and Ethnic Division’, p 30.
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built shopping centre, owned by a businessman allegedly linked to the current government.  Although evidence 
of such actions is anecdotal, corrupt and criminal activities by PSCs should obviously be closely scrutinised by 
law enforcement agencies.
5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
The laws covering the private security industry are the following:
n The ‘Law on the Personal and Property Security Activities’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘Law on Security’). 
Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No 80/99, dated 17 December 1999; and
n The ‘Law on Arms’. Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No 07/05, January 
2005.
Sections I and II of the Law on Security cover the requirements for registration of companies and personnel with 
the police and the conditions that apply in the course of providing such services. Although background checks 
are required by the new Law on Weapons, the Law on Security does not require background checks to prevent 
convicted criminals owning or working in a PSC. The law does however specify that individuals applying for PSC 
work must not have a court decision prohibiting them from employment.23 A security guard can never get a 
licence for possession and carrying a firearm if he has a criminal record (Articles 9 and 12). According to the 
Chairman of the Chamber for Security, most applicants bring a statement from the court demonstrating that they 
have no criminal record, even though this is not required.24 Article 8 of the Law on Security also stipulates that 
individuals licensed for private security activities by MIA must be citizens of Macedonia and have residence in the 
country.25 As a result, no international PSCs have been granted a licence to operate in Macedonia. However, the 
MIA reports that it is reviewing the procedure to consider issuing a licence to one firm, which was co-founded by 
a Macedonian citizen and a foreign citizen.26 Article 8 of the law also stipulates that security workers must pass 
a state examination administered by the Chamber for Security in order to receive a licence to work, with Article 9 
describing the content of that examination.
While the Law on Security provides the essential legislative framework and the oversight provided by the Chamber 
for Security and MIA sees to the basis of a good regulatory system, there are questions as to the extent to which 
the laws and regulations are enforced. As discussed above, the apparent close links between some PSCs and 
political parties carries the potential for abuse. 
5.2 Use of force and firearms 
The Law on Security requires that ‘security workers may be armed in accordance with the regulations concerning 
purchase, ownership and use of firearms’ (Article 20, Paragraph 1). This means that Macedonia’s main legislation 
on civilian firearms possession and acquisition, the Law on Arms passed in February 2005, also applies to PSCs 
as described below. In the case of PSCs however, the law on security requires that weapons used for this purpose 
be registered to the company by the MIA. Although all private security guards are trained in weapons handling 
and use in the run-up to the State Examination (see below), the law requires that PSC staff wishing to carry arms 
must have first been licensed and issued an ID card by the Chamber of Security and also receive approval from 
the ministry to carry firearms as per the Law on Arms. Approved personnel may only carry the firearm during 
service hours.27 
23 ‘Law on Security No88/99’, Article 8, Paragraph 2, Item 3.
24 Op cit Tihomir Nikolovski.
25 Section II Article 5 states that: ‘in addition to the conditions envisaged for the registration [as legal business under the ‘Law on Commercial 
Societies’], it is necessary for the legal person to have at least five persons with a licence and work permit issued by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The legal Person from Paragraph 1 of this article may be established by a domestic legal of physical person’.
26 Information provided by Goran Pavlovski, Spokesperson for Ministry of Internal Affairs, 25 February 2005.
27 Op cit Tihomir Nikolovski; Information provided by Pavlovski, 25 February 2005.
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The Law on Security (Article 20) also restricts the type of firearms that PSCs may use, stating that this is to be 
determined by the MIA. Pistols and revolvers are most commonly used although in some circumstances semi-
automatic rifles have been approved for private security provision outside populated areas (e.g. guarding dams 
or radio towers).28 The weapons permitted for use by PSC employees, with approval from the MIA, are defined in 
Categories B and C in Article 4 of the ‘Law on Arms’.29 These are listed below: 
Category B – weapons that can be acquired with a permit are:
• Semi-automatic or repeater firearms;
• Single shot short firearms with central firing pin;
• Single shot short firearms with total length smaller than 28cm;
• Semi-automatic long firearms with magazine and chamber containing more than three bullets;
• Semi-automatic long firearms with magazine and chamber containing less than three bullets and with a 
movable charger;
• Repeater and semi-automatic long firearms, with unrifled barrel less than 60 cm;
• Semi-automatic long firearms for civilian use, similar to automatic firearms;
• Single shot long firearms with one or more rifled barrels;
• Pneumatic weapon with projectile’s energy over 7.5J and calibre over 4.5mm; and
• Weapons for industrial purposes.
Category C – weapons, which can be acquired with a permit issued under extenuating conditions, are:
• Repeater long firearms, not included under point 6 of Category B;
• Semi-automatic long firearms, not included under points 4,5,6,and 7 of Category B;
• Single-shot short firearms with total length larger or equivalent to 28cm;
• Pneumatic weapons with projectile’s energy of 7.5J, and calibre of 4.5mm; and
• Weapons for light-acoustic signalisation.
As the Law on Arms was only passed in January 2005, the type of firearms that can be used by private security 
guards ‘will be more precisely regulated in the sub-legal acts which the Minster of Internal Affairs should pass’.30 
Article 7 of Law on Arms, restricts the amount of ammunition that a PSC may possess to up to 50 rounds for every 
weapon listed on its licence. As noted above, Macedonia’s 2004 report on implementation of the UN Programme 
of Action on SALW cites 55 registered security companies.31 The same report indicates that 13,797 SALW are 
registered to ‘Legal Entities’, which includes PSCs and legal subjects (of the government, but not Army or Police). 
As there are a maximum of 6,000 licensed security guards in the country, official statistics alone suggest that 
28 Op cit Tihomir Nikolovski.
29 Official Gazette of RM, No.07/05.
30 Information provided by Pavlovski, 25 February 2005.
31 Macedonian Report on the Implementation of the POA, p 11.
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PSCs are relatively well armed.32 However, one must also take into account the widespread availability of illegal 
weapons in Macedonia, which are widely believed to be used by at least some PSCs.33
There do not presently seem to be any specific legal regulations regarding the storage of firearms and ammunition 
licensed to PSCs. The Law on Security No88/99, Article 20, Paragraph 1, states that ‘security workers may be 
armed in accordance with the regulations concerning purchase, ownership and use of fire-arms’. The new ‘Law 
on Arms’ does include new regulations on safe-storage (Article 13) and may positively affect the storage security 
for firearms and ammunition licensed to PSCs. If this is not the case then this is a clear area where additional 
regulation should be considered. Also, there do not appear to be any restrictions on the carriage of concealed 
weapons at the present time.
According to the Law on Security, Article 17, ‘the security worker shall be entitled to apply physical force only 
when it is necessary for the performance of duties’, until the arrival of police and only after a loud verbal warning. 
Article 21 states that ‘a security worker shall have the right to use firearms only if he is objectively incapable of 
calling the police and if, in some other way, he is incapable of repelling an immediate attack’. Article 21 further 
defines what qualifies as an immediate attack. In case of the use of force, a security worker and PSC are required 
to inform immediately (at the latest within 24hrs) the MIA and, in the case of any use of a firearm, the PSC and 
security worker are to submit a written report to the ministry immediately, and no later than 24 hours after the 
incident. Article 22 further limits the use of a firearm by forbidding its use when it may endanger lives of other 
citizens, against a visibly pregnant woman, children and older people (except if they are using a firearm to directly 
endanger security workers or persons in their charge). Articles 36 and 37 of the Law on Security contain penal 
provisions for the inappropriate use of force, misuse of firearms and failure to report a use of force.
There has been significant media coverage of alleged excessive use of force by some PSCs in Macedonia. In the 
most notable case, the wife of a defendant in the politically charged ‘Rashtanski Lozja’ Court Case testified that 
her husband was arrested during a raid by ‘masked personnel wearing the personalised uniform of the Security 
Agency OSA, led personally by Branko Bojchevski [OSA Director]’. During the raid on their home on 09 May 2004, 
the wife claimed that the OSA security personnel held guns to their children’s heads.34
5.3 Professionalism and training 
In order for an individual to receive a licence for employment as a security worker, the individual must apply to the 
Chamber for Security to take the State Examination. The application includes basic information on the individual 
and a 6000MKD (€100) fee to take the examination. In order to pass the examination, the applicant must pass 
at least seven of twelve subjects, eleven written/theoretical and a final practical exam on shooting and handling 
of firearms. The twelve subjects include: 
a) the ‘Law on Security’; 
b) criminal law; 
c) criminology; 
d) the ‘Law on procuring, possession and carrying of weapons’ (this subject will be updated to cover the new 
‘Law on Arms’ which has replaced this legislation); authorisation and tactics in use of authorisations; 
e) organisation of security matters; 
f) tactics in performing security measures; 
32 So far only 112 firearms have been registered with the Ministry of Internal Affairs by PSCs since the new Law on Arms came into force. 
These include 103 pistols, six hunting rifles, and three semi-automatic rifles. Information provided by Pavlovski, 25 February 2005.
33 According to a recent report on SALW and security in Macedonia, it is not unknown for private security guards to carry illegal weapons. Op 
cit ‘Macedonia: Guns, Policing and Ethnic Division’, p30.
34 The Rashtanski Lozja trail is a politically charged court case, due to its links to the previous VMRO-DPMNE government and allegations of 
revenge by the current SDSM government. In the trial, several former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the former VMRO-
DPMNE Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski, are accused of orchestrating the 2002 murder of seven economic migrants from South Asia in 
order to claim the Ministry and Police had foiled an attempted terrorist attack on the US and UK Embassies. It is alleged this was an attempt 
to show Macedonia’s support and role in the US lead War on Terror. Dnevnik, 17 January 2005; Dnevnik, 19 January 2005.
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g) the firing and handling of firearms; 
h) self-defence; 
i) fire prevention and safety; 
j) use of means and devices for technical protection; and 
k) first aid. 
Some PSCs, including OSA and Nikob, apparently offer preparatory training courses in preparation for the State 
Examination. The Chamber for Security publishes the training manual, which covers all of the above subjects, 
and other materials for the State Exam.35 When an individual passes the State examination he receives a licence 
from the Chamber for Security, which qualifies him to be employed as a security worker. Upon employment with a 
PSC or other entity, the PSC or company must register the security worker with the Chamber for Security in order 
to receive an ID badge (Security Authorisation Card). According to Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Law on Security, 
the security worker is required to carry the ID badge with him at all times while on duty and must show this ID 
badge whilst on duty or upon request from authorised staff of the MIA. Upon termination of employment the ID 
badge must be immediately surrendered to the Chamber for Security.36
As well as the above training and examinations, the Chamber for Security also provides a ‘Code of Professional 
Ethics of Security Officers’. The code was voluntarily adopted by members of the Chamber for Security and 
includes commitments to obey the law, maintain professionalism and restrain from the unnecessary use of force. 
All security workers employed by companies that belong to the Chamber for Security must take an oath to abide 
by this code.37 Despite all of the above, a previous study on security in Macedonia found that in reality, the level 
of professionalism among PSCs varies greatly.38 Interviews conducted for this research suggest that in general 
it is the larger PSCs that have developed the better practices, not least because their higher profile client base 
demands it.39
5.1 Oversight
In theory Macedonia now has good regulations covering oversight of the private security industry. The situation 
is certainly much improved compared to the period before 1999 when the Law on Security was introduced, and 
information gathered during this research points to the level of professionalism in the industry as increasing 
over time. There are, however, a number of anomalies, the most important of which is the lack of a requirement 
for background checks of private security guards. Security guards are only required not to have a court decision 
prohibiting them from employment.40 According to the Chairman of the Chamber for Security, applicant security 
guards must submit a document from the court stating that there is no security measure or court decision that 
prohibits that persons employment. However, most applicants bring a statement from the court demonstrating 
that they have no criminal record, even though this is beyond what is required by the law.41 
The MIA and the Chamber for Security are the main regulatory bodies for the private security industry in Macedonia. 
According to the Law on Security (No 88/99), a PSC, in addition to registering as a business in accordance with 
the Law on Commercial Societies, must be registered and approved by the MIA for the performance of security for 
property and people.42 Furthermore, a commission with four members (two from MIA and two from the Chamber 
for Security) is responsible for the State Examination required for the licensing of security workers.43 The MIA also 
35 Tumanovski D et al, ‘Obezbeduvanje na lica I imot’, Chamber for Security of People and Property, Skopje, 2001.
36 Op cit Nikolovski.
37 Op cit Atansova.
38 Op cit ‘Macedonia: Guns, Policing and Ethnic Division’, p 30.
39 Interview with Rupert Breitmeyer, Security Officer for EAR, 23 February 2005.
40 Law on Security No88/99, Article 8, Paragraph 2, Item 3.
41 Op cit Nikolovski.
42 Law on Security No80/99, Articles 3 and 5.
43 Law on Security, No.80/99, Article 9.
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provides professional assistance and organises annual shooting practice for security workers. In addition, all use 
of force by a PSC must be reported to MIA. Furthermore, the MIA is responsible for the implementation of the 
‘Law on Security, the work of the Chamber for Security, as well as overseeing PSCs.44
The duties of the Chamber for Security include: 45
a) Organising the State Examination; 
b) Issuing licences to individuals who have passed the examination to work as a security worker; 
c) Issuing ID badges (Security Authorisation Cards) to companies; 
d) Maintaining records of those licensed individuals and companies; and
e) Improving image and professionalism of the security industry in Macedonia.
As always, the extent to which these regulations are implemented is the key question. While further research 
would be required to examine this issue in detail, an initial area of concern may be the political associations 
attributed by some commentators to Macedonian PSCs, the existence of which would make it impossible to 
rigorously implement the regulations governing the industry.
There does not appear to be any attempt at self-regulation within the industry. This is unfortunate and should be 
encouraged, as it would be a way of de-politicising some of the oversight of the industry. If and when the market 
is opened up to international companies, this will become especially important.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
Macedonia appears to face similar challenges to neighbouring countries in the region with respect to the effective 
regulation and oversight of PSCs. Although gaps remain, the introduction of new legislation has provided a 
reasonably good basis for oversight of the sector as a whole, including individual security guards’ use of force 
and firearms. As is the case in other countries, consistent enforcement of the applicable laws is not an easy task 
and requires greater attention. PSCs clearly operate in a difficult context with ethnic segregation, limited state 
capacity, corruption, patronage networks and the widespread availability of SALW posing clear challenges to their 
work. Under these conditions it is understandably difficult to maintain consistently high standards. Yet despite 
this, the larger PSCs providing security to international organisations and businesses (e.g. Nikob and MBI) seem 
to be quite professional. It is perhaps the smaller PSCs that are less organised, less professional and also seem 
to be facing real difficulties in surviving in the current commercial climate. 
Wherever firms are closely linked to political parties – as has been alleged in the case of the two largest 
firms, Osa and Kometa No1 Security Agency – any professionalism will be undermined by those links, which 
compromise the independence of the firm and carry the risks of misuse of force for political ends and corruption. 
The existence of such links, predominantly political in nature but with an inevitable ethnic component because 
of the structure of Macedonian society and politics, is the principle issue facing the industry today. Such linkages 
are important for two reasons. Firstly, strong political links can undermine the effectiveness of regulation and 
oversight. Secondly, in a society that is polarised along ethnic lines, it is important that private security companies 
do not become the legal proxies of ethnic paramilitaries. The industry itself might contribute more in this area, 
with the more established and respectable firms coming together to better define and uphold best practice 
among themselves.
44 Law on Security, No.80/99, Section VII, Supervision, Articles 32, 33, 34 and 35.
45 Op cit Nikolovski.
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6.1 Main recommendations 
n The MIA should take action against all unlicensed operators without delay, requiring companies either to 
obtain licences or dissolve.
n Criminal background checks should be made a mandatory prerequisite for issuing Security Authorisation 
Cards. A licence to work as a security guard should be time-limited, and a requirement for re-testing or re-
checking for criminal behaviour before re-issuing a licence should be introduced.
n The Law on Security should be amended to expressly prohibit the carriage of concealed weapons by PSC 
staff.
n The use of military-style weapons by PSCs should be prohibited.
n The laws on the storage of SALW and ammunition should be clarified.
n The MIA should work in cooperation with other actors to eliminate the use of illegal SALW by PSCs.
n The system for licensing weapons to PSC staff should be amended. Time-limited weapon permits and 
objective criteria for assessing the need of those applying for firearms should be introduced.
n The MIA should thoroughly investigate all cases of excessive use of force by PSC staff and prosecutions 
initiated where appropriate.
n The Government of Macedonia and the international community should give greater consideration to political 
affiliations of PSCs and their links to current and former security personnel. Given the governance context 
in Macedonia, attempts at self-regulation may be the best solution to these problems in the short-term. It 
is important that PSCs work to de-politicise themselves, and to distance themselves from security forces, 
whether current or disbanded.
n Joint working agreements should be introduced to specify the roles and responsibilities of PSCs and police 
in joint operations and minimise the chance that the two sectors enter into competition.
n The legal prohibition on foreign firms working in Macedonia should be removed. This is likely to drive up 
standards by introducing a new element of competition.
n Oversight should be improved by empowering parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman to scrutinise 
the conduct of PSCs and handle public complaints.
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Moldova
1 Background to the privatization of security
Since declaring its independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991, Mol-
dova’s political, economic and institutional development has been under-
mined by the lack of a resolution of the status of the breakaway region of 
Transdniestria, which occupies the area between the river Dniestr and the 
Republic of Moldova’s (RM) border with Ukraine, and has large ethnic Russian 
and Ukrainian communities. Transdniestria gained de facto ‘independence’ 
during a brief conflict in 1992, and has developed a range of administrative 
institutions that mirrors those of the Republic of Moldova. The breakaway 
Transdniestrian administration’s control over the 425km long border between 
Moldova and Ukraine undermines any attempt that the Republic of Moldova might make to police its own borders 
and restricts its ability to combat smuggling, arms transfers and other illegal activities, and as a result a profitable re-
export business has developed through Transdniestria due to taxation loopholes1 as well as smuggling.2 Moldova’s 
economic situation is characterised by extreme poverty, especially in rural areas. In addition to inadequate health 
and school facilities, roads and transport, a lack of business/employment opportunities is one of the main causes 
for migration from the countryside to the capital and to foreign countries.3 
The Republic of Moldova inherited a range of institutional deficiencies from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova 
(SSRM), which it succeeded in 1991. Although the republics seceding from the Soviet Union were endowed with 
state institutions, such as Ministries of Interior (MoI), these institutions were heavily reliant upon the central Soviet 
administration in Moscow for policy formulation and, in most cases, simply implemented central Soviet policy. 
Consequently, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was a lack of experience of policy formulation and 
implementation at the institutional level. This weak institutional capacity was particularly relevant in the security 
sphere where it has taken the successor states a considerable amount of time to build up their military and policing 
infrastructure. In particular, the Moldovan Armed Forces had to be built from scratch in the early 1990s, while the 
Moldovan police force has had to undergo retraining in the provision of more ethical and citizen centred policing due 
to its previous focus on maintaining the power of the state under the Soviet administration. 
Moldova has found it problematic to engage in SSR, with reform mostly involving the ‘periodic downsizing of the 
armed forces and the redistribution of tasks among the institutions and organisations responsible for national 
security’.4 The most important document relating to SSR in Moldova is the ‘Concept of Military Reform’, which was 
approved by the Parliament of Moldova in July 2002. The document underlines the fact that Moldova does not 
face ‘enemies’ and the threat of conflict with another state is very low. Instead, there was a greater emphasis on 
‘soft’ security threats, such as organised crime and smuggling activities involving drugs and weapons. According 
to the Concept, the Army is still to bear the majority of responsibility for combating these threats. The Concept also 
proposes legislative changes, including measures such as improved parliamentary and civilian oversight, in order 
to adapt to European standards. There has been some difficulty in implementing the Concept due to a lack of funds 
(the defence budget is about EUR 9 - 10 Million).
Several international actors have become involved in supporting reform of the Moldovan police force. They include 
the Council of Europe, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP), and 
UNDP.5  The culture of abuse of prison inmates, ill treatment of suspects and arbitrary detention has not been 
1 ‘Moldova: Regional Tensions Over Transdnietria’, ICG Europe Report No 157, ICG, Chisinau/ Brussels, 2004, p 15.
2  Perepelitsa G N, ‘Konflict v Pridnestrove Prichiny, Problemy I Prognoz Razvitiya’, Kiev, 2001, p 12 - 13. For example approximately 60% 
of cigarettes sold in Ukraine are smuggled through the border between Transdniestria-Ukraine, op cit ‘Moldova: Regional Tensions Over 
Transdniestria’, p 11.
3 The EU’s relations with Moldova:  Country Strategy Paper 2002 - 2006, European Commission, 27 December 2001, p 6. Available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/moldova/csp/02_06_en.pdf755.
4 Greenwood D and Volten P, Security Sector Reform and Transparency-Building: Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, The Centre of 
European Security Studies, Groningen: March 2004, p 94.
5 UNDP website,  http://www.undporg/bcpr/jssr/3_projects/, accessed 24 June 2005. 
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eradicated despite this international assistance. These practices are compounded by a continued lack of civilian 
and parliamentary oversight and accountability with police officers responsible for such abuse not being held 
accountable.6 
It is difficult to establish what, if any, SSR reform has taken place in regards to Tiraspol’s security services due 
to a lack of information about the police force and special police force. The operation of such units is not subject 
to public scrutiny.7 The various police units in Transdniestria continue to act as a prop for the state rather than 
protecting the community.8
Given that parallel systems of governance run in Moldova and in the area controlled by the Tiraspol administration, 
PSC operations are regulated differently in each part of the country. The preferred designation for companies 
providing private security-style services in Moldova is ‘Private Detective and Guard Companies’ (PDGCs). The 
Government of Moldova insists that there are no ‘private security companies’ operating in the country and sticks 
firmly to this alternative name for companies providing such services. According to the national legal framework, 
the term ‘security’ cannot be used for these kinds of businesses and services. In terms of accepted international 
terminology in this area though, the PDGCs are effectively PSCs.
The Moldovan private security industry expanded rapidly after the 
first company appeared in 1989, culminating in a market of over 
100 PDGCs by 2000. Since then, there has been a consolidation 
of the industry resulting in around 30 of these firms disappearing 
from the market, with a corresponding growth in the largest firms. 
As of 23 February 2005 ninety-one companies had valid PDGC 
licenses. Thirty-four PDGCs have armed employees. As it is illegal 
for international PSCs to operate in Moldova, at the present time 
all operating PDGCs are domestic companies.9 MiA records indicate 
there are approximately 3,000 fully registered private security guards 
working in Moldova who are permitted to carry and use firearms.10 
However one estimate by a PDGC director put the number of actual 
staff working in the industry at 10,000.11 Were this estimate to be 
correct, even accounting for administrative staff, it would suggest 
that several thousand personnel are operating outside the law. Since 
however it was not possible to corroborate this estimate during the 
research for this report, further research is advisable on this question. 
The most widely recognised Moldovan PDGCs are ‘Respect’, ‘Justar’, ‘Legion’, ‘Bercut’, ‘Tantal’ and  ‘Allas’. The 
cities of Chisinau and Balti along with the other major urban centres represent the main centres of geographical 
activity for PDGCs.  
Information about the private security sector in Transdniestria is difficult to obtain; for example, only one 
company, ‘Sheriff’, seems to offer security services in the region, but the research team were not able to obtain 
any information about the services that it offers or what its primary activities are. Therefore by necessity, the 
majority of this chapter focuses on the private security industry in the part of the country controlled by the 
government of the Republic of Moldova. However, to fully understand the role the private security providers have 
in relation to security, crime, trafficking and weapons ownership and use, it is essential at some point that the 
situation on the left bank of the Dniester river is analysed in greater depth.
6 Report 2004: Moldova, Amnesty International, 2004.  Available on http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/mda-summary-eng, accessed 24 
June 2005.
7 ‘Moldova: No Quick Fix’, ICG Europe Report No 147, ICG, Chisinau/ Brussels, 2003. 
8 ‘OSCE Official Denounces ‘Linguistic Cleansing’ in Transdniester’, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 16 July 2004. 
9 Law 283-XV, Article 5, Lines 3 and 4. 
10 Interviews with Ion Lisnic, Inspector, and Larisa Ivanov, Chief Inspector, Ministry of Interior, 01 – 09 February 2005. 
11 Interview with Ion Mizunskii, Executive Director of ‘Securicom’, 26 January 2005. 
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2 Contemporary security threats
While the general crime rate has been falling in Moldova, violent crime rose steeply between 2003 and 2004. 
This rise in violent crime is a key factor in the recent growth of the Moldovan private security industry. While 
interviewees were aware that theft and other non-violent property offences are a greater problem than armed 
robbery, they still perceived violent crimes to be a greater threat and cause of insecurity. As long as individuals 
and businesses in Moldova perceive violent crime a threat to their security, demand for PDGC services is likely 
to remain strong.
Table1: Reported Crime Figures 2002–2004.
2002 2003 2004
Registered Crimes 38,776 33,942 27,311
Violent Crimes - 1,536 2,047
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Some independent experts were sceptical of official data reporting a reduction in property related crime, stating 
that there is evidence of field police stations not registering reported crime, in order to give an impression of 
‘success’ in fighting crime.12
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
Although it is relatively common for individuals to employ the services of 
companies in this sector, with about 300 - 600 households per year employing 
the services of a PDGC, the business sector is considered to be the largest 
employer of private security services in Moldova.
Static security and rapid response services are the most common security 
services offered by PDGCs, with a much lower demand for VIP escort and 
close protection services. Further, in stark contrast to the rest of SEE, where 
banking and the financial sector comprise a major (if not the largest) market 
for private security provision, banks, as well as a number of other institutions, 
are actually prohibited from employing PDGCs for security provision in Moldova. The following institutions are not 
permitted to contract a PDGC to provide private security services:
n Ministry of Internal Affairs;
n Ministry of Defence;
n Security and Information Service;
n Centre for Combating Corruption and Economic Crime;
n Border Guards Department;
n Customs Department;
n Informational Technology Department;
n State Telecommunications Institutions;
n National system of energy and natural gas institutions;
n Fresh water supplying institutions;
n Storage for arms, munitions, explosives, toxic, radioactive and dangerous substances; and
n Public administration authorities, courts of law, banks, enterprises controlled by state.13
Security of Cash in Transit, 
Tantal Group S.R.L, 2005
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12 Interview with Viorel Cibotaru, IPP, 15 February 2005.
13 PDGC Governmental Decision No 1510 passed on 12 December 2003, The Official Monitor of the Republic of Moldova, No 254 - 261, 
25 December 2003.
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The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) provides property security to these 
institutions as well as a range of security related services to other client groups, 
including foreign embassies and diplomatic mission offices in Moldova. 
The provision of state security to embassies and other clients is handled 
and regulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Security and 
Information Service.14 There is the potential for direct competition between 
the private and public security sectors given that the state-run police service 
in RM provides guarding and alarm installation services on a contractual 
basis.15 As the police are also the main regulatory body for the private security industry there is a potential 
clash of interests that should be addressed. No legislation has yet been developed to remedy this potentially 
problematic situation.
4 Affiliations between PDGCs and other sectors
Unlike the situation in several other South Eastern European countries, there is no direct evidence of affiliation 
between outside organisations and the private security industry except within Transdniester. If this is correct, then 
Moldova is unique not just in South Eastern Europe but also in the world. Although none of those interviewed 
for this study were able to confirm the existence of such affiliations, the possibility that PDGCs have links with 
political parties was raised in the spring of 2005 during the General Election campaign. In this case, parties 
opposed to the electoral block ‘Moldova noastra’ (BMD) accused it of employing ex-combatants and former 
police and intelligence officers to act both as bodyguards and to monitor and intimidate other parties, some of 
whom were said to have also worked for PDGCs.16 Whatever the truth of the matter – and electoral investigators 
came to different conclusions about the case17 – it is instructive that allegations like these are deemed plausible 
enough to air.
PDGCs accept that, since many security workers have previously been employed by the state security sector, 
there is opportunity for communication and informal collaboration, especially in reprehending offenders and 
maintaining public order.18 There are also more formal working agreements between PDGCs and the police 
for patrolling the streets and maintaining public order, for instance during football matches and other public 
events.
‘Sheriff’ - the company in Transdniestria that seems to be the monopoly provider of private security - is widely 
believed to have strong connections with the government of the region. ‘Sheriff’ also holds a monopoly in a 
number of other economic sectors, being described in a recent OSCE report as being the monopoly owner of 
telecommunications services in Transdniestria, as well as the largest owner of supermarkets and other businesses 
including the only commercial TV station and a major football team.19 It is alleged to have been founded by 
three former policemen and is thought to have very close ties to the ruling family. The BBC when discussing the 
company in 2004 stated that ‘organised crime experts in the UK suspect that ‘Sheriff’ really belongs to the first 
family of the rogue republic, and claim the Smirnovs use it to launder money’. It went on to say that a ‘recent 
report funded by the British Department for International Development says that ‘Transdniester is a smuggling 
company masquerading as a state’.20 It is unclear what, if any, regulations govern the provision of private security 
in the territory.
14 Government Decision No 1510 passed on 12 December 2003.
15 MIA Regulation No 3 ‘On Paid Services’ dated 12 January 2000, The Official Monitor of the Republic of Moldova, No 14 - 16, 10 February 
2000.
16 Interview with Viorel Cibotaru, IPP, 22 June 2005.
17For example, see OSCE/ODIHR Statement, http://www.osce.org/item/4353.html++BMD+2005+Elections+intimidation&hl=en&start=7.
18 Interviews with Iurie Chimacovschi, Vice Director, ‘Delta Forta’, 27 January 2005; Dorin Damir Executive Director,  ‘Tantal’, 25 January 
2005; Ion Mizunskii, Executive Director, Securicom trade association, 26 January 2005.
19 Assessment Visit to the Transdniestria Region of the Republic of Moldova, OSCE, March 2005,  http://www.osce.org/documents/
rfm/2005/03/14036_en.pdf, accessed 25 June 2005.
20 Ash L, ‘Misery in a Pariah State’, Crossing Continents Programme on BBC Radio Four, 01 April 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes/crossing_continents/3586815.stm.
Corporate Security Response Capability, 
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5 Regulation and conduct
A complex system of registration exists in Moldova for PDGCs and their personnel. This complexity is almost 
certainly a bar to greater professionalism and oversight as excessive bureaucracy encourages both corruption 
and short cuts in the oversight process.
5.1 Legal basis for control of PDGCs
The ‘Law on Private Activity as Detectives and Guards’ (Law no. 283 –XV dated 4-07-2003)21 regulates the 
licensing and activity of PDGCs in Moldova. According to this law, in order for companies to offer services as 
private guarding companies and private detective agencies they must first obtain a licence, issued jointly by the 
Licence Chamber and the MIA. Each PDGC employee must then register with the Licence Chamber. It is forbidden 
for a PDGC to hire an individual who is known to use narcotics or has a criminal conviction. The MIA is responsible 
for completing background checks on all applicant security staff. In addition, each company also needs to have 
its logo and identity card approved by MIA.22  Non-observance of the law is punishable by the withdrawal of the 
company’s licence.23
Analysts consulted for this research note that the current legal system for PDCG regulation is excessively 
bureaucratic, requiring numerous different certificates for company registration.24 The researchers were unable 
to clarify the apparent anomaly highlighted above by different interviewees’ estimates of the number of PDCG 
guards working in the country (10,000 versus 3,000). Additional research is certainly required to discover whether 
in fact there are large numbers of guards working illegally. If this were indeed the case, it would probably indicate 
that the current legal system is prohibitively complex and that the penal provisions are not effective deterrents. 
5.2 Use of force and firearms
Law No 283 - XV, Article 28(3) lists the types of weapons and special 
equipment that private guards may use, and has rules on the 
acquisition, storage and carrying of weapons. Private security guards 
employed by PDGCs are restricted to the use of firearms authorised 
for individual possession by Moldovan citizens and are not permitted 
to carry military style weapons.  Firearms used by private security 
guards should be registered to both the employing PDGC and the 
individual guard.25 Firearms are registered by the police and should 
be stored only on PDGC company premises. Details on common 
requirements for accounting methods when issuing weapons and 
ammunition to staff are provided by MIA Decision No 365 (passed 23 
December 1993).26 The use of force, firearms and special equipment 
is regulated in a separate provision of Law No 283 – XV (Chapter IV, 
Articles 28, 29 and 30) and appears in some ways to be consistent 
with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials. However, there are no specific rules or 
guidelines requiring PDGC employees to report incidents in which 
they have discharged their weapons.  This is instead covered more 
21 The Official Monitor of the Republic of Moldova, No 200 - 20, 19 September 2003, www.docs.md, accessed 25 June 2005.
22 Law No 283-XV.
23 Law No 283-XV, 04 July 2003, Article17 Legea nr. 451-XV passed on 30 July 2001.
24 Correspondence with Viorel Cibotaru, IPP, February 2005. Also Law 283-XV (22(5), 23(3), 26(2)).
25 Interview with Iurie Cohaniuc, Operational Head, PDGC ‘Respect’, 22 January 2005; Op cit Damir and Mizunskii; Government Decision No 
126 passed 15 February 2000.
26 Law No 283-XV Article 28(3).
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generally in the Moldovan Penal Code. No information on the Laws regulating PDGCs in Transdniestria was 
available.
The main human rights and media monitoring organisations working in the Republic of Moldova were unaware of 
any cases in which PDGC staff had been reported as using excessive force or firearms inappropriately.27 However, 
although no evidence of such misuse is available, it remains possible that incidents occur and are not reported.28 
Unfortunately no information was available on the conduct of PDGC staff working in Transdniestria.
Despite these findings, it has to be seen as likely that abuses do happen as they are endemic within the state 
security system and therefore it has to be seen as highly likely that such behaviour would be replicated by the 
private security sector and simply not reported, as it is not seen as wrong by the oversight agencies.29 
6 Professionalism and training
Training is mandatory for all PDGC personnel and is organised by the MIA on an annual basis.30 All personnel 
receive training in firearms use and their minimal use  regardless of whether their roles demand carrying a 
firearm.  They should all also receive first aid training; however interviews for this research suggest that not 
all guards are provided with proper first aid equipment even if they have been trained.31 Interviewed guards 
felt that the mandatory training was relatively difficult to cheat as it was highly valued by the companies that 
employed them. In addition to the above law, PDGCs usually have their own internal regulations that contain 
further restrictions on the use of firearms. ‘Securicom’ - the only PDGC trade association in Moldova – acts as a 
lobby group to defend the interests of PDGCs as well as offering professional training and legal consultation. 
7 Oversight
The MIA is the main body responsible for regulating PDGC activity in Moldova. As well as providing training, 
approving company badges and logos, and (in conjunction with the Licence Chamber) licensing PDGCs, the MIA 
has the right to stop or suspend PDGC activity in the event of legal violations by PDGCs and their employees. 
Those interviewed for this study stated that the law regulating private security services in Moldova is enforced 
in practice, although it is too complex and creates a lot of barriers for the work of PDGCs. Although the MIA is 
expected to check the background of all PDGC employees, it checks only their criminal records.32
No information on the oversight of PDGCs in Transdniestria was available. 
8 Conclusion and recommendations
The lack of information on the private security sector in Moldova makes a thorough survey of the industry difficult. 
Whilst there is clearly a problem with transparency in the part of the country controlled by the Government of 
the Republic of Moldova, this problem is significantly worse in Transdniestria. Without being able to access and 
assess the situation on the left bank of the Dniester, it is impossible to construct a comprehensive picture of the 
role of private companies in the provision of security services. For its part, the Moldovan Government has recently 
demonstrated considerable openness in the security sector by requesting international support for police reform. 
This is to be applauded and there is clearly a dividend to greater transparency. This is also likely to be the case 
27 Despite searching the archives for the main media outlets in both parts of the country, the research team found no relevant references on 
the subject. Correspondence with Corina Cepoi, Centre for Independent Journalism, March 2005.
28 Amnesty International Moldova state that this is not an area in which they have expertise. Correspondence between researchers at IPP and 
Evghenii Golosceapov, Executive Director, Amnesty International Moldova, 08 March 2005.
29 Report 2005: Moldova, Amnesty International, 2005.  Available on http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/mda-summary-eng, accessed 
25 June 2005.
30 Law No 283-XV Article 24 (1,3)
31 Op cit Chimacovschi; Mizunskii; and Cohaniuc.
32 Law No 283-XV Article 27 (2 b, d).
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as regards private security provision and the government should not consider that increased transparency in this 
area would bring increased criticism; in many influential areas it will be welcomed.
Despite this, it seems that as with other sectors of the Moldovan economy, private security seems to be going 
through a period of consolidation and professionalisation. Although no evidence of human rights abuses or 
corrupt practices have come to light, it should not be assumed that these do not occur. Statistics gathered for 
this research also raise potential concerns that security guards may be operating without legal registration. 
Equally worrying is the inability of the government to legislate against conflicts of interest between PDGCs and 
the police for private security contracts. In terms of the general impact of PDGCs on overall security in Moldova, 
there is evidence to suggest that the rate of both overall recorded crime and recorded violent crime is lower in 
those areas where PDGCs operate. 
8.1 Main recommendations 
n The laws governing the licensing of PDGCs should be reviewed in order to reduce prohibitive bureaucracy. 
Consideration should also be given to the introduction of more detailed criteria for the licensing of both 
companies and personnel so as to further raise industry standards.
n The MoI should revisit the question of PDGC registration to discover whether unregistered personnel are 
operating, taking action to rectify any gaps in enforcement.
n Non-governmental actors should continue to monitor the activities of PDGCs with a particular emphasis on 
identifying any cases of improper political links.
n PDGCs should enhance self-regulation by introducing a progressive code of conduct for members of the 
current trade association.
n Donors, when conducting any SSR project support, should encourage the Government of Moldova to address 
the role and impact of the private security sector in the provision of security in the country. Further, donors 
should undertake an evaluation of the private security industry when conducting their security sector 
assessments with an eye to supporting greater regulation and oversight. 
n The police services and PDGCs should not be competing for commercial security contracts. A clear separation 
between the private and public sectors and the services they provide should be established to prevent 
potential conflicts of interest arising and corrupt practices occurring.
n Greater transparency is required by the authorities of both Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria. In 
particular the Transdniestrian authorities should publish details concerning PSCs operating in the territory 
they control, and any regulations that apply in this area.
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Romania
1 Background to the privatization of security
Romania’s transition from communism began in 1989 with the ousting and 
execution of Nicolae Ceaucescu during the ‘December Revolution’, a revolt 
against a highly totalitarian and oppressive government. Although the country was 
initially burdened with economic difficulties arising from its obsolete industrial 
base and command-oriented production, it was spared the civil unrest and inter-
ethnic conflict that afflicted its Balkan neighbours. 
After a long period of reform, the Copenhagen European Council in December 
2002 provided Romania with a road map, with the objective of EU membership 
in 2007. Accession talks were completed in December 2004, and NATO membership achieved in March 2004 
after substantial restructuring of the Romanian armed forces and its defence system in line with Euro-Atlantic 
practices. Despite these successes, if Romania is to attain its target of EU membership in 2007, further progress 
is still needed in several areas ranging from judicial and public administration reform, to civil service development, 
combating corruption and economic restructuring.1 
As in other countries, diminishing state involvement in the security 
sector during the transition from Communism created a demand for 
protection of privatised goods and services in Romania. A number 
of factors have contributed to the growth of the sector in Romania, 
including an opaque and in-egalitarian transfer of public goods into 
private hands during the transition period which, coupled with a corrupt 
and poorly functioning judicial system, has led to widespread distrust 
in the state and its security providers.2 PSCs first began to operate in 
1991 - 1992. However, it was not until 1996 that the first law to regulate 
them was introduced. The Romanian Security Association states that 
994 PSCs have obtained licences to operate in the whole country as 
of 2003, although this high number can be explained by provisions 
within Romanian law, which requires companies to set up protection of 
their assets either internally or externally. Thus, the market for private 
security has become a lucrative one. More than half of licensed PSCs 
in Romania are operating in Bucharest.3 
Officially there are 37,291 employees working for PSCs. The best 
known domestically owned companies include Bidepa, RPG, Cameleon, 
UTI, CPI Security, Cobra, Securit Force, BGS, Argus, Global Security and 
Romguard.4 The largest PSC employs 2,000 people (Bidepa) and a number of companies have around 1000 
employees (Romguard for example). There is a third tier of companies, which employ around 500 people (e.g. 
Cameleon 2010). The rest of the market is made up of small companies that generally employ anywhere between 
40 - 100 guards. Companies in this sector of the market face severe competition at the moment and many firms 
Guard Dog and Handler, BGS Security, 2005
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1 2004 Regular Report on Romania’s progress towards accession, European Commission, Brussels, October 2004, pp 148-151, available 
on http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf
2 Despite ongoing reforms, corruption in public and private sectors poses a serious challenge in Romania. ‘Surveys and assessments 
conducted by both national and international organisations confirm that corruption remains a serious and widespread problem in Romania 
which affects almost all aspects of society. There has been no reduction in perceived levels of corruption and the number of successful 
prosecutions remains low, particularly for high-level corruption. The fight against corruption is hampered by integrity problems even within 
institutions that are involved in law enforcement and the fight against corruption’.  Op cit European Commission, p 21.
3  Romanian Police website http://www.politiaromana.ro/serviciul_regim_paza.htm, accessed 28 July 2005.
4 Interviews with Gabriel Mihai, President Romanian Security Industry Association, 21 January 2005, and a number of prominent PSCs; also 
with Dr. Sartori, Paolo, Italian NCB Interpol Liaison Officer, Italian Representative to the SECI Regional Center for Combating Organised Crime, 
28 January 2005.
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are being absorbed by the larger PSCs as the industry consolidates.5 While the majority of PSCs are nationally 
owned, the market has steadily opened up to international competition. The largest foreign owned PSCs are 
Group4Falk (Denmark) and Civica (Italy) although other companies with Italian, Israeli and Spanish owners are 
known to operate in the country.6 The absolute number of PSCs in Romania is likely to decrease in the future as 
the consolidation within the industry continues, leading to a domination of the market by the largest companies. 
Foreign investment is helping to accelerate this process. 
2 Contemporary security threats
Although the private security market is relatively large in Romania, violent crime does not appear to be a serious 
problem. A total of only 3,800 violent crimes were recorded throughout Romania in 2002, probably reflecting a 
public perception that the police and judiciary can do little in response.7 Instead, non-violent theft and burglary 
are the most direct security threats that Romanians face. According to official statistics released by the Romanian 
government, the police have a relatively successful crime detection rate. During 2003 a total of 99,946  ‘serious’ 
crimes were recorded, of which 82,325 were solved. In 2003 there were 2,096 recorded criminal offences per 
100,000 inhabitants of which the detection rate was 1,519 per 100,000 inhabitants (see below). 
Table 1: Recorded Crime 2002-2004.
YEAR RECORDED CRIME PER 100,000 INHABITANTS
2002 1,432
2003 2,096
2004 2,090
Source: Ministry of Administration and Interior.8
Private protection services are typically only required by businesses and/or institutions that need static security. 
However, the use of private security is also a reflection of the general public’s distrust of the state authorities, 
particularly the police and the judicial system, combined with the widespread belief that even if one is caught 
the system can be manipulated by investing the right amount of financial resources or connections. In this 
environment the use of deterrence (e.g. security guards) is often seen as a more effective means of crime 
prevention than relying on the state. The perception that the state is unable to protect its population stimulates 
demand for alternative means of security thus indirectly assisting the privatization of security.
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
The PSC industry in Romania seems to have a fairly wide customer base. Clients include businesses, politicians 
and international organisations. Commercial enterprises in Romania are required by law to take care of the 
protection of their assets and most of the larger companies have decided to outsource this function to PSCs.9 
Several foreign embassies, including those of Italy and the UK, also employ PSCs to provide security services 
for consular sections and for cultural activities as do the World Bank and other international development 
organisations.10 It is not particularly common for individuals to hire PSCs and only 1 - 3 per cent of householders 
are thought to employ security guards.11 Geographically the private security industry is especially active in the 
5 Romanian Police website, www.politiaromana.ro, accessed 28 July 2005.
6 For instance the Danish-owned Group4Falk recently invested in Romania by acquiring and merging a number of locally owned PSCs. The 
local management have been kept, in accordance with the informal rules governing the Romania economy.
7 Country Profile for Romania, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005.
8 Official Ministry of Administration and Interior. Available on http://www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Bilant%20MAI/Plan%20operational.pdf.
9  Law No 333 from 2003; and interview, Gabriel Mihai Badea, President, Romanian Security Industry Association, 21 January 2005.
10 Interviews with Nicolae Stoenescu, General Manager Cameleon 2010 (PSC), 18 January 2005; Ioan Stangu, General Manager, Prompt 
Guard Private Security company, 19 January 2005; op cit Badea.
11 Ibid.
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capital Bucharest, but also in the country’s second city of Timisoara, around the country’s borders, and along oil 
pipelines near the Danube River.12
A major part of the private security industry in Romania is 
concerned with providing static security either for fixed assets 
or goods in transit. There is also a sizeable market for technical 
surveillance to the extent that trade professionals estimate 
there to be more than 150,000 alarm systems in operation in 
the country (both public and private sector), usually connected 
remotely either to PSCs or the Police.13 There is also a sizeable 
market for surveillance in Romania, and one study dating from 
1998 estimated there to be more than 160 private intelligence 
providers in the country, staffed for the most part by former 
Securitate or military intelligence personnel.14 The total value 
of the safety and security market is estimated in 2003 to be 
in the area of USD 100 to 150 million with an expected growth 
rate of 10-15% per annum in the near future. 15
Some companies specialise in particular aspects of security provision; for instance, ‘Argus’ only provides rapid 
response security. In what appears to be a new development, some Romanian companies are starting to work 
outside of the country in conflict zones. In 2004 a Romanian security contractor working for the Sofia based 
PSC, Bidepa, was killed and another seriously injured providing close protection to the interim head of the Iraqi 
government. They were attacked when their convoy was going through Hilla, south of Baghdad.16 The incident led 
the MFA to issue and advisory note to PSCs.17 
The overall effect of the sector on security is not entirely clear and is probably somewhat mixed depending on 
the type of service provided and the company in question. However, several interviewees consulted during the 
course of this research claim to perceive a tendency towards a reduction in crime rates in areas that are well 
protected by PSCs.18
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
Although it is prohibited in Romanian law for serving police officers to work as private security guards, a number 
of security guards (especially senior ones) are former members of the army and police. For example the owner 
of the PSC ‘UTI’ used to be a member of the military and many of the company’s employees were once in the 
Romanian army.19 The company has had contracts with the Cernavoda nuclear plant, the Romanian Parliament 
(both houses) and ‘Henry Coanda’ international airport, as well as more general guarding contracts with 
international actors including the Italian Embassy in Bucharest. Contracts for static security are outsourced to its 
subsidiary ‘Cobra Security’. As noted above, personnel with a background in the security services are particularly 
well represented in the surveillance side of the security industry.
In another example of links between PSCs and the public sector, the police signed a unique joint working 
agreement with several PSCs for a short period in 1998, allowing the police to use PSCs’ cars at a time when 
Residential Property Protection, BGS Security, 2005 
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12 Op cit Badea; Stoenescu.
13 Unpublished study commissioned by the EURISC Foundation in 2003.
14 C. J. Van Bergen Thirion, ‘Privatization of Security: A Blessing or a Menace?’ Pretoria, South African Defence College, 1998.
15 EURISC unpublished study.
16 Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, available on  http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx , accessed 28 July 2005.
17 Op cit Badea; Stoenescu.
18 Op cit Badea; Stoenescu; Stangu.
19  Op cit Stangu, 19 January 2005.
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there were insufficient funds to supply enough police cars. More recently a protocol was signed between the 
police and a number of firms to jointly maintain public order and combat anti-social behaviour.20
It is not uncommon in Romania for the gendarmerie and guards under the authority of local councils to also 
provide commercial security services. A special branch of the gendarmerie from the Ministry of Administration and 
Interior (MAI) provides static security services on a commercial basis. A total of 1,196 buildings and 1,222 km of 
pipelines were guarded by the gendarmerie in 2003. Of these, 348 were contracts for the private sector. Further, 
local guards under the authority of the local council and the elected mayor can also provide such services.21 With 
the public and private security sectors in direct competition for contracts there is concern that opportunities 
for corruption and conflicts of interest will arise. It is therefore important that clear lines of demarcation are 
established between the two sectors. 
4.2 Political affiliations
There seems to be very little evidence that there are explicit links between PSCs and political parties or government 
officials. However, it is common practice for politicians to hire private security guards to provide protection and 
other services, perhaps indicating that even the politically active share the population’s distrust of the ability of 
the state security sector to provide security. 22 This said there does not appear to be a direct relationship between 
specific political parties and specific companies although this is an issue that cannot be conclusively resolved 
because of the limited nature of this research. 
4.3 Organised crime affiliations
It is not easy to investigate links between PSCs and organised criminal groups (OCGs). Officially there are no 
connections, but media reports have alleged that links do exist. One of the most recent cases reported in the 
media involved a security company - Bronec - and its alleged connection to an organised crime cartel centred on a 
company called VGB.23 Following the election of a new government in November 2004, a judicial investigation into 
VGB was launched. This is an ongoing investigation and involves many powerful businessmen within Romania.
5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
As mentioned above, the industry has been regulated since 1996. The current legislation covering the industry 
is Law No 333 (08 July 2003); ‘Law Regarding the Guarding of Objectives, Goods, Values and People Protection’, 
State Gazette No 525 (22 July 2003).24 The law requires all companies to obtain an operating licence from 
the police, and thereafter to submit the details of prospective employees for background checks. Those with 
criminal records are prohibited from working as security guards. Checks are carried out both by the police and the 
domestic Romanian Intelligence Service.25 PSC owners, managers and their spouses must submit the following 
when applying to run a company: identity card and military record; curriculum vitae; medical record; psychological 
clearance; written proof that the individual concerned has received the necessary training to run a PSC.26 Under 
the present legislation, company licences need to be renewed every three years by the police – an unduly long 
period that lowers the probability that poor conduct will result in the revocation of licences.27 The law does not 
20 Op cit Badea; Stangu; Romanian Security Industry Association, Newsletter, November 2004, p 3.
21 Assessment of Activity in 2003, Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romania, Bucharest, 13 January 2004; Isac Stelian, Deputy 
Director, The Independent Service for Arms, Explosives and Toxic Substances, Romanian Police, 20 January 2005. 
22 Op cit Badea.
23 Ziua newspaper, 09 September 2004.
24 Law Number 333 from 08 July 2003, ‘Law regarding the guard of objectives, goods, values and people protection’, State Gazette No 525, 
22 July 2003.
25 Ibid, Chapter II, Section 4, Article 20, Paragraph 2; and Chapter V, Section 2, Article 41, Paragraph 1.
26 Romanian Police website, http://nt.politiaromana.ro/servicii/ordine.shtml, accessed on 28 July 2005.
27 Interviews with PSCs sources, January 2005; op cit Sartori.
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distinguish between international and domestic PSCs, allowing foreign firms to operate in the country under the 
same regulatory framework. At the moment there is also no regulation of Romanian PSCs or PMCs that operate 
abroad. 
Although a media search indicates that the law’s basic provisions are typically being adhered to both with respect 
to employees and companies, some industry observers have criticised the laws on the basis that they are unclear 
and open to misinterpretation by the regulatory authorities.28 PSC staff in particular identified the lengthy process 
for hiring approved staff as being open to abuse.29 One interviewee also stated that the law does not give the 
police sufficient powers to close problematic operators.30
5.2 Use of force and firearms 
PSCs’ use of firearms is currently regulated under Law 17, Regarding Arms and Munitions, introduced in 1996. 
Interestingly, Romanian security companies, uniquely in SEE, are not permitted to own their own firearms but 
must lease them from the police. Pistols and a range of non-lethal devices from irritant sprays to batons and in 
exceptional cases machine guns31 can be leased. This system means that the police and private security staff 
carry the same weapons, although PSCs are only allowed to carry firearms after submitting a specific protection 
plan to the police and obtaining their approval. The process for applying to hire firearms from the police is strict 
and time consuming, and PSCs must prove that the firearms are absolutely necessary for their work. In addition, 
they must demonstrate that the company possesses the resources and logistics to store firearms and train their 
employees in special police shooting grounds on how to use firearms (according to the 1996 Law Regarding Arms 
and Ammunitions, firearms have to be stored in special steel closets on the company premises, and ammunition 
stored separately).32 There are no known cases of PSC employees taking firearms home in contravention of 
the law. Given the cost and effort required to obtain firearms, few Romanian security guards are armed with 
SALW, and most PSCs tend to arm their guards with less lethal weapons such as batons or chemical sprays. The 
carriage of concealed weapons is not permitted. 33
However, a new Law of Arms and Ammunitions, adopted in June 2004 and published in the Official Gazette on 
30 June 2004 will considerably liberalise the possession of lethal arms by the general public and consequently 
by the Police when its operative regulations are finally introduced. In addition, firearms in use by PSCs will in 
future be registered to individual staff and not to the police. A number of civil society groups have raised concerns 
about the effects of liberalising the laws on firearms possession, with the backing of some representatives from 
the police. At the time of writing, these groups continue to lobby the Parliament to toughen the draft secondary 
regulations guidelines on the law’s implementation.34
Under the current legislation, firearms and ‘non-lethal’ weapons may only be used for self-defence while on duty 
and in such a way that the ‘rights and freedoms of citizens’ are not in any way harmed.35 As far as this research 
could determine, this requirement is not elaborated on in the law itself or in regulations on its implementation, 
but instead in the specific protection plans that PSCs agree with the authorities in each case. Protection plans are 
also required to comply with the internal regulations of the authorising agency. However, since any one of three 
agencies (MAI, gendarmerie, or police) may endorse a particular protection plan depending on the circumstances, 
28 Op cit Sartori; Stangu.
29 For example would-be PSC employees cannot receive the required training in the subject directly and then seek employment with a firm. 
They must first obtain police approval that they do not have a criminal record, then present proof that a firm wishes to hire them to the PSC 
school. The PSC in question then prepares a dossier of these documents, plus a medical clearance and proof that the company has paid 
the tuition fee. At this stage police approval of the dossier is again required, and a further letter of approval must be issued by the police. 
Correspondence with researcher Radu Ragea, EURISC Foundation, 21 July 2005.
30 Op cit Sartori.
31 ‘Law Regarding Arms and Munitions’. Chapter 6, Section 1, Article 48, Letter K. Op cit Stelian; Stangu; Stoenescu.
32 Op cit Stelian.
33 Op cit Law No 333, Chapter V, Section 3, Article 45, Paragraphs 1 and 2.
34 Correspondence with EURISC Foundation, March 2005.
35 Op cit Law No 333, Chapter 2, Section 5, Article 24.
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there is the potential for significant variation between plans on how force and firearms may be used. Despite 
this, there have not been many allegations that the PSC industry has used excessive force or threatened human 
rights in Romania. One fairly exceptional case occurred in 2000 when a PSC ‘Protect’, was implicated in the 
assassination of a union leader, resulting in the imprisonment of its director and two employees.36 Further, on two 
occasions discussed below, security guards have also attacked journalists. This said, because training standards 
in the industry are rather low, it is apparently quite common for guards to use physical force in the course of their 
work, in some cases for intimidation.
5.3 Professionalism and training
The general view among those consulted during this research was that levels of professionalism in the industry 
are typically low, with only a small percentage of firms meeting European standards with regard to service 
provision, or in key areas such as human rights. Contributing factors include poor pay and conditions, which 
particularly in the case of junior guards leads to a lack of concern about promoting a professional ethos at the 
junior level.37 Inadequacies in the training regime may also play a part. All prospective private security guards 
are expected to obtain a professional diploma following a training course lasting a minimum of 90 days.38 The 
course is organised either by the Romanian Gendarmerie, the Romanian Protection Service or other companies 
that are licensed to conduct this training and is said to cover topics such as first aid and self-defence techniques 
(a sample curriculum was not made available to the researchers).39 Yet a significant gap in the training that this 
research has identified is the lack of any instruction on how to deal with the general public. This is thought by 
some interviewees to be one reason why security guards resort to physical force more routinely than they might 
otherwise need to. It is unclear how this squares with a legal requirement that PSC staff may only use arms in 
such a way that the ‘rights and freedoms of citizens’ are not in any way harmed,40 and it is likely that the training 
curricula needs further development and elaboration in this area.
Nevertheless, reports of professional misconduct are relatively few and far between. Several high profile cases 
have been reported, and they are particularly noteworthy because of the apparent reluctance shown by the 
regulatory authorities in responding. The most recent incident involved journalists from Ziua newspaper who were 
attacked by security guards from Bronec PSC following an attempt to photograph a property they were guarding. 
The police did not intervene and initially defended the security guards’ conduct. In response to this attack and 
similar incidents, around 100 journalists organised a public protest in December 2004 against Bronec’s impunity 
and the reaction of the police.41 In general however, analysts consulted for this research felt that standards in the 
PSC sector are no better or worse than other areas of the Romanian economy.
There are three main professional PSC Associations in Romania (a fourth exists but is inactive) – the Romanian 
Association for the Security Industry; the Romanian Security Owners Professional Association; and the Romanian 
Association for Security Technology. The latter represents the interests of PSCs dealing mainly with technology 
such as CCTV or electronic alarm equipment. Another is composed of owners acting as a pressure group while 
the third is an umbrella body, which represents the interests of the entire industry.42 The Romanian Association 
for the Security Industry claims to have introduced a voluntary Code of Conduct for its members very recently. 
Such schemes obviously have the potential to drive up standards in the industry; however, the association’s 
representatives did not disclose its contents of their Code of Conduct to the researchers, leaving important 
questions unanswered. 
36 The new Czech management of the firm soon entered into conflict with one of its established union leaders who openly denounced a new 
and lucrative contract. This individual was beaten and stabbed to death by two males. The courts ruled that the factory manager, together 
with the General Manager of a PSC ‘Protect’ Vaslui, had planned the killing together. Protect’s director, Catalin Ciubotariu received 15 years 
in prison, and two employees 5 and 3.5 years each. The harshest sentences were reserved for the two murderers. Ziua newspaper, 16 August 
2000 and 10 October 2003.
37 The net pay for junior staff is between €80 and €120 per month. Op cit Badea; Stoenescu; Stangu.
38 Op cit Stoenescu.
39 Op cit Law No 333.
40 Ibid, Chapter 2, Section 5, Article 24.
41 ‘Un traficant de droguri este lider al PRM Dambovita’ Ziua newspaper, 17 December 2004, http://www.ziua.ro/display.
php?id=35424&data=2004-12-17&kword=VGB, accessed on 28 July 2005.
42 Interview with Ion Stanciu, President, Romanian Security Owners Professional Association, 20 January 2005.
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5.4 Oversight
As noted above, the MAI, through the police, is responsible for granting licences for every PSC that wants to work 
in the private security sector. Licences are only to be granted after the National Intelligence Service has endorsed 
the particular PSC. In addition, before being allowed to pursue the special training course required by law, the 
PSCs’ employees have to be endorsed individually by the MAI, with background checks also being required for 
the spouses of PSC owners.43
Unfortunately there are significant doubts as to whether the police regulation of the sector is effective. Firstly, 
police responsibility for the control of PSCs is compromised by a lack of capacity and potential conflicts of 
interest.44 Secondly, several of the sources for this study felt that the level of control exercised by the MAI and 
the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Service was deficient and not part of an ongoing monitoring process.45 
Lastly, the current legislation covering the industry, Law 333 of July 2003, ‘Law regarding the guarding of objects, 
goods, valuables and people protection’, has been criticised by one informed interviewee as being unclear in 
places, creating opportunities both for corrupt officials and PSCs to override them, and also contradictory in 
some respects with the internal working practices of the MAI.46 Especially in light of the fact that there is no 
additional scrutiny of the sector by parliamentary committees or an Ombudsman’s office in Romania, these are 
important deficiencies that should be addressed.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
The private security industry does not seem to be an issue 
of great official concern in Romania. Despite the relatively 
high numbers of PSCs operating in the country relative 
to other countries in the region, there is little feeling that 
PSCs have had a noticeable impact upon crime, apart 
from discouraging burglary and attacks on those buildings 
being guarded. The scope of this project has meant that 
it is difficult to assess the real impact of the industry 
either positively or negatively. This has not been helped 
by the noticeable lack of transparency displayed by most 
companies although it should be said that this is a general 
problem across the entire commercial sector and not just 
restricted to security companies. The private sector in 
Romania is remarkably opaque, e.g. few companies are 
listed on the Stock Exchange, and those that are, have highly restrictive disclosure policies. A related problem 
is the endemic corruption that affects political and economic life in Romania, which in turn feeds off a lack of 
transparency. 
It is vitally important therefore that the actors charged with PSC oversight are strengthened to prevent any 
malpractice. State supervision of the industry does not at present appear to be intense enough to allow problems 
to be identified at an early stage. The fact that the industry is perceived in some respects to be in competition 
with the state security sector is also a concern, since the result may be a zero-sum relationship between the 
two sectors, with PSCs undermining the public sector rather than providing an additional layer of protection. It is 
important that this perception is directly combated by defining more clearly the relationships between the two 
sectors and their mutual roles. With the public and private security sectors in direct competition for contracts 
there is also the concern that opportunities for corruption and conflicts of interest will arise. Further, the 
43 Op cit Law No 333.
44 Op cit Stoenescu; Sartori.
45 Interviews with PSC staff, January 2005; op cit Sartori; Monitoring Exercise of instruments and mechanism for Parliamentary oversight 
of the security sector in Romania, EURISC Foundation / The Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security, House of Deputies, 
Parliament of Romania, Bucharest, Romania. 2004.
46 Interviews with PSC directors, January 2005; op cit Sartori.
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standards within the industry continue to be low and therefore it is important that the industry itself enhances 
professionalisation through promoting greater training and improved rates of pay within the industry. 
6.1 Main recommendations 
n It is important that the state security sector and the private sector are not in direct competition with each 
other. Therefore, it is vital that clear demarcations are set between the two security sectors. This can be 
achieved through the introduction of joint working agreements.
n There is a possibility that corruption could occur at some point during the licensing process for firms and 
individual guards, especially considering the length of the process. Steps should nevertheless be taken to 
make the licensing process more transparent with, for example, the introduction and publication of standard 
assessment criteria against which applicants can be judged.
n The law should be amended to reduce the time period for which PSC licenses are granted, the current three-
year period being overly long.
n The Government of Romania should consider reviewing the current legislation to eliminate any ambiguities. 
In particular, clear, detailed and universal standards on the use of force, firearms and other less lethal 
weapons by PSCs should be incorporated into the national legislation.
n There have been questions over whether oversight actors (MAI, police and the intelligence service) are 
currently acting as efficient regulators. The arrangements and working practices that are currently in place 
should be revised and where necessary amended.
n Given that Romanian security companies are working abroad, including in conflict zones such as Iraq, it is 
important that the government of Romania consider the possibility of introducing the regulation of security 
companies that work abroad. 
n Attention should be given to developing and elaborating the training curriculum for PSC staff to ensure 
that detailed guidance is given on the minimal use of force in accordance with the UN Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and that examinations require candidates to 
demonstrate an adequate understanding of their responsibilities in this area.
n Professionalism among security guards is perceived to be low, partially as a result of the low levels of pay in 
the industry, but also because corruption makes it relatively easy to bypass aspects of the training system. It 
is therefore important that international clients specify that they require higher standards of training in any 
tender documents and consider the professionalism of company staff rather than going for the lowest bidder 
in any competition.
n Supplementary oversight methods, in particular the use of parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman’s 
office, should be established and supported.
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Serbia and Montenegro
The Republic of Montenegro
1 Background to the privatization of security
Montenegro survived the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) without armed conflict despite its ethnically mixed population. In the late 
1990s, until the fall of the Milosevic regime, the republic faced a very real threat 
to state security due to the politics of Milosevic and the various internal reactions 
this provoked among pro-Montenegrin and pro-Yugoslav groups. As the Belgrade 
authorities became more authoritarian, the Milosevic camp increasingly saw 
the government in Montenegro as overly sympathetic to the US and EU and a 
possible source of subversion. With fears of a takeover growing, the Montenegrin 
government began to militarise and enlarge the only security force fully under its control, the police force, which 
grew from around 10,000 to 25,000 personnel in a brief period.1 Tensions were markedly dampened by the 
change of government in October 2000, and fears of conflict between Serbia and Montenegro have finally 
receded. 
The complex constitutional arrangement that currently exists between the two republics of Serbia and Montenegro 
(SCG) has not entirely solved these problems. Born of EU pressure to retain regional stability, the State Union 
came into being when the then Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo 
Djukanovic signed the Belgrade Agreement on 05 February 2003. Under this arrangement, the State Union retains 
competency over functions such as foreign affairs and defence, with the remaining functions of government 
controlled at the republic level. Great uncertainty remains over Montenegro’s future within the State Union, 
creating a degree of tension both with Belgrade and the EU, which continues to support the SCG as a loose 
federation.
Nevertheless the chief security threat facing the republic today, rather than being external-security related, is 
organised crime.   Criminal organisations have long been seen as operating from and throughout Montengro, 
bolstered in particular by a shadow economy created by previous international trade sanctions on the FRY 
and the opportunities created by state paralysis.2 This reality is in striking contrast to the fact that, according 
to official sources, most citizens in Montenegro do not consider crime a serious problem.3 The Montenegrin 
Government continues to collaborate with a host of international organisations, ranging from the UNDP, to the 
EU and OSCE, on law enforcement and security sector reform. The EU, USAID/ORT and OSCE are particularly 
important international actors in these areas, assisting with police and judicial reform and border policing to help 
combat organised crime.4
It is against this backdrop that Montenegro’s private security industry has emerged. As with the rest of the 
region, the industry has only emerged in the period since the end of communism. The private security company, 
Fast Worker claims to have been the first legally registered PSC to be established in the ex-Yugoslavia in 1992. 
However, the industry only seems to have really picked up when the company Security Guard Montenegro was 
established in May 1999. There are now nine companies in the republic offering private security services.
1 Simic P, Yugoslavia at the crossroads: reforms or disintegration? Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade: March/April 
2001, p 6.
2 Davis I, Small arms and light weapons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: The nature of the problem, Saferworld, London, 2002, p16.
3 Interviews with Branko Bulatovic, Spokesman, Ministry of Interior, 25 January 2005; Sinisa Bjekovic, Executive Director, University of 
Montenegro Human Rights Centre, 20 January 2005.
4 SEESAC Weekly Media Review, 22 – 29 September 2003, www.seesac.org, accessed 03 May 2005.
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2 Contemporary security threats
As in all SEE countries, Montenegro suffers from a range of real and perceived security threats that act as 
generators of demand for private security provision. Recent research has found that citizens do not fully trust 
the police and that Montenegro suffers from ‘relatively high levels’ of small arms proliferation and violent crime 
compared with the rest of the region. Armed crime is a particular problem in smaller towns and handguns are 
the most commonly used weapons.5
As, at the time of writing, the latest official crime figures from the Ministry of Interior (MoI) were not available, the 
most up to date figures available are from a study conducted in 2004, which provides an overview of armed crime 
rates in the republic. In the period 01 January 1992 – 21 December 2002 there were 255 murders committed 
with firearms.6 In this period the number of violent assaults involving SALW per 100,000 inhabitants was highest 
in Cetinje (23 per 100,000), Bar (20), Niksic (17), Podgorica (17), Kolasin (17) and Budva municipalities.7 The 
assault rates for Kolasin, Cetinje and Budva are particularly noteworthy because less than 22,000 people 
populate all these municipalities, a fact that apparently contradicts general assumptions that gun crime is higher 
in urban rather than rural areas.8
A combination of petty and organised crime probably accounts for the above incidents; Montenegro is believed 
to have the highest rate of personal weapons possession per capita of any country in the Balkans, a factor that 
explains the routine occurrence of petty armed crime. However, for those people whose work or wealth has 
dubious legality and who have links to the criminal underworld, there is a perception that internecine feuds do 
occur with occasional violent outcomes.
The presence of large amounts of SALW, corruption and organised crime still, however, present significant 
challenges to public safety. The republic’s problems with organized crime and SALW trafficking are difficult to 
control given its weak and distrusted law enforcement agencies,9 widespread corruption10 and the challenges 
posed by its mountainous terrain.  
As in the Republic of Serbia, incidents of armed violence and armed homicide have decreased since the mid 1990s 
although the level of armed homicide in Montenegro remains high by international standards.11 Montenegro has 
seen a fall in politically motivated assassinations in comparison to earlier years although there have been several 
high-profile cases, such as the May 2004 murder of a newspaper editor Dusko Jovanovic in Podgorica.12
The republic has been identified in the past as a smuggling route for narcotics, humans and cigarettes although 
perhaps on a smaller scale than some neighbouring territories. In Montenegro, the low risks facing traffickers 
are thought to have fuelled this lucrative trade and its effects have been felt throughout Europe.13 International 
5 Montenegro SALW Survey, (Small Arms Survey, 2004), pp 3, 20 and 30. This report found, among other things, that citizens tend to perceive 
the police as ‘biased, behave rude and unprofessionally, frequently use policies of nepotism, and are often used as a ‘repressive instrument 
of the state’ that strictly follow the politics of the party in power, and that most households cite personal and family protection as the primary 
reason for gun possession.
6 Preamble to the ‘Law on Arms’, Official Gazette. No: 49/04. English language version available at http://www.seesac.org/laws/
Montenegro%20-%20Law%20on%20Weapons%20Oct%2004.PDF
7 Ibid. 
8 Unfortunately, there has to date been no rigorous analysis of why gun-related crime is relatively high in rural areas in Montenegro.
9 Op cit, Small Arms Survey, p 30.
10 Serbia and Montenegro is rated at 97 out of 145 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2004, www.transparency.
org accessed 10 May 2005. 
11 Op cit, Small Arms Survey, p39.
12 Dusko Jovanovic was shot and killed on 28 May 2004 as he left his office in Podgorica, even though he was protected by a bodyguard. The 
newspaper he edited - Dan - has been strongly critical of the government. In 2002, Reporters without borders criticised Montenegro following 
the imprisonment and fining of journalists charged with defaming the then President Milo Djukanovic. Various. ‘Newspaper condemned 
for saying president was cigarette smuggler’, Reporters without borders, 17 June 2002, http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=2620, 
accessed 15 January 2005.  
13 ‘High profits and low risks for Montenegrin smugglers’, Dan, 12 September 2003.
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development organisations - for example the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) - have therefore 
contributed resources to combat trans-border crime, especially by upgrading the capacity of border police. 
Problems in this area are of a regional nature, and the activities of Montenegrin Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) 
(if there are any) are likely overshadowed by those of regional criminal networks. Montenegro is a signatory of 
treaties and conventions covering the fight against organised crime although many observers have questioned 
the capacity of law enforcement agencies, and the will of government, to address this problem. As one report 
put it, even if law enforcement agencies had sufficient capacity ‘they certainly would not be able to match the 
enormous sums available to the organised crime gangs, who can presently bribe public officials’.14
The two best-known PSCs in Montenegro are Security Guard Montenegro and Guard Popovic Security. There 
are four other registered PSCs: Cobra Security (Podgorica); Security – NIK (Niksic); Top Security (Podgorica); and 
Vukacic Security Guard (Podgorica). In addition, an association of security providers lists three more PSCs as 
members: Star Spead Labudovic (Niksic), Agencija za zastitu (Podgorica) and Fast Worker UNO (Podgorica).15 
Though there are PSCs based in Niksic, Berane and Cetinje,16 the majority appear to be based in the largest city, 
Podgorica. As Montenegro is a small republic, it is possible for PSCs to easily operate throughout the country 
from this base. For example, according to its promotional material, Security Guard Montenegro works across 
the entire country, including all national branches of Podgoricka Bank.17 It is however difficult to determine the 
precise number of PSCs operating because many are small and unregistered. According to the Central Registry 
of the Commercial Court, there are five companies in Montenegro working in ‘private investigation and protection 
activities’ and one registered under the code for ‘public security, guarding, law and order’. Yet there is another 
company – ‘Fast Worker’ - based in Podgorica, which is not listed on the Court’s register. One head of a PSC 
estimated there were 10 - 15 PSCs in Montenegro, but that most of these were not legal enterprises.18
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
The most prominent registered PSCs in Montenegro provide a variety of 
services for their clients. For instance, Security Guard Montenegro (SGM) 
divides its services into three strands: 1) security provision; 2) public affairs 
service; and 3) physical and technical security. The first strand, security 
provision, deals with the design and manufacture of uniforms, bulletproof 
vests, armour for transportation vehicles, cases and belts. The second strand, 
public affairs service, deals with administration, the sale of alarm and video 
equipment, a VIP service19 and training centre. The final strand, physical and 
technical security, centres on SGM’s protection activities for ‘persons, facilities, 
assemblies, manifestations and the transport of money and valuables’. As 
part of its physical and technical security service SGM has a rapid response 
unit, bodyguards, detectives and a consultative security service. Security 
Guard Montenegro also has contracts with the police and military to provide 
special equipment such as uniforms and belts, but not weapons.20
The second prominent firm in Montenegro, Guard Popovic Security, lists its 
services as: safeguarding of objects and individuals; transporting money 
and valuables; escorting and protecting vehicles; installing alarm systems; 
providing video surveillance; providing systems for securing money; and an 
investigations office. Security Guard Montenegro and Guard Popovic Security are two of the largest PSCs in 
the country. Other smaller PSCs do not offer the same variety of services. There are also cases of PSCs being 
14 ‘Montenegro: Little political will to curb trafficking and corruption’, Civilitas Research, 09 January 2003.
15 Central Registry of the Commercial Court; Interviews with Jole Cavlovic, Head, Fast Worker UNO, 27 January 2005; Mr Marjan Marjanovic, 
Owner, Security Guard Montenegro, 19, 20 and 27 January 2005.
16 Op cit Bjekovic.
17 Security Guard Montenegro website, http://www.securityguardmn.com/eng/, accessed 15 January 2005.
18 Op cit Marjanovic.
19 The VIP service provides a ‘business club’ (bar, restaurant and club).
20 Op cit Marjanovic; Security Guard Website, http://www.securityguardmn.com/eng/, accessed 15 January 2005.
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employed for politically sensitive public safety services. For example, political developments in Podgorica have 
recently aroused public protest and Security Guard Montenegro has been hired by local authorities to clear cars 
from sites and prevent public sabotage.21 Security guards who work on an independent basis outside of PSCs are 
often hired as bodyguards for wealthy ‘businessmen’.22 
PSCs are on the whole hired for general security purposes, such as the provision of security at sports events 
and concerts, business security and the transfer of money, rather than from a fear of crime.23 PSC clients in 
Montenegro include:
n International institutions (e.g. UNHCR);
n Private businesses (e.g. Ski Centre Durmitor);
n Oil companies (TNK, Tyumen Oil Company Russia); 
n Private individuals and foreign visitors;
n NGOs (Women’s Peace Forum employs a PSC to guard its safe houses for abused women, as well as 
its offices);
n Banks (Podgoricka Banka);
n Celebrities (when the Serbian pop star ‘Ceca’ toured Montenegro she hired Security Guard Montenegro 
and Guard Popovic Security);24 and
n Medical establishments (Guard Popovic Security provides security at a range of hospitals).25
In all the above examples, the PSCs were employed to provide physical security. PSCs in Montenegro also sell and 
install technical security systems to the following: USAID, the Council of Europe, Atlasmont Bank, and ‘Monet’ 
mobile phone company.26
International organisations in Montenegro do not hire domestic PSCs at the present time. For example, the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) employs an EU-based PSC that in turn hires local individuals through 
local newspaper adverts.27 Because it does not have confidence in local firms, the US Consulate does not employ 
a Montenegrin PSC to guard its premises, instead, employing individuals directly. This practice is contrary to the 
majority of US missions in the world where local companies are hired.28 
Not many private citizens and households employ PSCs. Although the public does not have great confidence 
in the police, they are more likely to contact them before hiring the services of a PSC29 since the cost of hiring 
personal security is prohibitive for most Montenegrins. This said, wealthy and influential individuals such as 
newspaper editors and politicians are increasingly hiring PSCs and bodyguards. In some cases it is believed that 
personal security is hired by these individuals in order to protect themselves from potential resentment arousing 
from the alleged illicit manner in which they gained their wealth. A large amount of this wealth was gained 
through the illegal smuggling and trafficking opportunities that arose during the conflicts of the 1990s in the 
Former Yugoslavia and Albania. Nowadays PSCs are frequently hired to protect such property.30 Finally, there is 
also a perception that having a bodyguard is a status symbol for wealthy businessmen.31 
21 Interview with Mr Dragan Mugosa, Information Officer, EC Delegation to Montenegro/European Agency for Reconstruction, 28 January 
2005.
22 Interview with Women’s Peace Forum, 20 January 2005; op cit Bjekovic.
23 Op cit Marjanovic.
24 Interview with Biljana Batizic, Vijesti, 28 January 2005.
25 Interview with Vladan Simonovic, ‘Media’ and CEDEM, 21 January 2005.
26 Op cit Marjanovic; Women’s Peace Forum; Batizic; and Simonovic.
27 The contract lasts between 18 months to a year and is transparent and open to both local and international companies. The tendering 
process treats both local and international PSCs equally. EAR has strict regulations on the experience and background of PSCs it employs. 
After the contract has expired, the tendering process starts again.
28 Interview with Alan Carson, US Consulate, 26 January 2005.
29 Interview with Nedjeljko Rudovic, Journalist, Vijesti, 27 January 2005; Bjekovic.  
30 Op cit Bjekovic; Women’s Peace Forum.
31 Op cit Bjekovic; Batizic.
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The presence of the private security sector in Montenegro seemed to have become accepted. All interviewees 
were able to name at least one PSC (and often two). These tended to be Security Guard Montenegro and Guard 
Popovic Security. From interview responses, people have a very clear idea about the work that PSCs carry out and 
for which clients. Most of this work, such as guarding banks and providing security at public events, is viewed as 
legitimate. 
No official statistics are available to compare crime rates with the activities of PSCs, but according to most 
sources there is no doubt that the crime rate is lower in areas where PSCs operate.32 Figures for Montenegro 
show that several municipalities with populations lower than 22,000 have gun assault rates per 100,000 citizens 
higher or as high as Podgorica – the capital (population over 100,000). It might be possible to infer from this data 
that the presence of PSCs operating in Podgorica has had an effect on the gun assault crime rate. However, there 
has been no research conducted into this relationship or on any displacement effect that PSCs may be having. 
The Montenegrin police maintain that there is no connection between the rate of crime in Montenegro and the 
activities of PSCs, although they pointed out that the number of PSCs is rising at the same time that overall crime 
in the country is falling.33 
PSCs play an important role in supplementing the work of the police, who would otherwise be unable to supply 
enough officers. As the MoI’s responsibility for securing different institutions and production facilities has gradually 
reduced, PSCs have taken on responsibilities that would previously have fallen to the police. Consequently it 
appears that the police regard certain PSCs as rivals for lucrative security work that officers carry out in addition 
to their regular duties.34 The credibility of this accusation is enforced by a journalist from Vijesti who claimed 
that it was common practice for police officers to work as security guards, for instance at nightclubs,35 outside 
of hours.
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
In a jurisdiction the size of Montenegro (with a population of 616,000) it is inevitable that extensive informal 
connections will exist between a number of different sectors. It is however, important that such connections 
are clear and transparent and that legal and judicial systems are in place to ensure that individuals are not 
compromised by such connections.
4.1 Security sector affiliations
In Montenegro, PSCs are keen to portray their legitimacy and promote themselves as professional and reliable 
entities with a range of national and international clients. However, perhaps due to Montenegro’s recent history 
and its diminutive size and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, there is a sense that PSCs have emerged with 
some military and institutional affiliations. Companies such as Security Guard Montenegro and Fast Worker, 
who employ ex-military and ex-police personnel, are unlikely to be alone in this regard.36 Most PSCs were also 
established by former employees of the MoI and the Police.37
PSCs working with the police at public events, such as sports matches and concerts, certainly cooperate closely 
with the police, developing security plans that specify the roles played by each actor.38 In such cases the roles 
and competencies are decided before any event, with the police having oversight and control over security 
operations.39 For example, Security Guard Montenegro claims to communicate and plan with the police when 
extra security personnel are hired for sports events, concerts and public events.40 All interviewees mentioned 
32 Op cit Bjekovic.
33 Interview with Zivko Sipcic, Chief of Directorate of Police, 25 January 2005.
34 Interview with Jole Cavlovic, Head, Fast Worker UNO, 27 January 2005.
35 Op cit Batzic.
36 Op cit Marjanovic.
37 Op cit Cavlovic.
38 Op cit, Marjanovic.
39 Op cit, Bjekovic.
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the role that PSCs play in providing support to the police at these events, and this is seen as perfectly legitimate: 
the task of the police being to protect citizens, and of PSCs to give additional protection. Thus, there must be 
a certain level of cooperation and complimentary activity.41 Yet outside of these activities, there are generally 
no working agreements between PSCs and the police.42 It however is important that all forms of joint working 
between PSCs and police are established on a clear footing. More significant still, is the fact that it appears 
to be common practice for police officers to work as security guards outside of working hours, for instance at 
nightclubs.43 Yet, it is unclear whether this is officially sanctioned and controlled (as is the case in Kosovo) or is 
actually illegal. Ideally, this practice should be prohibited, but at the very least it must be brought under some 
form of legal control and closely monitored.
4.2 Political affiliations
There is mixed evidence regarding the existence of affiliations between PSCs and political actors. While there is 
no hard information on the existence of any such links and journalists interviewed for this research doubt their 
existence, it is very difficult for the media to investigate this issue due to the lack of a freedom of information act 
in Montenegro.44 Both the fact that security and protection of Government officials is carried out by the police 
and not PSCs45 and that individuals and not PSCs guard political parties might indicate the absence of any such 
affiliations.46 However more concealed affiliations may exist. Though one senior employee at Security Guard 
Montenegro claims to have good relations with the MoI,47 on the whole the PSCs interviewed were reluctant to 
comment on the existence of political affiliations, either by themselves or by other PSCs.48 
4.3 Organised crime affiliations
The most problematic affiliation issue in Montenegro is that of potential connections between PSCs and organised 
criminal groups (OCGs). Government officials, whilst openly acknowledging that the Yugoslav conflicts of 1990s 
fuelled OCG activities in Montenegro, downplay the present importance of OCGs stating that organised crime 
ceased to be a problem in Montenegro after Milosevic was removed from power in Serbia.49 Other sources, 
including interviews conducted for this research, suggest a different, albeit ill-defined, reality, but these sources 
were unable to clarify, what kind of connections might exist between PSCs and OCGs.50 If there are OCGs operating 
in Montenegro, the Government is unwilling to concede that it is an issue worth confronting. This view is disputed 
by the barrister of the assassinated Dan journalist Dusko Jovanovic who believes that there is clear evidence of 
OCG activity in the country; ‘Jovanovic’s assassination was a clear manifestation of the existence of organised 
crime’.51 On the other hand, the lack of prosecutions could be evidence that there is no will to tackle organised 
crime, or moreover, to eliminate the corruption within the government’s ranks and confront the ‘many shady 
businessmen connected to the senior members of government, police and customs’.52
40 Op cit, Marjanovic.
41 Op cit, Bjekovic.
42 Op cit, Sipcic.
43 Several interviewees remarked on this. For example, Op cit, Batzic.
44 Op cit Batizic.
45 Op cit Nedjeljko Rudovic; Marjanovic.
46 Op cit Bjekovic.
47 Op cit Marjanovic.
48 The PSC ‘Fast Worker’, while denying that they have any links to political parties themselves, declined to comment on or ‘slander’ other 
PSCs in the industry. Op cit Cavlovic.
49 Op cit Branko. For example Vesna Medenica, the Supreme Public Prosecutor, declared that ‘time will tell whether there is organised crime 
in Montenegro’, citing the lack of any criminal charges brought against OCGs in Montenegro. ‘Vesna Medenica is not sure whether there is 
organised crime in Montenegro: No offence reported so far’, See oneworld.net, 09 February 2005.
50 South Eastern Europe SALW Monitor, SEESAC, Belgrade, 2004; Op cit Bjekovic; Women’s Peace Forum.
51 ‘Vesna Medenica is not sure whether there is organised crime in Montenegro: No offence reported so far’, See oneworld.net, 09 February 
2005.
52 ‘Montenegro: Little political will to curb trafficking and corruption’, Civilitas Research, 09 January 2003.
83
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
5 Regulation and conduct of PSCs
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
The current laws governing PSCs are the ‘Law on Arms’ (Official Gazette No 49/04) and the ‘Law on Business 
Organisation’ (Official Gazette No 6/02). In addition, two new laws are presently being drafted: the ‘Law on 
Protection of Property and Individuals’ and the ‘Law on Detective Agencies’. The ‘Law on Protection of Property 
and Individuals’ will regulate the activities of all persons and companies that provide security services. Currently 
it is only available in draft form. Some of the main provisions are listed below.
According to Article 3, protection services can only be provided by individuals and companies registered at the 
Central Economic Court.53 All companies must register with the Economic Court in order to receive a registration 
number and they subsequently become automatic members of the Chamber of Commerce. Membership is 
compulsory. However, in an interview with the Chamber of Commerce of Montenegro it was stated that there was 
only one PSC operating in the country – Security Guard Montenegro. Confusingly, it does not appear that all PSCs 
are registered with the Chamber of Commerce or indeed with the Economic Court. All companies are required to 
re-register annually. After registering with the Economic Court, PSCs must register with the local police in order 
to be issued with weapons licences.
Article 6 states that companies and individuals providing protection services (hereafter PSCs) are not allowed to 
provide domestic or foreign military or espionage services. Articles 8 specifies that PSCs are allowed to provide 
services for:
a) the protection of property from damage, theft and destruction;
b) installing alarm/audio/video systems;
c) preventing unlawful access;
d) protecting a person’s rights/integrity/personal security;
e) protecting money and valuables; and
f) security at public gatherings.
Articles 18 and 19 set out the conditions that those wishing to register a PSC must meet. They must have at least 
five employees; be citizens of Serbia and Montenegro; be resident in Montenegro; have attended high school for 
a minimum of two years; be healthy; have no criminal record or have not been accused of any crime; not have a 
drinking, drug or violence problem. 
Article 25 of the draft Law states that permission to carry out private security activities can only be granted if 
the applicant has passed an examination set by the MoI. However, if individuals have worked for the police, they 
automatically qualify to undertake PSC work.54
5.1 Use of force and firearms
The ‘Law on Arms’, Article 31 allows companies to issue arms and ammunition to individuals who are working 
as bodyguards and in the protection of facilities and goods, (provided the criteria of the prior Article 17 are 
met).55 Weapons can only be carried whilst the guard is on duty and cannot be carried outside of the facility 
being guarded or protected. However, Article 31, Paragraph 2, states that guards of crops, vineyards, hunting 
and fishing areas, and other persons who are professional bodyguards and are employed to provide security for 
facilities, property and goods may carry weapons outside the said facility or area to a place of residence. Guards 
who handle money or valuables can also carry weapons beyond the site being guarded for purposes of transport. 
53 Further PSCs are registered by the Central Registry of the Commercial Court under either the ‘Private Investigation and Protection Activities’ 
(‘Delatnost trazenja lica I zastite’) code or the Public Security, Guarding, Law and Order’ (‘Javna bezbednost, obezbed; zanona, reda’) codes.
54 ‘Law on Arms’ (Official Gazette No 49/04); Draft ‘Law on Protection of Persons and Property’.
84
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
The PSC must, however, issue a licence for carrying or transporting weapons to the person entrusted with them 
and must inform the MoI. The current law is an improvement on the previous ‘Law on Arms’, which did not require 
that a licence for carrying and transporting weapons be issued by PSCs to guards.56
PSC staff and citizens alike are not allowed to possess any automatic weapons and semi automatic weapons 
with a magazine capacity of more than five bullets (except rifles of 22 LR calibres).57 Weapons for self-defence 
are classed as pistols and revolvers of 5.56 mm calibre and more.58
The Criminal Code covers the force that the police can use and it is expected that the new ‘Law on Protection 
of Property and Individuals’ will contain provisions referring to PSCs and weapons. The ‘Law on Arms’ (Article 
12) lists all banned weapons and applies to all citizens and companies.59 Although there is no formal legislation 
regulating the use of force, one PSC interviewed for this research claimed to train employees to use minimal 
force.60
With regard to training in the handling and management of firearms, although the law requires that citizens 
with weapons licences have training in how to handle them, there is no specific law pertaining to PSCs in this 
area.61 To date no PSCs or employees have been convicted in Montenegro for violations of the laws governing the 
use of force and firearms. It was not possible during this research to carry out a detailed survey of the training 
provided by the different PSCs operating in Montenegro to determine whether it meets international standards 
(in particular the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials), and extra 
research is warranted on this question. Further, while the fact that no evidence could be found of firearms misuse 
by PSC staff in the course of this research, given the widespread availability of firearms in Montenegro, and the 
high levels of gun misuse in wider society, a degree of caution is probably warranted. Since this wider context is 
likely to condition the behaviour of at least some PSC staff, there is plenty of scope for force and firearms to be 
used, and every possibility that in doing so, security guards will meet an armed response.  Additional questions 
arise about the use that off-duty police may make of their weapons and the licensing arrangements that apply 
in this area. Further research is therefore required on a number of questions surrounding the use of force and 
firearms by PSCs and police in Montenegro.
No information on the laws regulating the carriage of ‘non-lethal’ security equipment, such as batons and sprays, 
was available. 
5.2 Oversight
According to the draft ‘Law on Protection of Persons and Property’, Article 16, the MoI has responsibility for 
PSCs and has the right to investigate them if required.62 There is at present no special department that regulates 
PSCs. The MoI and the Economic Court have responsibility for registering all commercial societies but there is 
no department within the MoI specifically concerned with PSCs. Some Montenegrin PSCs do claim to have a 
55 The ‘Law on Arms’, Article 17 sets out the criteria for licensing to posses and carry firearms. A licence for arms purchase can only be 
issued to individuals who are over 21 years of age and who have not been prosecuted for an offence committed while on duty. There must 
also be a justifiable reason for arms procurement. There must exist no potential for the misuse of weapons, such as frequent and excessive 
consumption of alcohol, gravely disturbed family, neighbourhood or working relations; discipline violations in the context of hunting or sporting 
marksmanship regulations. Individuals must also pass a health examination to verify that they are capable of handling and carrying weapons 
and must have been trained in handling arms and understand the relevant regulations. Article 17 also dictates that an arms license can only 
be issued to an individual who is trained in handling arms and knows the regulations related to arms handling and keeping. The Ministry 
of Interior issues a certificate of aptitude for keeping and carrying and correct use of weapons. The new Law also requires that the person 
carrying and transporting weapons show this licence at the request of an official. Preamble to the ‘Law on Arms’, p37.
56 Ibid. p37.
57 ‘Law on Arms’, Article 12.
58 ‘Law on arms’, Article 14.
59 ‘Law on Arms’; Criminal Code (2003 / correction 2004. Official Gazette No 79/2003 and no. 7/2004 - Correction).
60 Op cit Marjanovic.
61 Op cit Bjekovic.
62 Op cit Bulatovic; draft ‘Law on Protection of Persons and Property’.
63 Op cit Bulatovic.
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means of self-regulation in the form of a Code of Conduct that specifies guidelines for hiring and firing guards.63 
However, it is unclear whether it is company-led and as our researchers were unable to obtain a copy of the code 
the nature of its conduct is unclear.64
Since it introduces tighter regulation, the introduction of the new ‘Law on Protection of Persons and Property’ may 
also provide a window of opportunity to re-examine oversight in the sector. However according to a prominent 
Montenegrin think-tank, the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM), a prerequisite for effective 
oversight is the introduction of a freedom of information law which will allow information on corruption and the 
activities of PSCs to be passed freely between the public, companies and the police. A new law on freedom of 
information is currently being drafted and is eagerly anticipated by NGOs and the media in Montenegro who 
describe the current situation as characterised by ‘arbitrary behaviour of executive power bodies’.65
5.3 Professionalism and training
Client satisfaction with the professionalism of Montenegrin PSCs varies. After contracting Security Guard 
Montenegro between 2000 – 2001, UNCHR Podgorica office wrote that ‘our overall impression is that Security 
[Guard] Montenegro is a reliable company which we can recommend for cooperation’.66 Yet although as noted 
above, some companies run in-house training for their staff, the law does not specify any training for PSCs, except 
that all citizens and commercial enterprises that apply for weapons’ licences must have been trained in handling 
arms.67 Unfortunately it was not possible to examine the exact requirements on weapons handling during this 
research or to determine the precise content of any in-house training that is provided. However, further attention 
is clearly required in this area to ensure that all PSC staff are trained to an acceptable standard.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
PSCs do not attract a large amount of attention or concern in Montenegro. This can be interpreted in two ways. 
Firstly, PSCs are carrying out legitimate work and the private security sector is simply a response to social and 
economic changes in line with Montenegro’s transition from a command economy. Or secondly, the level of 
societal corruption is so high that people assume that, along with other areas of Montenegrin life, PSCs have 
to operate in a semi-legitimate grey-area with links to government, police, and criminal organisations. Criticism 
tends not to be directed at the PSCs themselves, but at the system in which they work and the institutions that are 
in need of reform. There have not been any stories or negative rumours about security guards in the Montenegrin 
press, and tellingly, one of the main human rights organisations in Montenegro, when questioned about rumours 
of PSC links to organised crime, blamed the system that regulates PSCs – in other words, the government – but 
not the companies themselves.68 Even the most forthcoming journalists only criticised the government, police 
corruption and their lack of freedom of information to investigate PSCs, rather than PSCs themselves. In this 
view of course, PSCs are no worse or better than any other institution or industry in the country. Indeed, the fact 
that they provide security at public events and for businesses such as banks appears to give them increased 
acceptance in the public’s eyes.
The sector as a whole can be expected to grow and mature in the near future. The MoI, PSCs and the media 
predict that the number of PSCs and security guards will grow as a result of several factors. Firstly, growth in the 
economy will see the establishment of more businesses that will require security services, and if Montenegro’s 
tourist industry continues to attract investment, new hotels and amenities will generate greater demand for 
security providers. Secondly, the ongoing restructuring of the Police and Army could lead to ex-servicemen and 
64 Op cit Cavlovic; Simonovic.
65 Op cit Batizic; Rudovic; Bjekovic. The Law will establish the right to free access to information, the obligations of the government, 
transparency, appropriate procedures and legal remedies. ‘Transition in Montenegro’, CEDEM, Report No. 23, September 2004, p 25 - 27 
and p 30 - 34
66 Reference letter written for Security Guard Montenegro.
67 Certificates must be submitted to the Ministry of Interior with all other documentation. Interview with Milan Jovovic, Beretta gun shop, 28 
January 2005.
68 Op cit Bjekovic.
69 Op cit Bulatovic.
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police officers joining PSCs or hiring themselves out as individual security guards.69
6.1 Main recommendations
n The draft ‘Law on Protection of Property and Individuals’ is a positive step towards the regulation of the 
activities of PSCs; however there is not enough support to implement the reforms. Frameworks to ensure the 
implementation of the legislation need to be drawn up to supplement the new legislation.
n The draft ‘Law on Protection of Property and Individuals’ entails enhanced freedom of information. For the 
successful implementation of this law, the general transparency of state agencies will need to improve to the 
point where information can no longer be withheld by the authorities on the basis of discretionary powers, or 
manipulated, as is currently said to be the case.
n Prospective PSC employees should be required by law to undergo detailed background checks.
n The current system for storage of SALW by PSCs should be reviewed to determine whether the current 
arrangement, by which staff providing security to certain installations may take weapons home, can be 
improved upon.
n Particular attention should be given to the introduction and consistent application of rigorous training 
programmes in the minimal use of force and firearms for PSC staff. Such training must be nationally approved 
and regulated, and consistent both in theory and practice with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
n The informal working relationship between the state security service and PSCs must be formalised and better 
regulated through the introduction of joint working agreements between PSCs and police. In particular, the 
authorities need to stop the police working as security and bodyguards outside of hours.
n A lack of consistent official information regarding the number of PSCs operating hampers analysis of the 
privatised security sector in Montenegro. The MoI and Chamber of Commerce must reform the registration 
process to ensure full compliance with the law, as at present only one of nine known PSCs have registered 
with the relevant authorities in Montenegro. 
n The better-established PSCs should come together to agree a progressive code of conduct and promote its 
adoption throughout the industry. Government and clients should encourage this.
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The Republic of Serbia
1 Background to the privatization of security
As the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was amongst the most economically advanced of the former socialist-bloc 
countries, the Republic of Serbia’s subsequent economic and social decline, following the various post-Yugoslav 
conflicts, has been all the more dramatic. Between 1990 and 2000 Serbia experienced a 50 per cent reduction 
in GDP, a substantial decline in its industrial production, large reductions in exports, imports and the value of 
state pensions, increases in unemployment, a large increase in the importance of the informal sector and the 
substantial migration of skilled labour. 
During the same period, Serbia also experienced a dramatic decline in both the rule of law and the effectiveness 
of state security structures that were used as instruments of oppression rather than security providers, allowing 
organised criminality unprecedented freedom and power. The penetration of criminality in Serbian society was 
most evident in the increased collaboration between the security services - Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti (SBD) 
- and criminal networks. Rooted in the 1970s when Yugoslav criminal networks were utilised for smuggling 
arms, cigarettes and tobacco and assassinating dissident émigrés,70 these links were formalised following the 
imposition of economic sanctions by the UN in May 1992, as parallel trading networks were actively encouraged 
by Milosevic’s Government to counter the embargo. This environment was exacerbated as the security forces 
waged successive wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, further diverting resources away from domestic security 
provision.  
As in the rest of SEE, Serbia is undertaking extensive Security Sector Reform (SSR). As well as the SSR problems 
experienced by the region as a whole, Serbia has specific problems related to both the Serbian security services’ 
participation in the post-Yugoslav wars, especially regarding implications of involvement in ethnic cleansing and 
other violations of human rights, and the purported close links between the security services and organised 
criminal networks. A series of reforms have been initiated to tackle this specific legacy as well as the demands 
of modernisation and professionalism. A substantial downsizing of the armed forces has already begun, with 
the intention of creating modern armed services capable of addressing contemporary threats. Action has also 
been taken to make the police service more accountable to the public and more capable of providing a safe and 
secure environment. This has focused on improving the technical capacity of the police to investigate crime (e.g. 
training in forensics); improving the police’s ability to communicate with the public through introducing community 
policing approaches; raising the accountability and professionalism of the police through the introduction of a 
new Police Code of Conduct; the creation of an Office of the Inspector General for oversight purposes; and the 
creation of a Multi-Ethnic Policing Entity in southern Serbia to better serve the needs of the ethnic Albanian 
minority there. These measures have had some tangible successes including increasing trust between the public 
and the police.71 
The private security market first emerged in Serbia during the early 1990s as demand for private property 
protection grew in response to the ineffectiveness of Serbia’s state security providers. A range of private security 
companies were formed to meet this demand. Embryonic PSCs in Serbia were predominately informal groupings 
of armed men that as well as providing private security services engaged in racketeering, money laundering and 
trafficking.72 These groups were able to operate relatively freely due to a lack of regulation and their connections 
to both formal (the police) and informal (powerful businessmen) local power structures. 
It is important to note that elements of Serbia’s security services also underwent virtual privatization during 
the 1991 - 1995 period, when various paramilitary groups consisting of ‘quasi-private criminal combatants’73 
70 Partners in Crime: The Risk of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and Organised Crime in Southeast Europe, CSD, Sofia, 2004. In the 
1970s, over 150 criminals, including ‘Arkan’, allegedly leased themselves to the Federal Ministry of Interior. Ibid 
71 Living with the Legacy – SALW Survey of the Republic of Serbia, UNDP, 2005, p 45.
72 Simpson, J. ‘Private security in Serbia: industry growth is offset by poor legislation, creating a dangerous vacuum’, (Unpublished) 16 March 
2005, p 5.
73 Andreas, P, ‘The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia’. International Studies Quarterly, 48 (1), 2004, p 29 - 51.
88
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
conducted operations not only within the various areas affected by war but also in regions within Serbia proper, 
such as the Hrtkovci, Kosovo, Pljevlja, Sandzak and Vojvodina provinces.74 These ‘operations’ consisted of 
intimidation or acts of open violence against Muslim, ethnic Albanian, Croatian and Hungarian communities and 
were conducted with the knowledge of, and in some cases support from, local security structures. 
A number of key economic and legislative reforms, in part designed to harmonise legal and regulatory standards 
with EU norms, have had an impact on the development of the private security sector. These include the 
privatization of viable production assets, the reform of the social security system and taxation, the liberalization 
of labour laws, the opening up of the economy to international markets and radical changes to law enforcement 
and the provision of justice. As well as increasing the amount of private property owned by Serbian citizens, these 
reforms have succeeded in securing foreign investors.75 As a result there has been an increase in demand for 
private property provision from both domestic actors, who have acquired assets under the privatization process, 
and international businesses. 
There now exists a diverse, competitive and largely unregulated private security sector in Serbia, consisting of 
companies, cooperatives and informal groups. PSCs with links to the old regime and little respect for the rule 
of law operate alongside PSCs attempting to emulate the professionalism and accountability of foreign private 
security companies, although no international PSCs currently operate in Serbia. Companies range from two man 
teams of private investigators working from small rural homes and offices in provincial towns to well structured 
firms of 1,600 employees providing static protection, rapid response and body-guarding services. As there is 
still no legislation governing the private security sector and no regulatory obligation to register a PSC, estimating 
the overall size of the industry is difficult.  Informed sources estimate that there are approximately 3,200 firms 
operating across Serbia,76 of which only 170 are registered with the Chamber of Commerce,77 and that between 
30,000 – 60,000 people are employed by PSCs, though the exact number would fluctuate daily given the informal 
nature of the bottom end of the market.78 
2 Contemporary security threats 
Overall recorded crime in Serbia is low, in comparison with most of its neighbours and European averages,79 and 
minor crime, such as pick-pocketing and drunken and disorderly behaviour is relatively uncommon.80 While such 
low levels of crime may reflect a culture of not reporting crime owing to a lack of trust between the public and the 
police, it must also be noted that the public appear to genuinely feel safe from most forms of crime.81 The most 
significant kinds of criminal activity in Serbia are those engaged in by serious and organised criminal networks, 
particularly the trafficking and trade in drugs, people and arms. Rade Bulatovic, Head of the Security Information 
Agency (BIA), confirmed this when he recently stated, ‘international organised crime continues to use Serbian 
territory as a transit route for drug trafficking, illegal migration, and trading in arms’.82 
74 The most infamous of these groups are Arkan’s ‘Tigers’ and Vojislav Seselj’s ‘White Eagles’ or ‘Cetniks’. Final Report of the United Nations 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674, 27 May 1994 and Annexes, Volume 
1 - Final Report and Annexes I through V.
75 Foreign direct investment in 2003 was €1.1billion, or 5.8% of GDP, and analysts estimate that a further €500 million was invested up to 
December 2004. Serbia and Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, Commission of the European Communities.
76 Peric-Zimonic, V. ‘Private eyes watch over market’, Inter Press Service News Agency, 26 August 2004.
77 Chamber of Commerce, Belgrade, ‘Privredna Komora Srbije’, 2004. Quoted in Living with the Legacy – SALW Survey of the Republic of 
Serbia, UNDP, 2005.
78 Dragisa Marinkovic, General Manager of DMD Systems believers there are around 33,000 people working in private security agencies 
in Serbia. Quoted in Simpson, J. op cit. The MuP registry of firearm licenses is another potential indicator of the size of the private security 
workforce. Although no category of license especially is dedicated to private security firms, there is a category for ‘Legal Entities’. Whilst 
this category includes commercial hunting associations as well as private investigators, it is probable that the large majority of the 47,528 
licensed firearm holders within this category are employed by PSCs
79 MuP 2003 Activity Report, available at www.mupsr.gov.yu, accessed 24 June 2005. 
80 Author’s experience. 
81 Quoted in Living with the Legacy – SALW Survey of the Republic of Serbia, UNDP, 2005, p 39 - 41.
82 Beta News Agency, ‘Serbian Secret Police Chief Describes Security Situation as Stable’, 01 July 2005.
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Significantly, there is a general belief amongst the Serbian public that as long as they remain out of the political 
environment or out of organised criminal circles they are unlikely to become victims of crime.83 Ministry of 
Interior (Mol) figures would appear to confirm this perception. The Mol’s 2002 Activity Report documents the 166 
recorded murders in Serbia in that year. In the majority of cases victims or perpetrators of murders were people 
generally thought to be connected to organised crime or those caught in the crossfire.84   
However, the threat of assassination constitutes a very real threat for a number of high profile figures. During the 
late 1990s and early 2000s Serbia was witness to a number of assassinations of high profile politicians, such 
as Serbian Renewal Movement members Zvonko Osmajlic and Vucko Rakocevic and Mol official Bosko Buha, 
high profile businessmen, such as Yugoslav Airlines Director Zivorad Petrovic, and high profile criminal bosses 
such as the notorious Serbian paramilitary leader Zeljko ‘Arkan’ Raznatovic. These killings culminated in the 
assassination of the reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003. The Prime Minister’s assassination 
was followed by a state of national emergency and a three-month anti-organised crime operation by the security 
services titled ‘Operation Sabre’. Although there has been a reduction in the number of assassinations and 
attempted assassinations since the start of ‘Operation Sabre’, some high profile killings have still occurred. 
Recent examples include the March 2004 murder of an eyewitness to the Djindjic assassination, the July 2004 
murder of a bodyguard to a suspect in the Djindjic case and the October 2004 assassination attempt on the 
discredited businessman Andrija Draskovic. 
While the number of assassinations and armed homicides (88 in 2002) has fallen in the last two years, the 
number of armed robberies has increased, reaching 4,149 in 2003.85 The majority of these have targeted banks, 
post offices, state buildings, supermarkets and transporters of cash and valuables.86  As a result, banks in 
Belgrade now regularly employ at least one armed and highly visible static security guard, generally supported by 
a team of rapid response security personnel87 while private banks increasingly use private security companies to 
secure cash transportations.  
There is a large discrepancy in the rate of violent crime between the different regions, with approximately 80 
per cent of criminal activity occurring in Serbia’s three largest urban centres - Belgrade, Nis and Novi Sad.88 The 
public’s perception of security reflects these statistics, with most people considering these three cities to be more 
dangerous than their own communities.89 It is, therefore, unsurprising that the majority of PSCs have a presence 
in these major urban areas. The highest concentration of PSCs is found in Belgrade, which is both the centre of 
commercial and criminal activity in Serbia. More than 100 companies are known to operate in Belgrade90 and 
all large PSCs in Serbia have a presence in the city. The largest and most successful PSCs in Belgrade include 
Pro-Gard, FTO, Pro Tech, INEX Obezbedjenje and Sigurnost. 
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
The services offered by the private security industry as a whole can be divided into three categories: a) asset 
protection, including static security, rapid response and the transportation of cash and other items with high 
material value; b) bodyguard and close personal protection services to businessmen, politicians and high profile or 
high vulnerability individuals; and c) private detective investigation, including services that detect lost persons or 
property. Within these areas the quality and range of services afforded by individual companies varies greatly.
83 Public Perceptions  Survey, Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute, August 2004, p 23. 
84 MuP Activity Report 2002, available at www.mupsr.gov.yu, accessed 24 June 2005.
85 More recent figures are not available.
86 Examples include the Zemun Post Office on 25 November 2003, the Vero supermarket in New Belgrade in January 2004; and the 
Eksimbanka in New Belgrade in January 2004. ‘Sorting the criminals from the police’, B92, 10 October 2004.
87 Author’s experience. 
88 Interview with Bozidar Prelevic, former acting Minister of Internal Affairs/ NGO ‘Lex’ (League of Experts) Executive, Belgrade, March 
2005.
89 Living with the Legacy – SALW Survey of the Republic of Serbia, UNDP, 2004, p 39.
90 ‘Gorila U Gazdinom Sakou’, Playboy Srbija I Crna Gora, Halilovic et al., July 2005, p 29. NB: Consultations with UN sources confirm the 
validity and accuracy of this report.
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3.1 Asset protection services 
The majority of PSCs in Serbia offer asset protection services. It is estimated that 
40 per cent of this market is shared between fifteen large companies of more 
than 100 employees, most of which operate from Belgrade.91 The largest of these 
is Pro-Gard Securitas, which employs 1,600 security officers and has contracts 
to secure close to a thousand commercial sites.92 A significant proportion of 
the remainder of the asset protection market is controlled by in-house security 
services. In-house security services exist where an organisation, business or 
individual hires, trains and manages its own security staff. US Steel appears to be 
one such company operating an in-house security team.93
A small number of PSCs provide property and personal protection to the international sector, comprised of 
foreign owned and managed businesses, organisations and embassies. In exchange for more lucrative contracts, 
the international sector demands a professional service, comparable to standards in the UK or US.94 Between 
ten and fifteen firms are thought to meet the required international standards and are in a position to vie for 
business from the international sector.95  The influence of international firms, demanding enhanced standards 
from domestic PSCs, has had a positive impact on the industry as a whole, as the incentive now exists for self-
regulation through enhanced operational standards, training requirements and codes of conducts.
3.2 Bodyguard services
The demand for close protection and bodyguard services in Serbia is growing despite the improved security 
situation. This is perhaps unsurprising given the legacy of high profile assassinations in Serbia. Most of the major 
Serbian PSCs offer close protection or bodyguard services and in Belgrade alone there are approximately 100 
PSCs offering these services.96 
Clients that employ bodyguards do so either for reasons of necessity (i.e. they perceive themselves to be genuinely 
vulnerable) or for reasons of vanity. The salaries bodyguards are able to command reflect the seriousness of 
the threat faced by their employer. Professional trained bodyguards are paid an average of €1,000 per month 
(four times the average salary in Serbia), including the agency fee. Those who are not trained in firearms use 
or that have not completed an internationally recognised close protection course may earn as little as €200,97 
while experienced bodyguards for the most ‘at-risk’ individuals may earn up to €2,000.98 The most experienced 
bodyguards can also expect to receive clothes, mobile phones and per diems.99 Consequently, bodyguarding is 
increasingly viewed as a glamorous profession for young men with few other vocational opportunities. 
3.3 Private detective agencies
Almost all firms that offer private investigation services are small and informal companies with only a handful of 
employees.100 In fact, many of the companies working in this market have no full-time employees, relying instead 
on a network of contacts that effectively act as consultants when work arises.101
91 Simpson, p 4.
92 Ibid, p 9.
93 Author’s experience.
94 Interview, Prelevic.
95 Simpson, p 5.
96 Halilovic, p 30.
97 Anonymous interview with an employee of a Belgrade based PSC, February 2005.
98 Simpson, p 9.
99 Halilovic, p 29.
100 Simpson, p 3.
101 Ibid, p 5.
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The range of services that private investigation firms offer includes corporate due diligence and intelligence 
gathering, searching for missing and kidnapped persons and surveillance for a wide variety of clients, both 
foreign and domestic. The ongoing privatization process means that corporate intelligence gathering is a growth 
area for private investigators.102 Because of the secretive and informal nature of these PSCs it is difficult to gauge 
the full nature of their activities. Industry insiders claim that reputable firms, despite requests from some clients, 
do not employ force.103  The same sources claim that most private detectives do not carry firearms although they 
are legally permitted to do so. 
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
There are a number of strong informal connections between PSCs and Serbian security structures. Most PSCs, 
such as Pro-Gard Securitas, are managed and directed by retired police officers.104 Further, as in the rest of SEE, 
PSC personnel are disproportionately likely to come from state law enforcement and security services.105 A limited 
survey conducted for this report revealed that around 40 per cent of employees working for the top five PSCs were 
previously employed by the Serbian police service. These former police officers and security services personnel 
will have informal links to the state security services. While it is not necessarily problematic to have former state 
security personnel working for PSCs, it is problematic that serving police officers work simultaneously for PSCs. 
There have been a number of incidents in which serving police officers have been found moonlighting for PSCs. 
For example, in 2004 three Belgrade policemen were dismissed and charged after they were discovered working 
for a businessman with connections to a criminal gang.106 Officially, the Police Code of Conduct outlaws serving 
police officers from moonlighting for PSCs.107 Although no study has been undertaken, it is also believed that a 
large number of former armed forces personnel are being attracted to the private security sector.108  
While private detective work and static security is usually carried out by personnel with law enforcement 
backgrounds,109 the close protection and bodyguard services for high profile individuals are often carried out by 
former security service personnel, often drawn from the disbanded Special Operation Unit (JSO).110 A variety of 
sources also pointed to the continued presence in PSCs of paramilitaries from the war in Bosnia.111 In the case of 
the Lupus Security Agency, owned by the wife of the man accused of Prime Minister Djindjic’s murder, all security 
personnel are former members of the JSO.112    
4.2 Political affiliations
A number of political parties employ PSCs for private security provision. Both the Radical Party (SRS) and the 
Yugoslav Left (JUL) are known to use PSCs for their own perceived security needs.113 While ministers receive 
protection from members of an elite company of the army,114 the majority of politicians do not have access to 
the state security apparatus. As politicians remain genuinely vulnerable to political and criminally motivated 
102 Anonymous interview with an employee of a Belgrade based PSC, February 2005. 
103 Ibid.
104 Simpson, p 2.
105 Ibid, p 4.
106 ‘Sorting the criminals from the police’, B92, 10 October 2004.
107 Republic of Serbia Mol Code on Police Ethics, Article 7 of ‘Law on Internal Affairs’, August 2000, Article 25.
108 Interview, Marko Malijkovic, 12 December 2004
109 Simpson, p9.
110 As in the case of the Lupus Security Agency, quoted in VIP News Service, Daily News 18 May 2005.
111 VIP News Service, Daily News, 08 May 2005. 
112 VIP Daily News Report, Issue No 3080, p 2.
113 Simpson, p9.
114 Interview, Aleksandar Radic, Journalist, VIP News, 03 July 2005.
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violence, some political figures do require a level of protection that the state security services are unable to 
provide. The use of PSCs by political actors does, however, raise concerns of political intimidation, particularly 
in smaller communities115 and could also provide an explanation for the lack of political will in tightening the 
regulations on private security companies.
4.3 Organised crime affiliations
While more secure and stable than at any time in the last fifteen years, Serbia continues to face a number of 
obstacles to its transition process that if mismanaged pose the potential to threaten further stability. Of these, 
organised crime ranks amongst the most serious. Its reach may be reduced, however the effects of organised 
crime continue to weaken the state, imperil nascent democracy and crowd out the legitimate sector. The scale 
of organized crime and the cost it infers socially and economically is hard to measure but in Serbia it is by all 
accounts significant. A recent survey by the Serbian Statistical Office indicated that the grey economy accounts 
for approximately 9% of GDP, although when illegal activities such as prostitution, drug trafficking and piracy 
violations are included, the true figure could be between 20 – 25% of GDP.116 
Organised crime in Serbia is undergoing a period of transition, one significant aspect of which is the attempted 
legitimisation of ill-gotten capital.117 Organised criminal networks are no longer certain of support from state 
structures to facilitate their activities and have consequently had to find new ways to insulate their businesses. 
As a result, organised criminal groups have used private security companies as fronts for criminal activity. The 
Belgrade Special Court, designed to try those accused of serious acts of organised crime, is currently unravelling 
the extensive and complex relationship between established organised criminal networks, private security firms 
and those connected to former state structures. Further research would be needed to determine the extent of 
this problem.
5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
In contrast to the rest of SEE, there is a near total absence of regulatory control of the private security sector in 
Serbia. Although it is unlawful to run a business and employ staff without registering with the Serbian Business 
Registers Agency, private security providers are not legally obliged to register as a ‘private security company’. Every 
PSC that has staff members will be registered with the Serbian Business Registers Agency as an incorporated 
legal entity, although it is likely that very small informal ‘firms’ that provide ad hoc PSC type services will not 
be registered, have company names or any of the other legal characteristics of a company. Currently the only 
advantage of registration is that it provides legitimisation and evidence of professionalism, especially to potential 
clients from the international sector. A list of those private security firms operating in Serbia that have chosen to 
register is available from the Chamber of Commerce.118 A large number of smaller and informal PSCs – such as 
Lupus for example - do not appear on this list. 
According to sources in the PSC industry, the Mol does ‘inspect and observe the work of all PSCs’.119 It was not 
possible to corroborate this or analyse the process of oversight, as Mol officials were unavailable for comment. 
It is also presumably difficult to inspect PSCs and their activities when there exists no definitive list of those 
companies providing private security services. At most the Mol would only be able to ensure that PSCs meet the 
same requirements as any other legal entity registered with the Serbian Business Registers Agency but could not 
regulate their actions as private security providers.
115 Interview, Prelevic, Op Cit.
116 http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=5118, 15 September 2004.
117 Interview, Aaron Presnell, Jefferson Institute, Belgrade, 16 November 2004.
118 Privredna komora Srbije.
119 Interview, anonymous PSC employee, Belgrade, January 2005.
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5.2 Use of force and firearms
There is no distinct legislation covering the licensing and use of firearms by PSC employees. Private security 
guards need only fulfil the same legal criteria as any other Serbian citizen licensed to own and carry firearms. 
The legal provision governing firearm possession is the 1992 ‘Law on Weapons and Ammunition’. Article 17 
of this law regulates companies, institutions and other legal persons that possess firearms for the purpose of 
‘performing physical protection and objects’ protection’ and is therefore applicable to private security companies. 
Article 17 forbids firearms holders from carrying automatic pistols, although they may possess automatic and 
semi-automatic rifles.  Some 2,395 rifles are licensed under this legal provision.120 Those holding firearms under 
Article 17 may acquire firearms ammunition ‘in quantities necessary for their work or activity’, which is probably 
at the discretion of the licensor. 
The type of firearm carried by a private security guard will vary and is dependent on the type of security being 
provided although generally there are only two services that warrant a firearm being carried.121 For a transfer 
of money between two different geographical locations, guards tend to travel using long barrelled guns such 
as rifles or the AK-47. When protecting a property or person, PSC employees tend to carry a sidearm. Larger 
firearms are unusual except in the case of an embassy or building at risk of terrorist attack. The majority of PSC 
employees that are armed carry 9mm semi automatic revolvers.122 Exceptions to these practices are thought 
to exist especially with in-house security arrangements, where rules and regulations are at the discretion of the 
individual in charge of security policies, or in the smaller PSCs that employ less staff. 
Article 17 stipulates that firearms holders must be medically fit and trained for arms handling, be mentally 
capable and without a criminal record.123 While PSC employees cannot legally own a firearm if they have a 
criminal record, this is not a sufficient safeguard as the 1990s witnessed a near collapse in the law and order 
and judicial processes with criminals such as ‘Arkan’ being actively employed by the state. It is therefore highly 
probable that a number of persons that committed criminal acts during the 1990s and have not had criminal 
proceedings brought against them are presently employed as private security guards. 
Article 17 further stipulates that the individual rather than the company receives the firearm permit and only 
those people named as being responsible for the protection of persons or objects are permitted to hold weapons. 
Firearms holders may only carry their weapons while performing their professional duties and may not take 
their weapons home. Firearms holders must hand over their weapons and ammunition within fifteen days of 
the termination of their employment. Professional PSCs tend to store firearms and ammunition in locked gun 
cabinets on company premises. According to one PSC guard interviewed for this research, the best run firms in the 
industry have armouries that are supervised by authorised personnel or shift managers who take responsibility 
for issuing weapons and ammunition to the guards on duty.124
5.3  Oversight
As Serbian security services have allegedly either directly or indirectly participated in the post-Yugoslav wars, 
including possible involvement in ethnic cleansing and other grave human rights abuses, and the private security 
sector recruits a majority of its personnel from the security services, workforce vetting is an important aspect of 
PSC regulation. There are, however, no fixed industry standards and employers take responsibility for establishing 
their own vetting procedures. The largest and most successful PSCs do have structured vetting processes for 
their employees. Applicant security guards need to pass a basic medical evaluation and be able to prove they do 
not have criminal records and are not under investigation for criminal acts. Companies can obtain confirmation 
of applicants’ criminality from local police stations, though some sources claimed that it was ‘easy’ to have such 
120 Article 17, ‘Law on Weapons and Ammunition’, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 9/92, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 44/98, 
39/2003.
121 Simpson, p 14.
122 Interview, representative of ‘Gordon’ security firm, Belgrade, March 2005
123  Ibid.
124 Interview, anonymous PSC employee, February 2005.
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vetting rubber-stamped.125 As noted above, there is also the possibility that persons who committed criminal acts 
during the 1990s and have not faced criminal proceedings are presently working as PSC employees. 
5.4 Professionalism and training
As there is at present no legislation regulating the Serbian 
private security industry, professionalism and training 
standards vary enormously and are governed by market 
forces. Although some PSCs provide training for their 
employees, in most cases this entails one hour of basic 
training in firearm protocol.126 There are, however, examples 
of professionalism and established training regimes in the 
private security sector. For example, Pro-Gard cites foreign 
security organisation endorsement, structured training 
and full corporate liability insurance as examples of its 
professional credentials. Each company regulates the use 
of force and firearms individually, although this must be 
within the limit of the law. The quality of weapons training 
provided varies, although all PSC directors consulted for this study insisted that their training programmes 
were rigorous.127 Some independent sources, however, maintain that training often only consists of ‘an hour of 
instruction’.128 Other sources claim that there are countless examples of smaller PSCs that are using weapons 
that are not registered as well as employees who do not know how to use their firearm properly.129 Unfortunately, 
the limited scope of this study meant a full comparative analysis of industry standards was not possible.
As PSCs have increasingly provided private security services to foreign companies, which demand high levels 
of professionalism, there has been growing support for both industry self-regulation and national legislation 
governing the private security sector. A range of Serbian PSCs are presently members of two voluntary regulatory 
mechanisms that introduce minimum standards for the private security industry - the Code of Ethics of the 
American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) and the International Bodyguard and Security Services Association 
(IBSSA). The ASIS Code stipulates that security personnel obey the law, are honest, act with diligence and care, 
exercise discretion with confidential information and ‘protect their professional reputation’.130 While the adoption 
of this code by firms such as Pro-Gard is a step forward, it is insufficient to guarantee the proper conduct of 
PSCs and their employees. The IBSSA provides a more substantial regulatory mechanism. This association is a 
non-profit association that provides technical support and training to PSCs in areas such as VIP Security, bank 
security, diplomatic security, event security, investigation and administration. The organisation has a training 
centre in Vracarevic and some of the more professional PSCs in Serbia have attended training there.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
Judged in numerical terms, Serbia has one of the larger private security sectors in the SEE region, with PSC 
personnel outstripping the number of police officers in the country. Given that the industry is almost entirely 
unregulated, this is a serious cause for concern, and an issue that both government and the international 
community should look to address. The Government of Serbia in particular should consider the options for 
regulation without delay. The legacy of insecurity in Serbia means that PSCs will continue to play a central role 
in Serbia’s transition and expansion processes. This means that while there are a few professional companies 
providing a necessary service to a range of clients, there is a sizeable sector of the industry that poses a serious 
125 Interview, Slobodan Pejic, former Chief of Security at the Ministry of Interior who established a private investigation agency DEZA in 2003, 
March 2005.
126 Halilovic, Op Cit.
127 Interview, Hajdukovic.
128 Halilovic, Op Cit. 
129 Interview, Hajdukovic. 
130 www.asisonline.org
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security risk to the public, business and the state. Further, as is the case in some other countries, the PSC 
industry in Serbia is expanding in parallel with the economy, fuelled by new investment and the legitimisation of 
black market capital. In such circumstances delaying the introduction of legislation will only store up problems 
for the future.
While the industry remains largely shrouded in secrecy, the few public examples of complicity between PSCs, 
criminal organisations and certain elements of state mechanisms provide also provide a compelling rationale 
for regulation of the industry. In spite of the self-regulation already underway at the upper end of the market, the 
absence of state legislation means that a number of unscrupulous PSCs continue to shelter criminals and their 
activities, with a potentially destabilising effect on the country. As the experience of neighbouring Bulgaria and 
Croatia has shown,  the introduction of legislation, backed by even modest levels of enforcement, can bring about 
tangible improvements to the security environment.  
6 .1 Main recommendations
n The Government of Serbia should develop specific legislation regulating the private security industry. The 
legislation should make provisions for dealing with immediate priorities identified in this report such as:
ü A requirement for PSC personnel to acquire licences and for detailed background checks to be carried 
out on PSC owners and employees.
ü A requirement for all companies to register and receive time-limited licences.
ü A requirement for firearms in use by PSC staff to be licensed to companies.
ü Clear and detailed stipulations on the possession, carriage and use of firearms by PSC staff in line with 
international best practice (to include a prohibition on the use of military-style weapons).
ü Provisions for routine monitoring and oversight of PSCs by the MoI/police.
n It is vital that any new regulation examines the links between PSCs and both political parties and organised 
crime groups. Measures to guarantee the security of prominent public figures need to be combined with laws 
that are directed at ensuring that individuals who own or work for PSCs have no past criminal record. It is 
important that this provision should also include spouses or direct family members of PSC owners.
n Joint working agreements between the police and PSCs should be introduced so as to formalise roles and 
responsibilities and decrease the likelihood of competition between the two sectors.
n State certified training in the minimal use of force and firearms, consistent with the UN Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, should be introduced across the board.
n The OSCE and the wider international community should ensure that they promote effective regulation and 
oversight of the private security sector as part of their wider contribution to enhancing the rule of law and 
supporting security sector reform programmes. This could include assistance with the drafting of legislation, 
with the creation of a training academy, industry code of conduct and the formation of a specialist unit within 
the MoI to police the sector.
n Greater oversight of the sector is required, and parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman’s office 
should be empowered to scrutinise the sector and deal with complaints about companies and employees.
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The Entity of Kosovo
1 Background to the privatization of security in Kosovo
The Internationally Administered Entity of Kosovo (hereafter ‘Kosovo’) has recently emerged from a period of 
violent conflict that had its origins in a system of autocratic rule exercised from Belgrade, first under Communism 
and later under an increasingly nationalist government that struggled to gain legitimacy among predominantly 
ethnic-Albanian Kosovars. In the course of the conflict, which saw a largely peaceful resistance movement 
transformed into a violent insurgency dominated by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), thousands of deaths and 
incidences of ethnic cleansing brought the prospect of regional instability into focus for western powers.131 The 
aerial bombing campaign by NATO from March to June 1999, directed at targets across the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), ultimately led to a full withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces and the creation of a de-facto UN 
protectorate from the summer of 1999 onwards, albeit under the auspices of a UN Security Council Resolution 
1244/99. This allowed the FRY to retain nominal sovereignty, while implicitly recognising the separation of the 
territory for the foreseeable future. At the time of writing, Kosovo is facing two significant tests that will together 
determine its future. In late 2005, a review of Kosovo’s progress towards implementing UNMIK’s ‘Standards for 
Kosovo’ will take place. This key test of democratic readiness should be followed in quick succession by ‘Final 
Status’ talks that will determine the ultimate shape and status of Kosovo. 
In the years since 1999, Kosovo has absorbed tremendous levels of international aid, which has included 
significant capacity building and reform programmes for security institutions. However, according to UNSC 
Resolution 1244/99 and the 2001 Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, the territory’s Provisional Institutions 
of Self Government (PISG) have little or no powers to oversee the Entity’s public security apparatus, responsibility 
for which lies solely within the remit of the executive mandate of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as 
‘reserved powers’. Under this arrangement, key public bodies such as the judiciary, intelligence services, police, 
prison system, border control and emergency services are beyond the control of Kosovo’s fledgling government, 
and entirely new structures such as the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) have been created and shaped under foreign 
tutelage. It is in the area of policing that UNMIK can claim one of its greatest successes, forging a largely service-
oriented internal security body with 6,000 officers in a short space of time. In other security sectors however, 
including the justice, correctional and emergency services, capacity building has been slower or absent. One 
notable omission from the reform process has been the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC/TMK), an organisation 
created in September 1999 following an ‘undertaking’ signed by the KLA Commander in Chief and Commander 
of KFOR, which stated that the KLA would demilitarise and take on responsibility for civil emergency work.
As of June 2005 however, a wide-ranging Internal Security Sector Review was approved by the Special 
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (SRSG), Contact Group and UNSC, paving the way for 
drastic reforms to the security sector in the Entity.132 UNMIK initiatives already well underway for the creation of a 
MoI and Ministry of Justice (MoJ), as well as a new Police Act may now come under the influence of Kosovars for 
the first time as a result of the review. For the time being however, information on the regulation, operation and 
review of the security sector remains limited, and public debate on such subjects has yet to be initiated. 
According to UNMIK’s Weapons Authorisation Section and Security Providers Inspection Unit (SSPIU), PSCs began 
operating shortly after UNMIK took over the administration of Kosovo in 1999. In response to the emergence of 
new companies, legislation regulating PSCs was introduced via UNMIK Regulation (REG/2000/33) on ‘Security 
Service Providers’, which entered into force on 25 May 2000. Upon the introduction of UNMIK REG/2000/33, 
somewhere in the region of thirty different firms applied for licences to operate as security services providers, 
131 For example, approximately 1.5 million ethnic Albanian refugees fled from Kosovo to Macedonia and Albania in 1999. Davis I, Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Saferworld, London, 2002, p12.
132 The review was conducted by the British Government’s ‘Security Sector Development Advisory Team’.
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only seven of which were successful.133 Two companies, Grays and International Support Services (ISS), were 
granted licences to operate as armed international security providers.134 
The five remaining companies, Balkan International, WDG, Trans Balkan Trade, International Procurement and 
Logistics (IPL) and Black Panther were licensed to operate as unarmed security providers. Those companies 
whose applications were unsuccessful, and any other firms providing unlicensed security services in Kosovo 
at the time, were required to end operations by 11 May 2001. Any businesses that had signed a contract with 
an unlicensed company were advised to change their contracts to one of the seven licensed companies or face 
sanctions under UNMIK REG/2000/33.135 Many of these other companies, such as Black Dragon, Cobra and 
Eagles, then went out of business or were transformed into new companies that then received a licence to 
operate. 136  
Of the seven companies initially granted licenses as security service providers, Trans Balkan Trade and Grays are 
no longer operating in Kosovo, while IPL is now considered an armed international PSC and ISS operates as an 
unarmed local PSC. The number of total licensed PSCs has increased since 2000 and the industry seems to be 
flourishing. According to the SSPIU there are currently 22 PSCs licensed to operate in Kosovo; of these four are 
‘international’ PSCs, licensed for firearms, and 18 are ‘local’ unarmed PSCs. Of the twenty-two licensed PSCs, 
only 19 are thought to be currently operating.137 According to figures from February 2005, these PSCs employed 
2,579 security guards, of which 81 were armed internationals working for the three operating ‘international’ 
PSCs.138 The size of PSCs ranges from four to nearly 1,000 employees. Four firms dominate the sector. Kosovo’s 
largest firm, Balkan International, employs over a third of the entire sector with 978 employees. The next most 
important firms in terms of size are WDG with 723 employees, Panther Security with 308 employees and Skyfterat 
with 156 employees.  
In terms of areas of operation, according to SSPIU data the majority of PSCs are based in Pristina. Of the seven 
PSCs based outside Pristina, 5 operate in the Gjilan region and are based in towns located on the main trade 
routes with Macedonia.  The other two PSCs registered with the SSPIU are based in Dragash and North Mitrovica. 
According to sources in Belgrade, a number of Serbian PSCs also provide services in North Mitrovica, however 
these apparently operate under Serbian law.139 Some of the larger PSCs that are based in Pristina have clients 
in other towns, predominantly in the Gjilan and Peje regions, both of which have comparatively high levels of 
economic activity. None of the ‘local’ PSCs operate in other countries in the region as this is not considered to 
be economically viable at present.140
During 1999/2000 PSCs were used by the UNMIK authorities to support the work of the KPS and were considered 
to be working in parallel as ‘colleagues in promoting peace’.141 Since that time however, the KPS has grown in 
size and capacity, creating a rivalry between the two sectors to the point where PSCs and KPS are ‘undeclared 
enemies’.142 Nowadays it is apparently more common for PSCs experiencing difficulties and law breaking to enlist 
the help of other companies rather than the KPS. As described below, legal arrangements that allowed KPS 
officers to provide PSC-type services were central in creating this atmosphere. 
133 ‘UNMIK Grants Licenses to Seven Companies to Provide Security Services’, UNMIK Press Release No 573, 26 April 2001. Available online 
at: http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/press-r/pr573.html.
134 UNMIK regulations distinguish between ‘international’ and ‘national’ companies, permitting the former to possess and use firearms 
under certain circumstances – see below.
135 Op cit UNMIK Press Release No 573
136 Interview with Lulzim Elshani, Director of Panther Security, 11 March 2005.
137 Interviews with Carlos Meireles, Chief of Weapons Authorisation Section, UNMIK, 16 February 2005 and Frank Rodet, Security Service 
Provider Inspection Unit (SSPIU), Weapons Authorisation Section, UNMIK, 24 February 2005.
138 Information provided by Frank Rodet, SSPIU, Weapons Authorisation Section, UNMIK, 24 February 2005.
139 Interview with Belgrade-based PSC, February 2005 (see Serbia section of this report).
140 Interview with Besnik Berisha, Director Balkan International Security, 15 February 2005.
141 Ibid.
142 Correspondence with Carlos Meireles, Chief, Weapons Authorisation Section, UNMIK, 19 July 2005; also op cit Besnik Berisha.
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2 Contemporary security threats
Six years after the cessation of conflict in Kosovo, the territory still suffers from a number of perceived and real 
security problems that act as generators of demand for private security services. As well as crime and the fear 
of crime, Kosovo continues to be affected by ethnic division and intense political rivalry, which contribute to an 
atmosphere of chronic low-level insecurity. Other contributing factors include the uncertainty over the final status 
of the Entity, (which adds an air of impermanence to the security arrangements currently in place), difficulties with 
re-integrating ex-combatants into a struggling economy, and the widespread availability of arms and ammunition. 
As the events of 17 March 2004 demonstrated, the conditions for large-scale violence still exist in the territory.
Thus, despite the continued deployment of KFOR troops and the steady growth of KPS capacity, Kosovo remains 
a violent territory. Recent research by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey concluded, ‘the security and safety of 
civilians is a serious concern in post-war Kosovo’. 143 Violence in Kosovo often has a political or ethnic component, 
including shootings of returnees,144 and intra-ethnic fighting between rival groups.145 In addition, Kosovo remains 
a hub for criminal activity in the region, a phenomenon that is not entirely separate from the territory’s other 
problems. As one report put it, ‘political and criminal violence is becoming interlinked through increasingly well-
organized crime structures…..business, organized crime, and regular and extremist politics are linked in various 
ways….The links are strongest in extreme nationalist organizations, which are thought to finance their activities 
mainly through crime, and most recently through a spate of kidnappings’.146
Although UNMIK spokespersons stress that the number of recorded murders have reduced by 50 per cent 
since 2000, other crimes, such as kidnapping, rape and burglary have not.147 In the past few years civilians 
and policemen alike have been killed and wounded in outbreaks of violence. Increasingly, businesses are also 
being targeted.148 Perhaps unsurprisingly, private security guards are not themselves exempt from attack.149 
The director of one company interviewed during this research reported cases where guards were beaten or 
kidnapped by thieves in the course of a robbery, ‘If thieves want to rob a business or house in Kosovo, nothing 
will stop them’.
Kosovars interviewed as part of this study continually cited a lack of faith in the ability of the police to respond 
to security threats as a major cause of insecurity.150 This acts as a further driver for the increased demand for 
the provision of private security.  While the number of criminal incidents in Kosovo is falling, perhaps reflecting a 
general process of stabilisation within the province, as long as the level of violent crime in Kosovo remains high, 
feelings of insecurity will continue to exist, thereby benefiting the private security sector. 
143 Khakee A and Florquin N, Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo, Small Arms Survey 
and UNDP Kosovo, June 2003, p viii.
144 An ethnic Albanian shot a Serbian woman, 72, when she tried to move back into her house in Kosovo. Weekly Media Review, 29 Sept 
– 06 October 2003, www.seesac.org.
145 28 October, Weekly Media Review 28 October – 03 November 2003, www.seesac.org.
146 Op cit Kosovo and the Gun, pp7 and 8.
147 A press release from October 2003 confirmed that 475 people were killed, 705 wounded and 183 armed robberies had happened in 
Kosovo in the last year. ‘Chappell: UNMIK Police Launch Operation Against Organised Crime’, Daily Media Review 20 November 2003; 17 
October 2003, Weekly Media Review 13 - 20 October 2003; www.seesac.org.
148 A somewhat extreme example of the kind of threats that businesses face in Kosovo occurred in November 2004 when a large shopping 
centre was blown up by a car bomb. ‘The successful business, a target of a terrorist attack’, Economic and European News, Office of the 
DSRSG/Department of Public Affairs, 11 November 2004.
149 In one incident, a Panther guard had seen a thief breaking into a building near where he was guarding and had reported the break-in to 
the Kosovo Police. After two hours the thief was released by the Police, who had told the thief they were tipped off by the Panther Security 
Guard. The thief then returned and beat the Panther Security Guard for informing the police. Interview with Lulzim Elshani, Director of Panther 
Security, 11 March 2005.
150 In one case reported to the researchers it took the police around 45 minutes to arrive at the headquarters of an international organisation 
after a bomb threat had been reported. This was despite the fact that the office concerned was located in a very prominent building only 
about 650 meters away from a Police Station. 
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Table 1: Major Crime in Kosovo 2000 – 2001.151
CRIME
NUMBER OF CASES BY YEAR
2000 2001 2002
Murder 245 136 68
Attempted Murder 275 225 144
Kidnapping 190 165 106
Attempted Kidnapping 108 91 64
Rape/Attempted Rape 115 133 114
Grievous Assault 226 288 463
Robbery 490 440 365
Arson 523 218 477
Looting 22 6 6
TOTALS 2,194 1,695 1,807
Table 2: Weapons Related Offences in Kosovo 2001 - 2003.152
OFFENCE
NUMBER OF CASES BY YEAR
2001 2002 2003
Illegal weapons possession 1,661 1,377 1,234
Discharge of firearm 508 396 410
Explosive attack 252 132 111
TOTALS 2,421 1,905 1,755
It is very difficult to obtain verifiable data on the extent to which PSCs have an impact on the level and nature of 
crime in the areas in which they operate. However, many of the interviewees believed that PSCs have a positive 
impact on reducing crime levels, primarily by acting as a visible deterrent.  An example was given by the Director of 
Panther Security, who claimed that after the company began working in Prizren, the KPS noticed a 70% reduction 
in crime in the city. The presence of PSCs also appears to have a positive impact on business confidence153 and 
lowers the insurance rates that companies have to pay. 
There have, however, been cases in which shop and bar owners have not contributed to the payment of a security 
company to guard business premises, and when their property was burgled, the guards protecting the other 
properties claimed not to have seen anything.154  A source that wished to remain anonymous attributed this 
to racketeering on the part of PSCs,155 however this type of occurrence can also be explained by commercial 
motivations. This is a difficult issue, as on one hand, PSCs do have a moral responsibility to uphold law and order, 
while on the other hand, there is a commercial imperative to try to encourage customers to employ their services. 
151 UNMIK Crime Statistics for 2000 and 2001, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/statistics.htm.  Crime Statistics for 2000 
- 2002 also available in ‘Major Crime in 2002’, UNMIK Police Press Release, 17 January 2003.
152 Statistics provided in correspondence with UNMIK Spokesperson Neeraj Singh on 08 October 2004. Published in Risser H, ‘Disarmament 
in Kosovo stymied by future security fears’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Volume16, No12, p 41.
153 Interview with Ismjal Salihu, Marketing Director, Skyfterat, 13 February 2005. For instance, after hiring a security company, the owner 
of Mobishop in Pristina took the bars off his shop window because he ‘felt more secure in general’. Interview with Agron Berisha, owner of 
Mobishop Pristina, 15 February 2005.
154 Interview with Arianit Ahmeti, Lawyer, 15 February 2005 and op cit Agron Berisha.
155 Interview with a bar owner, Pristina, February 2005
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This ultimately has to mean that a balance is struck so that while a company protects its clients, if their guards 
see anything in the general environment they should be obliged to report it, as should any other citizen. This is an 
issue that should be addressed in the development of internal regulations, as in countries with a well-developed 
and regulated private security industry there is a widely understood responsibility implicit in being a security 
guard to work towards the public good.
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
Static security of buildings and goods is the principal service that PSCs are hired to provide in Kosovo. The 
business community apparently feels a keen need for the additional protection that PSCs offer; many shops 
employ private security guards and frequently shops on the same street will pool resources to hire a PSC that will 
guard their premises during the night.156 As the infrastructure in Kosovo improves, services provided by PSCs are 
evolving.  Increasingly reliable supplies of electricity have lead to a rise in the number of customers requesting 
alarms, supported by 24-hour rapid response units.  This service is generally cheaper157 and minimises incidents 
of guards being threatened and running away. CCTV is another service that is becoming more popular and one 
PSC interviewed for this research is preparing to offer GPS services.
An additional public order role that PSCs presently execute is that of securing public events, such as football 
matches and concerts. The KPS are not hired to secure public events organised by municipalities because it 
is felt they do not have the resources, time or professionalism to provide adequate security.158 While there is 
meant to be a delineation of responsibilities in regards to the provision of security at public events,159 with PSCs 
providing perimeter security and the police responsible for crowd control, there is a perception amongst PSCs 
that in this area they are in competition with the police.160
In fact the issue of the police taking on the type of duties performed by security guards is an important one that has 
only lately been addressed in Kosovo. Until very recently, KPS officers were allowed to supplement their income 
through the ‘Secondary Employment Programme’. The KPS Secondary Employment Programme, introduced in 
2004 with the approval of UNMIK Police, allowed KPS officers to take second jobs ‘where a government, profit-
making, or not-for-profit entity has a contract agreement with the police agency for police officers in uniform who 
are able to exercise their police duties’.161 KPS officers working in the programme were approved by the Deputy 
Commissioner for Planning and Development, UNMIK Police and had to remain armed and in uniform. 162 Officers 
carrying out these extra duties were subject to regular inspections on-site by KPS’s ‘Supplemental Police Unit’. 
The number of officers who took advantage of Secondary or Off-Duty employment was not insignificant. In 2004, 
52 KPS Officers took Off-Duty Employment, while approximately 1,500 KPS Officers undertook Secondary Duty 
Employment.  Types of extra-duty services that may be considered for contracting include crowd control, security 
and protection of individuals and property and plain clothes assignments. Clients for the Secondary Employment 
Programme comprise sports clubs, diplomatic liaison offices, government buildings, shopping centres and 
banks.163
Unsurprisingly, the Secondary Employment Programme was seen as problematic by PSCs interviewed for this 
research, particularly the unarmed local ones, who saw the programme as a threat to their business.164 As the 
156 Op cit Ahemeti and Agron Berisha. PSCs seem to agree. As one representative put it ‘if it wasn’t for security companies, half the city would 
be robbed’, op cit Salihu.
157 €30 a month as opposed to €50 for static security. Op cit Besnik Berisha.
158 Op cit Salihu.
159 Nick Booth, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Police and Justice, UNMIK, 14 February 
2005.
160 Op cit Besnik Berisha.
161 Correspondence with Jill Muncy, Deputy Commissioner of Operations, UNMIK Police, 27 February 2005.
162 All KPS officers undertaking either Off-duty or Secondary duty work are permitted to retain their service weapon.
163 The number of contract agreements per group in 2004 were sport clubs (45), liaison offices (3), shopping centres (5), government 
buildings (13), museums (2), swimming pools (4), banks (2), music concert organizations (12), open markets (6), travel agencies (1) and 
others (3). Op cit Muncy.
164 Interview with KPS officers in Weapons Authorisation Section, 24 February 2005.
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Director of Panther Security put it, with so many unsolved criminal cases each year, ‘KPS have enough work to 
do without stealing jobs from the PSCs’.165 This problem finally came to a head on 21 February 2005, when three 
PSCs (Balkan International, Securicor, and ISS) brought a court case against KPS under the ‘Law on Competition’ 
(Law No 2004/36). The court having ruled in favour of the PSCs, UNMIK-Civpol suspended the Off-Duty and 
Secondary Employment arrangements soon afterwards.166
In addition to the security guards employed by PSCs that provide close protection services, there are currently 
89 registered ‘Bodyguards’ in Kosovo, overwhelmingly concentrated in Pristina.167 Bodyguards are individuals 
hired by a ‘vulnerable person’ and licensed with a Weapons Authorisation Card (WAC), which allows them to 
carry firearms while executing their duties.168 The existence of the close protection section of the private security 
market in Kosovo is almost certainly a reflection of the perception that kidnapping and assassination are 
genuine threats, though fashion and personal image may also play a part. Since 2004 the KPS Protection Unit 
has been empowered to provide close protection service for VIPs.169 In general though, officials retain their own 
bodyguards rather than obtaining KPS protection.170 This part of the private security market is probably the most 
problematic in Kosovo. While background checks on individuals are carried out prior to a WAC being issued, there 
are no criteria that an individual has to meet to become a bodyguard. No training arrangement is in place, and 
no system exists to monitor the work of these individual bodyguards over and above the weapons they may have 
been issued by UNMIK. Recent changes to KPS’s scope of work will apparently mean it takes on responsibility for 
close protection of senior government figures and visiting VIPs, alleviating this problem somewhat.171 However, 
in view of the sensitive and important services provided by bodyguards, action should be taken to regulate and 
monitor those individuals providing close protection services.
The private security sector in Kosovo is marked by the distinction between ‘local’ and ‘international’ PSCs, the 
different security services they offer and their client base. While there is some degree of overlap in the range 
of services offered by these two groups, the ‘international’ PSCs unlike their ‘local’ counterparts are licensed 
to provide armed security guards. There are four licensed international firms who are permitted to carry 
firearms in Kosovo – HAP, IPL, TEPE and Henderson Risk Ltd. Only HAP, IPL and TEPE are, however, currently 
operating in Kosovo. These international firms presently employ 81 armed security guards. The remaining PSCs 
are considered ‘local’, even though a number (e.g. Balkan International and Besa) are owned by international 
individuals (American and Bulgarian respectively). As these PSCs are operated by and employ local Kosovars, 
they are not permitted to carry firearms. 
Given that international PSCs are allowed to carry weapons, they fill a specific market niche and largely provide 
highly specialised services.  For example, the UK company, Henderson Asset Protection (HAP), a subsidiary of 
Henderson International, employs Nepalese Gurkhas to provide escorts for transfers of money to banks.172 
Another company, IPL Consulting, provides security solely to international organisations, and currently has a 
contract with the EAR and the European Commission.173 
The client base for the wider local industry seems to be concentrated largely on commercial or institutional clients 
as opposed to individuals. Nevertheless, local firms have a diverse client base ranging from small businesses to 
municipalities, banks, utility companies, local and international NGOs, development agencies, the OSCE, KFOR 
and UNMIK. Most of the large international actors in Kosovo, including the UN, OSCE and some large NGOs employ 
165 Op cit Elshani. 
166 Op cit Meireles.
167 Interview with Nishant Sankale, Weapons Authorisation Card Unit, Weapons Authorisation Section, UNMIK, 24 February 2005; also Op 
cit Besnik Berisha.
168 UNMIK Regulation No 2001/7 Sections 1(c) and (d) and Section 3.2.
169 Op cit Meireles.
170 Op cit Booth.
171 Op cit Meireles.
172 Op cit Rodet.
173 Interview with Marc Cardinael, Operations Manager, IPL Consulting LTD, 02 March 2005.
102
SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: 
A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?
(2005-08-15)
PSCs either for technical or static security. As the Head of Security for the European Agency for Reconstruction 
(EAR) in Kosovo and Macedonia stated, PSCs can respond to an incident much faster than the KPS.174
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors
4.1 Security sector affiliations
Although there are individual examples of connections between PSCs and security structures (most managers/
directors have a military or police background and a former KPS officer now heads the Besa Security Company175) 
this research did not uncover evidence of illicit connections between PSCs and the state security actors. There is 
potential, however, for police officers to be attracted to the private security sector as the average income of public 
and private security employees is similar. A junior security guard earns approximately €250 per month, broadly 
similar to police salaries. There is however a marked difference in income at the senior level – the director of a 
security firm can expect anywhere between €300 and €500 while a senior police officer would expect about 
€300. The ‘international’ PSCs pay even more, in some cases up to €400-500 per month.176
A blurring of roles between PSCs, state security and security provided by the KPS represents a more pressing 
problem. So for example the Courts and the public telecommunications provider ‘Posts and Telecommunications 
Kosovo’ (PTK) have their own security which is distinct from the KPS and PSCs.177 Further, in those cases where 
there is a need for static security for clients considered not appropriate for PSCs, such as government buildings 
and some diplomatic liaison offices, this security is provided by KPS Security Division, which is comprised of 
KPS guards who have received a shortened version of police training. As discussed above, until very recently the 
police also provided security services normally carried out by PSCs.178 While it is inevitable that there will always 
be some crossover between government, police and the private security industry services, the experience has 
shown that this needs to be monitored with great care lest undue competition and tension is created between the 
police and PSCs. Kosovo’s regulatory authorities should ensure that clear lines of demarcation are established 
between the roles of the territory’s various security providers at all times.
4.2 Ethnic affiliations
The majority of ‘local’ PSCs only provide services to the Albanian or international communities in Kosovo and 
therefore have a predominantly Kosovar Albanian workforce. Two PSCs interviewed during the course of this 
research stated that they have a multi-ethnic workforce. Balkan International has a contract with UNMIK to 
protect vacant Serb houses rebuilt following the events of March 2004 and provides services within the enclaves, 
as does Panther Security. Ultimately the needs of having a multi-ethnic workforce are dictated by both the danger 
of working in an area dominated by another ethnicity and the demands of clients. 
4.3 Political and paramilitary affiliations
Kosovo’s political scene is at present dominated by an intense rivalry between political factions, some of which 
have links to groups of former combatants. As tends also to be the case in countries neighbouring Kosovo, a 
significant number of PSCs have links with, or employ, former combatants. The recruitment of former fighters 
into security agencies, public and private, is only to be expected in former conflict zones, and one of Kosovo’s 
public security bodies, the KPC, was in fact established in 1999 precisely to bring KLA units under control. Again 
it is difficult to assert whether the employment of former combatants provides proof of significant connections 
between PSCs and political parties and their agendas, but real or otherwise, the perception of such links certainly 
exists. Many former KLA fighters are now working as self-employed bodyguards for PSCs or have set up their own 
174 Interview with Head of Security, EAR, 17 February 2005.
175 Interview with KPS officers in Weapons Authorisation Section, Pristina, 24 February 2005.
176 Op cit Salihu, Cardinael, and KPS officers working in Weapons Authorisation Section, UNMIK.
177 Interview with Ed Preston, Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police Service School, 16 February 2005.
178 Op cit Booth.
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companies. For instance, the directors of the firm WDG fought together in the KLA.179 The director of a leading 
private security company claims that WDG also has close links to the LDK party, which helped it to access a 
valuable contract.180 
Panther Security is allegedly also very close to the LDK party, and many former members of the Armed Forces of 
Kosovo (FARK) paramilitary unit are reportedly employed by the company.181 Any direct connection with FARK has 
been denied by the directors of Panther who say that this perception of bias may be due to the fact that LDK has 
in the past hired Panther Security to provide security during elections.182  Another company, Skyfterat, felt that it 
was important that they recruited former fighters. They argue that by employing KLA veterans, they are providing 
them with a source of employment that keeps them out of trouble (usually this group find it very difficult to find 
employment because of their low level of education, past experience, age etc) and are consequently contributing 
to stability in Kosovo.183 
4.4 Organised crime affiliations
As previously noted, organised criminal groups pose a serious and ongoing challenge for the authorities in 
Kosovo, and the possibility that criminal groups might in some way make use of PSC guards and companies to 
conduct their business certainly exists. While the potential for connections between the private security sector 
and organised criminal groups is a problem in any post conflict country, legislation in Kosovo seems to reflect 
concerns about this problem. The UNMIK ‘Police Policy and Guidelines on Security Service Providers (SSPs)’ in 
Kosovo Section 7b (H) states that a PSC permit to operate may be revoked due to it ‘being connected or associated 
with organised criminal gangs or gangs of any kind’. These worries also seem to affect PSCs themselves. Several 
directors interviewed claimed that any involvement in organised crime would be damaging to their business 
interests and take measures to vet potential customers.
No direct evidence was found of links between PSCs and known criminal groups during this research. However at 
least one client organisation that was interviewed stated a strong preference for international PSCs, which they 
perceive as being less likely to have dubious connections and less susceptible to criminal influence because they 
possess an external management body. 
5 Regulation and conduct
Because of the heavy international presence and the relative youth of the private security sector, Kosovo has 
some of the most modern and sophisticated PSC regulations in SEE. 
5.1  Legal basis for control of PSCs
There are four principal regulations relating to PSCs in Kosovo:
n UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/33 on Licensing of SSPs in Kosovo and the Regulation of their Employees, 25 
May 2000;
179 ‘Siguria e Kosoves : fillon ne oborrin tone’, http://www.seguraweb.nl/diskursive/nbeqiraj-02.html, accessed 23 February 2005.
180 Interview with the Director of a leading PSC, March 2005.
181 Interview with Friedrich Haas, Political Advisor to KFOR Commander in Prizren, Pristina, 17 February 2005. In the early 1990s, the Kosovo 
Prime Minister in exile, Bujar Bukoshi, appointed a Defence Minister, Hajzer Hajzeraj, to begin creating a territorial defence organisation, 
the Armed Forces of Kosovo – FARK. This structure had a strained relationship with the emerging KLA, and effectively lost control by the 
time KFOR entered Kosovo and the KLA’s ‘political directorate’ under Hasim Thaci took over government in Kosovo. See ‘Wag the Dog, the 
Militarisation and Demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army’, (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2001).
182 The Director also claimed that Panther Security has been hired by the PDK party and that they would provide security to any political party 
that hired them. They claimed that to be closely linked to a political party would be bad for business, by driving away some small business 
customers who may support other parties. The Director claimed that the company would hire anyone of any political background provided 
they are qualified to work. The Director also said that a general rule for employees of Panther is ‘no politics’ while on duty. Op cit Elshani. 
183 Op cit Salihu.
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n UNMIK Police Policy and guidelines On the operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo; 
n Business Registration Unit Administrative Instruction No JIAS/BRU/AI/2000/1. (On general 
requirements for license to operate a business); and
n UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/7 on the Authorisation of Possession of Weapons in Kosovo, 21 February 2001 
(includes licensing of bodyguards).
These regulations govern the individual companies as well as their employees. In Kosovo all PSCs must be 
registered with, and issued a business licence by, the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  Once a PSC has received 
a business licence, it must register itself and its employees with the SSPIU and then apply for an individual 
licence for each employee.184 There is a requirement for background checks for individual employees of PSCs.185 
The checks, among other things, require that an employee: must not have documented connections to criminal 
activity or criminals as identified by background checks conducted by UNMIK Police; must not have been found 
guilty of an automatically prosecutable crime; and is not to have been found guilty of a crime that UNMIK Police 
consider as unacceptable to the activity of the role of a PSC.186
There is no immunity agreement for the international PSCs operating in Kosovo. If an international employee of 
an international PSC violates Kosovo law, they are then subject to prosecution in Kosovan courts.187
5.2 Use of force and firearms
The key issue in terms of the use of force and firearms by PSCs is the difference between domestic and 
international companies. The private security sector in Kosovo, and the range of services it provides to combat 
contemporary real and perceived security threats, is distinguished from the sector in other SEE states by the 
distinction made between ‘international’ PSCs, whose employees are permitted to carry firearms, and ‘local’ 
PSCs, whose employees are not. A PSC qualifies as ‘international’ if it is owned and staffed by internationals 
excluding citizens of the states of the Former Yugoslavia or countries neighbouring Kosovo. 188 A PSC is classified 
as ‘local’ if it employs local staff from Kosovo. However if individual security guards within a local PSC are properly 
trained and approved by SSPIU, that PSC may be authorised to use batons, chemical sprays and handcuffs.189
According to UNMIK Regulation 2000/33, Section 3, weapons may only be carried by authorised internationals 
during periods of official duty as specified in the permit. The licensee must notify the SSPIU of all weapons in its 
possession and provide details of the international staff to whom the weapons are assigned. The regulator must 
approve the number of firearms that a PSC can hold. Weapons must be stored in an armoury or other secure 
facility approved by the SSPIU and must be returned to company storage facilities at the end of duty each day. 
Ammunition has to be kept separately, in a secure container away from the weapons.190
Only uniformed security guards may carry weapons and they must carry an I.D. card that will be annotated as such 
in the ‘status’ category of the card. The PSC must keep a written register that includes: an individual signature 
for each weapon entering or leaving the armoury; the date and time of drawing or returning the weapon; the 
duties on which the employee was assigned; and the records of weapons and ammunition inventories subject to 
184 ‘UNMIK Reg/2000/33’, Section 1: Issuance of Licenses and Section2: Registration and Issuance of Permits. ‘UNMIK Police Policy and 
Guidelines on the Operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo’, Section 3: General Regulations.
185 ‘UNMIK Reg/2000/33’, Section 2.2
186‘UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo’, Section 4a: Requirements for 
employment in Security Service Providers.
187 Interviews with Piotr Zavgorodni, Senior Legal Officer, UNMIK, Pristina, 16 February 2005; Carlos Meireles, Chief of Weapons Authorisation 
Section, UNMIK, Pristina, 16 February 2005; op cit Rodet.
188 ‘UNMIK Reg/2000/33 on Licensing of Security Service Providers in Kosovo and the Regulation of their Employees’, 25 May 2000.
189 ‘UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines On the operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo’; Op cit Rodet.
190 ‘UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of SSPs in Kosovo’, Section 6d. ‘Regulation and Control of Weapons for Armed 
Services’, 1. Armouries: The SSPIU must approve armouries for the secure and safe storage of weapons.  Weapons must be stored in an 
armoury when not in use.  Weapons may only be checked out of the armoury for the duration of the employees shift, and must then be 
returned.  Ammunition is to be kept separately, in a secure container from the weapons.
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inspection by law enforcement officials at any time.191 However, there are no restrictions on the type of firearms 
that international PSCs can use in either Regulation 2000/33 or in the UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines. 192
Kosovan residents, while not permitted to carry arms while working as security guards for PSCs, are permitted to 
carry arms if working as independent bodyguards, provided they have obtained a WAC.193 Bodyguards are only 
permitted to carry their firearm while on bodyguard duty. Since the bodyguards are employed on an individual 
basis, they do not fall under the Reg/2000/33 on PSCs, but rather are governed by UNMIK Reg/2001/7 on 
Weapons Authorisation.194 If the individual also works at a ‘local’ PSC, (s)he is not permitted to be armed while 
working at that PSC.195 Vulnerable people granted a WAC or those employing bodyguards with WACs are generally 
high profile and include politicians, businessmen, witnesses and some judges.196 
An employee of a PSC can make a citizen’s arrest under Article 191(4) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia No 1410, dated 24 December 1977. In cases where arrests have been made the 
law enforcement agencies (LEAs) must be notified immediately. As is the case with the Police, a security guard 
can only use force when it is essential to the performance of his duties and when there are no other alternatives. 
When force is used it has to be applied on a graduated scale depending on the threat posed. If a security guard 
uses any force, the circumstances must be reported to the LEAs who may conduct an investigation to determine 
whether the force was or was not justified (see Table 3 below).
Table 3: Guidelines for PSCs on the use of force. 197
LEVEL OF THREAT LEVEL OF FORCE
Non-verbal intimidation Guard presence
Verbal threats Verbal direction (use of communication skills)
Passive resistance Empty hand control
Aggravated aggression Intermediate weapons
A number of cases are on record in which security guards have employed excessive force in carrying out their 
duties. Such excessive use of force is often justified by the assertion that, as ‘national’ staff are unable to 
carry guns, excessive force is the best way they can assert their authority and act as an effective deterrent to 
potential criminals. However, the very fact that these statements have been made openly implies that there is 
reason for concern over how rigorous regulations dealing with the use of force by private security guards are 
being enforced.198 Therefore it is important that the regulatory authorities consider the possibility of tightening 
enforcement, as while the regulations are in keeping with the UN guidelines, they are of limited use if they are not 
implemented on the ground. The differentiation between ‘international’ and ‘local’ PSCs, while understandable, 
is problematic. As the industry develops it is inevitable that the issue of permitting local PSCs to carry arms will 
be raised.
191 ‘UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of SSPs in Kosovo’ Section 4d Regulation of Activities: Arrests and use of Force. 
Section 6d. Regulation and Control of Weapons for Armed Services and UNMIK REG/2000/33 Section 2: Registration and Issuance of 
Permits (Sections 2.4 and 2.5 govern issue of permits to international staff for weapons) and Section 3: Regulation of Weapons Owned by 
SSPs.
192 According to UNMIK REG/2001/7 on Authorisation of Possession of Weapons, Section 3.6, ‘WACs shall be issued for sidearm pistols and, 
in exceptional circumstances WACs may be issued for short-barrelled automatic weapons if, in the particular case, the Threat Assessment 
Committee assesses that there is a need for such weapons’. Section 3.7 deals with ammunition, ‘authorised ammunition shall be standard, 
full-jacketed, military type ball ammunition which shall not be altered in any way from its original factory configuration. No other type of 
ammunition including semi-jacketed, flat-head, hollow-point or others may be authorised’.
193 This WAC can be applied for by all Kosovan residents and not just those intending to work as bodyguards. Generally WACs are only granted 
to those residents who are perceived to be under immediate danger (judges etc).
194 Op cit Zavgorodni and Carlos Meireles, 16 February 2005.
195 Op cit Sankale.
196 Op cit Sankale and Zavgorodni.
197 ‘UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of SSPs in Kosovo’, Section 6d, Regulation and Control of Weapons for Armed 
Services.
198 Op cit Ahemti.
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5.3 Oversight
Preliminary though it is, the research conducted for this report has suggested that the laws on PSCs are generally 
enforced. This is commendable considering the challenges that UNMIK Pillar One faces in managing and 
overseeing the conduct in Kosovo of all security forces  which comprise over 10,000 security sector personnel 
(both international as well as indigenous), most of them armed. UNMIK are assisted in this in that each PSC 
company has its own internal regulations and policies covering issues including what staff are permitted to do, 
how many hours they work and their reporting procedures. According to PSC representatives interviewed for 
this research, these are usually strict and are generally well enforced by PSC directors.199 Examples of internal 
regulations are outlined below:
n Balkan International: Guards are monitored 24 hours a day and have unscheduled inspections. 
Punishments vary from financial penalties to termination of contracts.200
n Besa: During working hours all guards are supervised by 1st line supervisor, at night the managers 
supervise.  The company also uses a reward system to provide incentives to guards – the worker of 
the month receives a 10% salary increase and the employee of the year gets an extra month’s salary. 
If guards break rules they are either fined or dismissed, depending on the offence.  Light offences 
include reading/not-wearing uniform.  Heavy offences include carrying arms, disrespecting command/
demonstrating political connections/threatening people.201
n Panther Security has an internal code of conduct of ‘Discipline Code’ which each hired guard must swear 
to uphold. According to the Director, the Code is needed to enforce internal regulations and maintain 
professionalism (e.g. upholding the law, and not sleeping on the job).202
In terms of enforcing official laws and regulations, one company said that the oversight mechanisms were 
becoming lax but several other companies interviewed were of the opinion that they were still strictly enforced.203 
Members of SSPIU have also added that since the legal PSCs operating in Kosovo are so competitive, PSCs 
often report any infringement of UNMIK laws and regulations by their competitors in an attempt to discredit 
their competitors and gain an advantage in the market. SSPIU, who investigate such cases, claim that most of 
these allegations have proved unwarranted. However, due to this high level of competition, SSPIU claimed that 
they would become aware of any illegal PSCs or illegal activity by PSCs.204 This assessment may, however, be 
overly optimistic as there are indications that PSC employees have used excessive force when carrying out their 
duties. 
Further, while the employees of local PSCs are prohibited from carrying firearms, it is debatable whether this 
requirement is strictly adhered to in a society with a widespread circulation of SALW.205 There have been incidents 
when firearms have been found in the possession of employees of local PSCs but licenses to operate were not 
confiscated. It has been alleged that action has not been taken against the local PSCs and their employees in 
these cases due to corruption within UNMIK.206 One interviewee (who wishes to remain anonymous) provided 
anecdotal evidence to this effect by claiming to have witnessed an incident that occurred outside the office of 
one major PSC, in which a guard pulled a gun on a street seller during a fight. The gun had apparently been lying 
on the desk in the office and belonged to someone with a WAC card. Although the police were called, there was 
no follow up to this incident.207 
199 Op cit Salihu and Besnik Berisha. Interview with Driton Asllani, trainer of PSC guards, 14 February 2005.
200 Op cit Berisha.
201 Interview with Nuredin Ibishi, General Director, Besa Security, 18 February 2005.
202 Op cit Elshani.
203 Op cit Berisha, Salihu and Ibishi.
204 Op cit Rodet.
205 Research conducted by the Small Arms Survey in 2002/2003 calculated that there were between 350,000 and 480,000 small arms in 
Kosovo, excluding those held by international forces. Op cit Kosovo and the Gun.
206 Op cit Salihu.  
207 Meeting with Ed Rees, Advisor to the Office of Public Safety, 18 February 2005.
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5.4 Professionalism and training
The training of security guards is covered by the UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of Security 
Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo, Section 4c(3). Although not specified in the law, all security guards working 
in PSCs must take a training course and pass an examination before being approved by UNMIK Police for 
employment in a PSC. The trainers and quality of training are approved by SSPIU.208 If the PSC wishes to use 
weapons such as pepper spray, batons and handcuffs, employees must also receive training in their use. The 
training must meet approval of UNMIK Police (i.e. SSPIU) and trained security guards must receive refresher 
training every 12 months.209
In contrast, the regulations covering the work of bodyguards do not require any form of training of the type given 
to security guards in a PSC. Vetting procedures are limited to checks by the WAC Unit, although these are primarily 
to ensure that the applicant does not have a criminal history. While some bodyguards have received formal 
bodyguard or security training in Western Europe or Turkey, others are former KLA soldiers.210 The omission of a 
formal training requirement is especially problematic as bodyguards can be licensed to carry firearms. 
There does not appear to be any form of trade association for private security guards and bodyguards, although 
most companies tend to have their own codes of conduct. Encouragement for the establishment of such an 
association should be considered as an industry-wide code of conduct would be a positive development and help 
promote professionalism and training.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
It is clear that the private security industry is relatively well developed in Kosovo, despite its youth. PSCs provide 
an important additional layer of security (which is clearly needed), and it appears that the PSC industry is 
generally seen as a positive contribution to effective law enforcement.  The relationship between the police and 
the industry needs to be re-examined with clearer demarcations established between the role and responsibilities 
of the industry vis-à-vis the KPS. 
While it is the case that PSCs reflect the societies where they operate, the fact that clearly large numbers of ex-KLA 
fighters have found employment in the industry is a potential cause for concern. A key consideration here, and 
one that warrants further investigation is the extent to which entire military ‘units’ are being recruited into firms, 
where previous loyalties and war-time practices may override more professional and commercial concerns. 
Further, the differing controls over the use of firearms by local and international PSCs seems to be short sighted. 
While in principle security guards should not be armed, it is strange that bodyguards and international PSCs 
are permitted to carry weapons while local companies are not. In a society as highly armed as that in Kosovo, it 
seems utopian to expect that local PSC employees will not arm themselves, even if in theory this is not permitted. 
If the requirement not to be armed is also not enforced rigorously this can create a significant problem with 
establishing and communicating acceptable operational standards and practice. Given that the law is almost 
certainly flouted it is possible that it would be more effective to regulate and control SALW carried by the PSC 
personnel than to have a situation where some individuals bring their own weapons when they go on duty. 
Provided there remains a demand for its services, the private security industry is likely to continue to develop 
in Kosovo with the number of companies and personnel employed in the sector increasing or decreasing in line 
with the economy. However, it is predicted that in the long term the larger PSCs will incorporate the smaller ones, 
as they will be better placed to provide cheaper services to a higher standard and will become more adept at 
interpreting the rules in their favour.211 An economic decline might also force smaller firms out of business.212
208 Op cit Rodet.
209 ‘UNMIK Police Policy and Guidelines on the Operation of Security Service Providers (SSPs) in Kosovo’, Section 4c(3).
210 Op cit Meireles, 16 February 2005.
211 Op cit Salihu.
212 Op cit Asllani.
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6.1 Main recommendations
n The question of regulated possession of weapons by local PSCs should be revisited. Either existing regulations 
prohibiting PSCs from possessing firearms should be enforced effectively, or local PSCs should be permitted 
to carry arms on a similar legislative basis to their international counterparts, provided effective state control 
and oversight can be ensured.
n A general prohibition on the use of military-style weapons should be introduced.
n It is essential that a framework for vetting, training and monitoring bodyguards be put into place. This should 
include training and examinations to the highest human rights standards, the introduction of time-limited 
licences issued according to objective criteria, and ongoing monitoring by the public security sector.
n Clear demarcation of roles should be established between the KPS and the private security industry to avoid 
the perception of competition between the police and the industry that has undermined cooperation to 
date. 
n The more established PSCs should begin discussions with a view to establishing a trade association for 
PSCs in order to promote greater self-regulation, ideally to be followed up by agreement on a binding code 
of conduct based on best practice and internationally agreed human rights standards. Donors and clients 
should encourage such moves.
n Further research should be conducted into the nature of the links between public security services and 
PSCs, and the pattern of recruitment of former combatants should be looked into as a matter of urgency.
n Oversight should be gradually broadened and improved by enhancing civilian involvement in the management 
and scrutiny of the security sector. As a first step, Kosovo’s Internal Security Sector Review should include 
the activities and regulation of PSCs in its remit. In the longer term, the role of Kosovar nationals will need to 
be enhanced in the ministries of police and justice that UNMIK aims to create by 2006, while parliamentary 
committees and an Ombudsman should be empowered to scrutinise the conduct of PSCs and handle public 
complaints.
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Regional overview and conclusion
1 Background
In the period since the early 1990s and the fall of communism in South Eastern Europe, the private security 
industry has moved from a position of virtual non-existence to becoming a presence in every country or entity 
in the region. While the market in some parts of the region is still relatively undeveloped, in other parts – most 
notably Bulgaria – the industry has expanded to a point where the number of PSC employees exceeds the police 
personnel by a significant amount (see Table 1 below). As discussed in the introduction, this pattern reflects the 
trend seen elsewhere in Europe and the Western world over the last few years. Therefore, it is likely that most 
other countries and entities in the region will, in the near future, match the present stage of development of the 
private security industry in Bulgaria.
Table1: Comparison of Police and PSC numbers in SEE
COUNTRY POLICE PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS
RATIO OF POLICE TO 
GUARDS
Albania 1 N/A 4,092 N/A
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 16,000 (Estimate) 2,000 8 / 1
Bulgaria 3 28,000
130,000
1 / 4.6
Croatia 4 21,000 (Estimate) 15,000 1.4 / 1
Kosovo 5 6,282 2,579 2.5 / 1
Macedonia (FYROM) 6 9,789 3,000 3.8 / 1
Moldova 7 13,431
(Fully Licensed) 3,000 (PSC 
Employees) 10,000
1.3 / 1 
(PSC Employees)
Montenegro 8 4,427 
(Legal) 1,900 
(Estimate Unregistered)  500
2.3 / 1 
(Legal)
Romania 9 45,830 (PSC Employees) 37,291 1.2 / 1
Serbia 10 21,000 (Estimate) 30,000 1 / 1.4
1 PSC figures from a speech by the General Director of State Police, Leader Bajram Ibraj, in the meeting with PSCs, on 06 November 2004.  
2 Police figures as of 2003, from: news.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/Europe/2661873.stm PSC estimate as of February 2005 from Muamer 
Bajraktarević, Sarajevo Canton Inspector for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Duško Vejnovic, Professor, Advanced School for Internal 
Affairs in Banja Luka.
3 PSC Figures from Ministry of Interior.
4 Figures as of September 2002. See Secretariat Report of the Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe of the Political Committee, 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, see: www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?TAB=326, February 2005. Estimate by Ms. Ankica Vrbanc, President, 
Association of Security Services (with Croatian Employers’ Association), and also Director, ‘Zagreb-Štit Vrbanc’ (Private Security Company), 
Zagreb, Vlaška 90. Interview held on 17 February 2005.
5 Figures from February 2005. See UNMIK: unmikonline.org/pub/news/fact_sheet.pdf.  PSC figures from SSPIU, Weapons Authorisation 
Section, UNMIK.
6 Police Figures from 2000. (Source: www.nationmaster.com/country/mk/crime). PSC figures from Interview with Tihomir Nikolovski, 
Chairman of Chamber for Security of People and Property, Skopje, 28 February 2005.
7 Figures from 2000. (Source: www.nationmaster.com/country/md/crime).  PSC figures from Ministry of Internal Affairs, (not counting 
Transdniestria).
8 2001 Police figures from Small Arms Survey SALW Survey Republic of Montenegro, 2004, p 8. According to the Survey, the Ministry of 
Interior of Montenegro was planning to downsize its total police force to 3,000 by June 2004. However, revised police figures are unavailable 
due to ongoing restructuring. There are no official numbers of licensed PSC guards and there is a sizable unlicensed sector so this is a 
conservative estimate based on our research.
9 Figures from 2000 (source: www.nationmaster.com/country/ro/crime) PSC figures Romanian Police www.politiaromana.ro.
10 According to the OSCE Report on Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001, employees of the Serbian MoI numbered near 
35,000, with approximately 21,000 uniformed officers (OSCE 2001; p. 34). This figure suggests a ratio of 2.8 uniformed police officers per 
1000 citizens. October 2002 official Ministry figures, however, give a ratio of 2.41. Information from the MoI does not disclose the raw data 
from which this figure was reached. (See Marijana Trivunovic, ‘Police Reform in Serbia’, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed 
As table 1 indicates, in most countries the private security sector remains quite small. This makes it possible 
to support improved training and professionalisation at relatively low cost, and the governments of the region 
should look to improve oversight and regulation of the industry in the immediate future before its natural growth 
makes the task that much harder. The international community should also seize an opportunity to address 
outstanding problems in the private security sector in tandem with existing work to promote professionalisation 
and transparency in the public security sector. For reasons discussed in the introduction, it is disappointing that 
the importance of this sector has generally not been recognised by those countries and international institutions 
who have been providing security sector reform (SSR) support in the region. Although relevant to the entire 
international community, the private security sector in SEE is perhaps of greatest interest to the EU, since a 
professional and well-regulated sector is vital for the successful development of these countries’ economies. In 
terms of prioritisation, it is clear that Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia are all countries where support 
for the state in regulating and professionalising the private security sector are perhaps of greatest importance. 
The findings of this research show that the rapid expansion of the industry in SEE over the last decade has 
not been without its problems. However, despite the rather chaotic origin of the industry, with the exception of 
Serbia most countries have chosen to introduce regulation of the industry. While this has not entirely eliminated 
those companies with links to organised crime, regulation of the industry has generally led to an increase in 
professionalism and addressed many of the principal concerns that observers had. An important additional 
factor in this growing professionalism is the fact that, as major international or multinational companies invest 
in the region, they are also expecting PSCs to operate to European standards. This has added an economic 
inducement for the industry to professionalise. In recent years the industry has shown signs of consolidation in 
most countries, leading to a net decrease in the numbers of companies that operate despite an overall expansion 
in the sector. Such consolidation acts as a further spur to greater professionalism, as larger companies cannot 
afford to develop a bad reputation and need to operate with far more discipline than a small company.      
Domestic PSCs continue to dominate the private security market in the region and very few international firms 
have a presence there. This is in part due to a prohibition on the operation of international PSCs in many countries. 
However, in the SEE EU candidate countries, the private security market has opened up to foreign competition 
and a number of international firms have already entered the market. The most high-profile foreign PSC operating 
in the region is Group 4 Falk, a Scandinavian company, which is currently the second largest PSC globally. A 
South East European PSC that operates across the whole region has yet to emerge. Further, with the exception of 
Kosovo, those international companies that have entered the region have generally done so through purchasing 
already existing local PSCs.   
Despite the generally positive direction being taken in most countries, a number of concerns remain. These 
are best illustrated in the following matrix, which presents the key findings in this report in a summarised form. 
The matrix examines some of the key issues addressed in each country study. It shows the areas of greatest 
concern in dark blue, those areas that need greater attention in light blue, and gives a brief summary of the 
main outstanding matters according to the research findings in each cell. The judgements made in the matrix 
and in the following section of the report are made on the basis of a normative framework for the regulation of 
the private security sector that is described in detail in the introduction to the report, and which all states should 
strive to employ. However, as in some cases it did not prove possible to access sufficient information on the 
effectiveness of existing regulation and monitoring by states, some parts of the matrix remain incomplete. 11
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11 There were additional concerns about a lack of transparency in some countries, though on different issues in each case. Although 
transparency was found wanting at some point in most countries studied, particular problems were encountered in Moldova, Serbia and 
Albania.
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2 Contemporary security threats
While the crime rates in the region seem to be coming under some control, especially with regards to issues 
such as assassinations and kidnapping, there continues to exist an environment where PSCs are needed. The 
principal threats seem to be armed robbery and theft – both types of crime that PSCs can provide an effective 
deterrent against. Racketeering and other organised crime continue to be a problem in the region, but as the 
state security sector gains strength this will probably diminish. 
3 Services provided by Private Security Companies
PSCs across the region offer largely similar services that reflect worldwide industry norms – guarding offices, 
factories, and other public buildings as well as providing armed response units and escorting valuable commodities 
and cash when in transit. Some of the countries in the region display smaller niche private security markets 
largely directed at the provision of close protection services (bodyguards) and, very rarely, the provision of private 
security to private homes. 
One interesting type of service offered in a number of countries and which represents a potential grey or even 
illegal area, is surveillance and private detective work. In a number of the countries and entities examined, 
companies offering surveillance and related services are active. These companies, often staffed by former 
intelligence and security agents from the communist period, provide some services that are clearly within the 
remit of this report, including industrial counter espionage, (for example, sweeping offices for surveillance 
equipment), and the provision of individual bodyguards, (close protection). However, some of these companies 
also offer more questionable services, such as private detection work, whether to assist people who have marital 
difficulties or to investigate staff that are suspected of stealing from their employer, through to work that can 
be classified as ‘industrial espionage’. This sector is largely beyond the remit of this report but its existence and 
its semi legal/clandestine status in many parts of the region is such that it merits greater attention and further 
research.
4 Affiliations between PSCs and other organisations
The issue of affiliation varied from country to country. However, it is a matter of general concern that there were 
affiliation issues in almost every country or entity in the region. Therefore, it is important that greater attention is 
paid to the associated problems outlined below.
4.1 Security sector affiliations
The problems associated with the birth of the private security sector were exacerbated in many instances by the 
emergence of a number of ethnic conflicts and civil disturbances across the region. Inevitably, a large proportion 
of PSCs’ workforce, especially at the senior end, has a security sector background. The exact situation varies 
with, for instance, many ex-military forces personnel entering the industry in Bulgaria, while relatively few ex-
military forces personnel have entered the industry in Romania. In virtually every country there is evidence of 
former police officers being employed by the private security industry. The employment of former police personnel 
by PSCs is not a problem if it is adequately managed. It becomes a problem where either formal or informal 
links mean that the sector is not properly policed and that excessive use of force or other illegal activities go 
unpunished. While PSCs do not assist the whole community, by working efficiently within the law they can have a 
crime prevention effect by allowing scarce public resources to be used elsewhere (though this must be balanced 
against the prospect of a further withdrawal of public security services as a side-effect). Further, most PSCs 
are armed and therefore it is vital, if this remains the case, that they should be armed appropriately and that 
every effort is made to ensure that those firearms they do have are not misused either by the PSC itself or more 
generally by employees. Therefore, it is important that countries build in monitoring mechanisms and delegate 
oversight actors to ensure that PSCs and their employees are fulfilling their roles adequately. 
In one or two areas, especially Kosovo and Bulgaria, concerns were raised that the private security industry 
was in competition with the police to an extent. This tended to occur when the police were allowed to compete 
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alongside PSCs for contracts. This is a situation that should be avoided if at all possible, since PSCs should not 
be seen as providing policing ‘on the cheap’. In some countries, such as Croatia and Bulgaria, there are either 
state or municipally owned security companies that are in competition with the private sector. While this is of less 
concern than competition with the police, every effort should be made to ensure that competition is conducted 
on a level playing field. This means that standards of professionalism as well as cost should be included in 
tender selection criteria. In terms of police competition with PSCs, it is interesting that in Albania a PSC is not 
allowed to be more than five percent of the size of the local police. While this does mean that the police will never 
feel threatened by PSCs, such legislation may prevent the Albanian private security industry consolidating and 
maturing as it has in other parts of the region. 
4.2 Ethnic affiliations
The conflicts of the former Yugoslavia provided significant numbers of ex-combatants who subsequently sought 
and found employment in the private security industry. This has created a situation wherein ethnically-centred 
companies continue to work as semi-successor organisations to demobilised armed groups. Kosovo provides 
one clear example of such affiliations between PSCs and ethnic groups. In divided societies, such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, there was also evidence of sectarianisation within the PSC industry. 
The case of Bosnia is perhaps the strongest, in part because the nature of regulation discourages rather than 
encourages the creation of multi-ethnic companies. In Bosnia PSCs are regulated at the entity level rather than 
nationally. This means that a company registered in FBiH cannot legally operate in Republika Srpska and vice 
versa. Further, within the FBiH enforcement is at the Cantonal level . In this way the regulatory framework strongly 
discourages the establishment of multi-ethnic security companies. It is therefore vital that regulation is introduced 
at the national level so that companies can begin to work legally across the country.
4.3 Political affiliations
The issue of links between political parties and the private security industry was highlighted in Serbia and Croatia 
as well as, to a lesser extent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. This is a matter of concern 
for two reasons. Firstly, such links may create opportunities for corruption, especially with regard to public or 
governmental tenders. Secondly, such links raise the possibility that an armed PSC could operate as a political 
militia should the opportunity or need arise. However, in contrast to many other parts of the world where PSCs 
have performed a political role in disrupting the constitutional order and helping to destabilise governments, 
the countries of SEE are by and large fortunate in having a PSC sector that has not posed a threat to the legal 
authorities.
4.4 Paramilitary affiliations
This was an issue of great concern in Macedonia as there was evidence that ethnically based groups, formally 
from the security forces, had established security firms. While it is inevitable that former members of the security 
forces find employment in the PSC industry, in the context of post conflict reconstruction this tendency is a 
matter of concern. In other parts of the world, PSCs have been used as a means of keeping armed paramilitary 
groups active following the end of a conflict, essentially acting as a form of reserve force should they need to be 
rapidly mobilised. In the case of Macedonia concern centres principally on members of the ‘Wolves’, a former 
Macedonian special forces unit, and the ‘Lions’, a former paramilitary police unit, both of which were involved in 
the 2001 conflict. There is also more limited evidence of links between PSCs and former paramilitaries in Serbia 
and Kosovo. It is important in such cases that action is taken to break any links and reorient companies away 
from such affiliations. 
4.5 Organised Crime affiliations
In its early years the private security industry in the region was often closely associated with organised crime 
syndicates and was seen as a negative phenomenon by the general public. In some parts of the region this is 
still an issue. Affiliations between organised criminal groups and PSCs were identified as a matter of concern 
in every entity covered by the report except for Moldova (and in this case it was probably because of a culture 
of poor transparency rather than the absence of the problem). It was interesting to note that in countries such 
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as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia where the private security market has become the most professionalised, the 
more crudely organised criminal elements have been removed from the market, as much as a consequence of 
commercial pressure as any other factor.
5 Regulation and conduct
5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs
While there has been a growth in the privatization of security, it is important to recognise that in most countries 
where this phenomena is most advanced, the industry is now regulated at least at the domestic level.15 Great 
variation still exists across the region, however, between states that have yet to regulate at all, (e.g. Serbia 
where more than 30,000 basically unregulated armed private security guards operate), and those with the most 
advanced regulatory systems, (Bulgaria and Romania in particular). In a region with diverse country membership, 
in which some states are nearing EU accession and others have only recently emerged from conflict and still 
depend for their stability on international peace-support operations (e.g. BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova), this 
is to be expected.
Where states have introduced national regulation, there often remain important omissions or loopholes in the 
legislation. For instance, in Bulgaria and Macedonia there is no provision made for background checks by police 
despite there being a prohibition on the employment of convicted criminals. Therefore, it is important that all 
countries should take into account the country specific recommendations in this study. Further, some thought 
should be given by those donors who support SSR programmes in the region to working towards harmonisation 
of laws in the region. An important opportunity arises in the case of countries applying to join the EU. EU entry will 
inevitably mean the private security market being opened up to international companies. In such circumstances 
it is in the long-term interests of domestic companies to adopt European standards before they find themselves 
in competition with international PSCs. In the case of Serbia it is vital that specific regulations are introduced to 
govern the work of the industry as soon as possible. 
Despite the introduction of legislation in most countries there remains concern about the  enforcement of these 
regulations. In some cases, such as Bulgaria and Albania, this is because the police, or other enforcement 
bodies, do not see the companies as a major problem. However, in other cases it is because of the inability or 
unwillingness of oversight actors to execute their responsibilities properly. A lack of enforcement is of special 
concern regarding the use of firearms by PSC personnel. While legislation on the use and storage of SALW in 
SEE generally reflects international norms, this report identified evidence that the legislation was being ignored 
by PSCs in a number of cases. This was especially the case with regard to PSC employees taking their firearms 
home with them.
5.2 Use of force and firearms
PSCs are permitted to carry firearms in every country or entity in the region with the exception of Kosovo, where 
only international personnel can be armed. While the regulations are different in each country, in most cases 
PSCs are restricted to the use of short-barrelled 9mm weapons. The few countries that do allow the use of military 
style weapons, such as Albania and Serbia, should urgently review this. Not only are assault rifles and other 
automatic weapons inappropriate for use in urban environments during peacetime, they are also not necessarily 
particularly useful as a defensive weapon at close range compared to a pistol or revolver. 
It is positive that regulations on the control of weapons exist in all SEE countries, with most countries insisting 
that when on duty, employees should only use company as opposed to personal firearms. Legislation in Romania 
has historically been even more exacting, requiring all PSC firearms to be leased from the police. Though this is 
due to change, it has allowed for greater state control of SALW until now. Such control ensures that it would be 
more readily apparent if a PSC were using an illegal weapon. Although Kosovo is the only jurisdiction covered by 
the study that does not allow local PSCs to carry weapons, there is evidence to suggest that PSC employees, who 
15 For instance in the UK the industry is regulated through the 2001 Private Security Industry Act. See http://www.the-sia.org.uk/home/
about_sia/legislation/psia.htm.
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are also licensed bodyguards, do in fact carry personal firearms when working for PSCs. If this is true, the issue 
is addressed at the earliest opportunity, possibly by following the Romanian precedent of leasing police weapons 
to local PSCs in controlled circumstances.
There has been evidence of lax armoury discipline in some of the countries examined as part of this research, 
which entails the risk of weapons being misused by individual PSC employees. In order to combat the potential 
misuse of firearms registered to PSCs, all countries in the region should ensure that there are regular and 
random inspections of PSC armouries to ensure compliance with existing regulations. Such inspections should 
pay adequate attention to the management and accounting of ammunition by PSCs, an area that this research 
could not examine in any detail. 
Finally, concerns were raised in most countries about the potential ‘heavy-handedness’ of PSC employees. While 
this is always a matter of concern, it should be noted that in some cases allegations made during interviews could 
not be verified and that there were relatively few proven cases of the misuse of force or firearms. Given the vital 
importance of questions surrounding the use of force, policy-makers, researchers and civil society organisations 
should continue to monitor the use of force by PSC personnel, with a particular focus on ensuring that the private 
security sector adheres to the best international standards, and in particular the UN Basic Principles on the Use 
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
A further issue that needs to be addressed is the extent to which PSCs should be armed and, if so, with what. 
The question of whether to arm security agencies, public and private, is one that should be answered only after 
careful threat analysis, regulation and training and with effective oversight mechanisms in place. However, in 
cases where it is deemed necessary and appropriate to arm private security guards, there is the added question 
of what sort of arms are appropriate for their use. Since in some SEE societies possession of SALW is widespread, 
it may seem obvious that security guards should be armed with firearms rather than chemical sprays and other 
less lethal weapons. Other courses of action are however available, and one might argue that denying arms to 
private security guards will help to reduce the public visibility and acceptability of SALW and establish a culture 
in which lethal force and firearms are only used when it is essential for the protection of life, rather than as a 
routine means for settling disputes. In some cases PSCs interviewed for this research were clearly in favour of 
their staff being permitted to use less-lethal weapons in addition to firearms. Were these weapons to become a 
substitute for firearms, this should be considered. If however the intention is to use these weapons in addition to 
firearms, and with a lower threshold of provocation, such moves should be resisted. These are all debates that 
the countries in the region should embrace. The use of less lethal weapons was not however addressed during 
this research in any detail and this is an area that warrants further investigation in the future.
5.3 Professionalism and training
Some degree of training is on offer to PSC staff in all countries studied for this report, though to varying standards 
and with different levels of consistency. Sometimes independent colleges deliver training, while at other times 
companies themselves or the state (often the police) provide training. This raises questions about the effectiveness 
of training, especially when conducted by individual PSCs. The curricula offered and the duration of the courses 
also vary widely from country to country, although most have a number of basic elements including understanding 
the law, use of weapons and firearms (where relevant), and first aid. However, training in first aid for instance, is 
often undermined by the lack of a requirement to carry field dressings or a first aid kit when bearing a firearm. 
In future all countries in the region should ensure that state-certified training courses are made compulsory for 
PSC staff, with licences being issued only on successful completion of training. They should also ensure that 
non-state training providers are themselves subject to assessment. The curricula followed should meet some 
minimum requirements, and in particular should follow and explicitly reference the UN Basic Principles of the Use 
of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officials.
Trade associations of one form or another are present in approximately half of the jurisdictions assessed. 
Where there is no trade organisation the industry should consider forming one, as this is a way for professional 
companies to distance themselves from those companies in the sector who are associated with organised crime 
groups or other such organisations. Further, very few trade associations had any form of code of conduct in 
order to demonstrate their professionalism.  Further, should a trade association adopt such a code of conduct 
employers of PSCs should insist that they only grant tenders to companies who take part in these schemes.
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6 Oversight
To various degrees there were common concerns in most of the countries of the region about the extent to which 
regulations are adequately implemented. Concerns were raised especially about those PSCs that employed 
significant numbers of former members of the security sector, where perhaps ‘favours’ can be called in. It is 
therefore essential that the oversight process itself is monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis. In light 
of this, time-limited licensing, which is not used in all jurisdictions, should be introduced to encourage regular 
reviews of company practice. It is especially important that complaints of heavy-handedness or illegal behaviour 
are investigated, since it was commonly alleged by interviewees that this is often not the case. All states should 
provide an additional layer of oversight above and beyond that provided by national police and intelligence 
services, looking in particular to develop the capacity of ombudsman’s offices and parliamentary committees to 
scrutinise the work of the private security sector and handle complaints.
7 Summary
It is arguable that while it is in the very nature of the private security industry to feed off people’s perceptions of 
insecurity, a sizable, well functioning and professional sector is ultimately both an indication and key guarantor 
of stability. Though concerns about its professionalisation and conduct remain, the private security industry in 
SEE has made great progress in terms of improved professionalism over the last decade or so, to the point where 
in most cases its members pose little or no security threat. There are of course important exceptions that have 
been well covered elsewhere in this report, ranging from cases of improper criminal, political or paramilitary 
affiliations, to the improper use of force in individual cases. 
It is vital that companies continue to move in this positive direction, and that they embrace codes of conduct and 
other mechanisms to ensure that dubious operators are excluded from the industry. Client organisations, whether 
businesses, state institutions, development agencies or international organisations should also promote self 
regulation and take some responsibility themselves in ensuring that they only employ companies which adhere to 
the highest professional standards. Procurement policy and practice should always strive to exclude companies 
with known links to political parties, organised crime cartels or paramilitaries. For their part the governments of 
the region have a special responsibility to effectively regulate PSCs and to empower other national institutions 
such as parliaments and ombudsman’s offices to oversee the sector. The pattern of expansion that this research 
has identified in countries where the PSC industry is most advanced may soon apply region-wide. In light of 
this the regulatory authorities of each country and entity in the region should continue to work towards the 
establishment of professional private security sector by working in collaboration with international organisations 
and the industry itself to address those areas of concern identified in this report. Civil society actors also have 
an important part to play in monitoring the evolution of the industry and in developing proposals for effective 
regulation at the national, regional and international levels. With this in mind, Saferworld and International Alert 
will continue to work together with local partner organisations to further elaborate best practice standards and 
tools for use by client organisations and regulatory authorities on the basis of these initial research findings.
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Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 
August to 7 September 1990.
Whereas the work of law enforcement officials16 is a social service of great importance and there is, therefore, a 
need to maintain and, whenever necessary, to improve the working conditions and status of these officials, 
Whereas a threat to the life and safety of law enforcement officials must be seen as a threat to the stability of 
society as a whole, 
Whereas law enforcement officials have a vital role in the protection of the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person, as guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Whereas the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provide for the circumstances in which 
prison officials may use force in the course of their duties, 
Whereas article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials provides that law enforcement officials 
may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty, 
Whereas the preparatory meeting for the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, held at Varenna, Italy, agreed on elements to be considered in the course of further work 
on restraints on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, 
Whereas the Seventh Congress, in its resolution 14, inter alia, emphasizes that the use of force and firearms by 
law enforcement officials should be commensurate with due respect for human rights, 
Whereas the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1986/10, section IX, of 21 May 1986, invited 
Member States to pay particular attention in the implementation of the Code to the use of force and firearms by 
law enforcement officials, and the General Assembly, in its resolution 41/149 of 4 December 1986, inter alia, 
welcomed this recommendation made by the Council, 
Whereas it is appropriate that, with due regard to their personal safety, consideration be given to the role of law 
enforcement officials in relation to the administration of justice, to the protection of the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person, to their responsibility to maintain public safety and social peace and to the importance of 
their qualifications, training and conduct, 
The basic principles set forth below, which have been formulated to assist Member States in their task of 
ensuring and promoting the proper role of law enforcement officials, should be taken into account and respected 
by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice, and be brought to the attention 
of law enforcement officials as well as other persons, such as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, members of the 
executive branch and the legislature, and the public. 
General provisions
1.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall adopt and implement rules and regulations on the 
use of force and firearms against persons by law enforcement officials. In developing such rules and regulations, 
Governments and law enforcement agencies shall keep the ethical issues associated with the use of force and 
firearms constantly under review. 
2.  Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and 
equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated 
use of force and firearms. These should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use 
in appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means capable of causing 
Annex A – Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials
16 In accordance with the commentary to Article 1 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the term ‘’law enforcement officials” 
includes all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention. In 
countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition of law 
enforcement officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services.
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death or injury to persons. For the same purpose, it should also be possible for law enforcement officials to be 
equipped with self-defensive equipment such as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of 
transportation, in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind. 
3.  The development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be carefully evaluated in 
order to minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved persons, and the use of such weapons should be carefully 
controlled. 
4.  Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means 
before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result. 
5.  Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall: 
(a)  Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the 
legitimate objective to be achieved; 
(b)  Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life; 
(c)  Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected persons at the 
earliest possible moment; 
(d) Ensure that relatives or close friends of the injured or affected person are notified at the earliest 
possible moment.
6.  Where injury or death is caused by the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, they shall 
report the incident promptly to their superiors, in accordance with principle 22. 
7.  Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials 
is punished as a criminal offence under their law. 
8.  Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be 
invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.
Special provisions
9.  Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of 
others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious 
crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to 
prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any 
event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life. 
10.  In the circumstances provided for under principle 9, law enforcement officials shall identify themselves 
as such and give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, 
unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious 
harm to other persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of the incident. 
11.  Rules and regulations on the use of firearms by law enforcement officials should include guidelines 
that: 
(a)  Specify the circumstances under which law enforcement officials are authorized to carry firearms 
and prescribe the types of firearms and ammunition permitted; 
(b)  Ensure that firearms are used only in appropriate circumstances and in a manner likely to decrease 
the risk of unnecessary harm; 
(c)  Prohibit the use of those firearms and ammunition that cause unwarranted injury or present an 
unwarranted risk; 
(d)  Regulate the control, storage and issuing of firearms, including procedures for ensuring that law 
enforcement officials are accountable for the firearms and ammunition issued to them; 
(e)  Provide for warnings to be given, if appropriate, when firearms are to be discharged; 
(f)  Provide for a system of reporting whenever law enforcement officials use firearms in the performance 
of their duty.
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Policing unlawful assemblies
12.  As everyone is allowed to participate in lawful and peaceful assemblies, in accordance with the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Governments and law enforcement agencies and officials shall recognize that force and firearms may be 
used only in accordance with principles 13 and 14. 
13.  In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the 
use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary. 
14.  In the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement officials may use firearms only when less 
dangerous means are not practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary. Law enforcement officials shall 
not use firearms in such cases, except under the conditions stipulated in principle 9.
Policing persons in custody or detention
15.  Law enforcement officials, in their relations with persons in custody or detention, shall not use force, 
except when strictly necessary for the maintenance of security and order within the institution, or when personal 
safety is threatened. 
16.  Law enforcement officials, in their relations with persons in custody or detention, shall not use firearms, 
except in self-defence or in the defence of others against the immediate threat of death or serious injury, or when 
strictly necessary to prevent the escape of a person in custody or detention presenting the danger referred to in 
principle 9. 
17.  The preceding principles are without prejudice to the rights, duties and responsibilities of prison officials, 
as set out in the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, particularly rules 33, 34 and 54.
Qualifications, training and counselling
18.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law enforcement officials are selected 
by proper screening procedures, have appropriate moral, psychological and physical qualities for the effective 
exercise of their functions and receive continuous and thorough professional training. Their continued fitness to 
perform these functions should be subject to periodic review. 
19.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that all law enforcement officials are provided 
with training and are tested in accordance with appropriate proficiency standards in the use of force. Those law 
enforcement officials who are required to carry firearms should be authorized to do so only upon completion of 
special training in their use. 
20.  In the training of law enforcement officials, Governments and law enforcement agencies shall give special 
attention to issues of police ethics and human rights, especially in the investigative process, to alternatives 
to the use of force and firearms, including the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the understanding of crowd 
behaviour, and the methods of persuasion, negotiation and mediation, as well as to technical means, with a view 
to limiting the use of force and firearms. Law enforcement agencies should review their training programmes and 
operational procedures in the light of particular incidents. 
21.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall make stress counselling available to law enforcement 
officials who are involved in situations where force and firearms are used.
Reporting and review procedures
22.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall establish effective reporting and review procedures 
for all incidents referred to in principles 6 and 11 (f). For incidents reported pursuant to these principles, 
Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that an effective review process is available and that 
independent administrative or prosecutorial authorities are in a position to exercise jurisdiction in appropriate 
circumstances. In cases of death and serious injury or other grave consequences, a detailed report shall be sent 
promptly to the competent authorities responsible for administrative review and judicial control. 
23.  Persons affected by the use of force and firearms or their legal representatives shall have access to an 
independent process, including a judicial process. In the event of the death of such persons, this provision shall 
apply to their dependants accordingly. 
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24.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held responsible 
if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command are resorting, or have 
resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, 
suppress or report such use. 
25.  Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that no criminal or disciplinary sanction is 
imposed on law enforcement officials who, in compliance with the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
and these basic principles, refuse to carry out an order to use force and firearms, or who report such use by other 
officials. 
26.  Obedience to superior orders shall be no defence if law enforcement officials knew that an order to 
use force and firearms resulting in the death or serious injury of a person was manifestly unlawful and had a 
reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. In any case, responsibility also rests on the superiors who gave the 
unlawful orders. 
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Country or territory being researched:
Name of researcher:
Organisation:
Telephone (with country & city code):
Fax:
Email:
Part 1: Introduction
QUESTION SOURCES
1. Do you know of any PSCs operating in your country? If so, please list the names of the 
most well-known ones.
2. Are the PSCs operating in your country nationally owned, internationally owned, or both? 
(Please give examples of each type, and total number operating where known.)
3. How many companies are there (please indicate whether this is an exact number taken 
from official sources, or your estimate. If an estimate, please specify how your calculation 
was made)?
4. How many private security guards do you estimate there to be in the whole country?
5. Approximately how many staff does each company have?
6. What is the average salary for a junior private security guard? (please give salaries both 
for junior and senior level staff).
7. What is the average salary of a police officer?
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 2: The services PSCs provide
QUESTION SOURCES
8. Who employs PSCs? (e.g. politicians, businesses, international organisations, NGOs). 
Please specify exact type and name of organisation where possible.
9. Are there certain areas in the country (regions/towns) where PSCs are particularly active?
10. Who, or what do they usually protect? (e.g. people, buildings, goods).
11. How many international actors employ PSCs? (e.g. NGOs, international organisations, 
international businesses).
12. What form of protection do they provide for their clients? (e.g. rapid response, static 
security, close protection) Please list them in order of importance with 1 being the most 
important?
Annex B - Research Questionnaire
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QUESTION SOURCES
13. What threats do clients hire PSCs to protect them from? 
14. How serious do you perceive these threats to be?
15. How common is it for PSCs to be employed by private citizens, either to protect properties 
or the individual?
16. Are private security companies contracted by the government  to play special roles such 
as running prisons or guarding government buildings?
17. How many households employ PSCs? (please indicate whether this is an exact number 
taken from official sources, or your estimate. If an estimate, please specify how your 
calculation was made).
18. What is the overall rate of recorded crime in the country? (please state total number of 
recorded crimes for years 2002, 2003 and 2004 where available).
a) Is the rate of recorded crime higher, lower, or the same in the areas where PSCs 
operate? Please specify.
19. What is the overall rate of recorded VIOLENT crime in the country? (please state total 
number of recorded violent crimes for years 2002, 2003 and 2004 where available. Also, 
please list the specific forms of crime in this case).
a) Is the rate of VIOLENT crime higher, lower or the same in the areas where PSCs 
operate? Please specify.
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 3:  The legal basis for controlling PSCs
QUESTION SOURCES
20. Is there any legislation in your country that regulates the work of PSCs? If so, please give 
the full title of the legislation in English and its State Gazette number.
21. Does the law govern domestic (national) PSCs in the same way as international ones? If 
not, what are the differences?
22. Are the laws enforced in practice? If not, in what way is the law not enforced, and why?
23. Is there any immunity agreement for international PSCs? If so, is there any extra-territorial 
form of control? Please specify.
24. Does the legislation provide for the following? (in each case, please specify the exact 
Article in the relevant legislation).
b) Restrictions on the weaponry that companies can and can not use, and 
restrictions on reasonable use of force?
c) Specific requirements to register either companies or personnel with the police 
or interior ministry?
d)  An official register of PSCs in your country detailing the ownership, size and 
form of activities offered? If so is this open to the public or confidential? 
e) Background checks to prevent convicted criminals owning or working for a PSC? 
If so do these checks include close family members (e.g. partners, parents, 
siblings or children) of either owners or employees?
f) Are there any requirements for personnel to be trained, and if so how?
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QUESTION SOURCES
g) The type of weapons that PSC staff may own.
h) The storage methods they must use for weapons stored at the company 
buildings.
i) The accounting methods they must use when issuing weapons and ammunition 
to staff, and also when they are used.
25. Are any international companies treated differently from locals in legal terms? (If so, 
please specify how).
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 4: The regulatory framework for controlling PSCs
QUESTION SOURCES
26. Do PSCs have any self-regulation, e.g. a voluntary ‘Code of Conduct’ established by 
companies themselves? If so, please specify what it involves and make clear whether 
there are any penalties for breaking it?
27. Are there any particular governmental institutions responsible for regulating PSCs (e.g. for 
registering them, training security guards, or monitoring their work)? If so, please specify 
the exact duties and powers the organisation has.
28. Do any joint working agreements exist between PSCs and state-run police services, in 
which the police formally allocate a role for PSCs?
29. Are there any situations where state-run police services provide extra security to 
businesses on a contractual basis? If so, please specify the exact services and 
contractual relationship involved.
30. Are there any informal institutions responsible for regulating PSCs (e.g. a trade 
association)? If so, please specify the exact duties and powers the organisation has.
31. How transparent or open are the procedures for monitoring the implementation of 
regulations? Is there any official monitoring of the oversight actors?
32. Does the regulatory system work in practice? (please state any known problems).
a) Has there been any example of a PSC or employee being disciplined or punished 
by the authorities?
b) Is there any evidence that crimes or misdemeanours carried out by PSCs have 
been deliberately overlooked?
c) In your opinion, what measures could be taken to improve the system?
33. By what process (if any) are PSCs appointed and contracts reviewed?
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
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Part 5:  Firearms
QUESTION SOURCES
34. Are private security guards armed? If so, what type of weapons do they usually have 
access to? (specifically, do guards have access to military-style weapons such as assault 
rifles?).
35. Are private security guards required to where a uniform or carry a visible id card when on 
duty? If so please make clear what the requirements are?
36. Do private security guards carry concealed weapons?
37. Are the weapons that private security guards use registered?
38. Are the registered weapons registered specially for use by private security guards?
39. Are their weapons registered to the employer or to the individual guard?
40. When weapons are not in use, are they stored on company’s premises, or are they taken 
home by employees?
41. What are the accounting procedures at the company? (e.g. is a register kept by the 
company? Are weapons signed in an out by employees).
42. Are there any differences between domestic and international PSCs with regard to 
weapons possession, use and management? (e.g. type and ownership of weapons, 
storage and accounting procedures).
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 6: Professionalism and training
QUESTION SOURCES
43. What background do the staff employed by PSCs operating in your country tend to have? 
(e.g. do they have a particular professional or ethnic background such as ex-police/
military)
44. Is any training for PSC staff required under national legislation, or informal regulations? 
(e.g. membership of professional associations)? If so, what type of training is provided, 
for how long, and by whom?
45. Is it easy to by-pass, avoid tests or cheat during training? Further, has it been known for 
candidates to try and bribe officials in order to pass them? How rigorous is the testing? 
What is the pass/failure rate?
46. Do PSC staff use force, and in particular firearms, only ‘when strictly necessary and to the 
minimum extent required under the circumstances’? 17
47. Are PSC staff taught to apply the minimal use of force during any training they receive?
48. Are armed PSC personnel trained in first aid and equipped to render assistance to 
anybody that they have shot? If yes do PSC employees carry first aid kits when on duty?
49. Are there special procedures to report or investigate PSCs if they fire their weapons, or are 
they covered by the Penal Code?
50. Do the major clients that PSCs work for (especially multinational companies and 
international organisations) require that company staff have been trained as part of their 
contract tendering process?
17 UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Article 3), UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (Principles 4,5,6 and 9).
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QUESTION SOURCES
51. Do the authorities ever conduct inspections in order to assess whether companies comply 
with regulations? If so are they spot checks or is there notice that an inspection will 
happen?
52. Overall, how professional do you judge PSC staff operating in your country to be?
53. Are you aware of any cases where individuals accused, or convicted, of human rights 
violations have been employed by PSCs?
54. Have there been any media reports concerning human rights abuses and/or excessive 
use of force by PSC staff?
55. Do you perceive there to be any difference between the level of professionalism in 
domestic and international PSCs? Please specify.
56. Are there unregistered PSCs in your country or other groups that carry out this function? 
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 7:  Impact
QUESTION SOURCES
57. What impact does the use of PSCs have on the following? :
a) State-run police services
b) Crime levels
c) Public safety
d) Human rights
e) Business confidence
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 8:  Affiliations
QUESTION SOURCES
58. Are there any formal or informal connections (including ownership) between PSCs and any 
of the following? (in each case, please explain the nature of any connections please note 
that connections can include close family members):
a) State-run police services.
b) The military.
c) Government officials.
d) Political parties.
e) Militias/paramilitaries.
f) Organised criminal groups.
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QUESTION SOURCES
59. To what extent are different PSCs in your country supported or undermined by political 
actors (e.g. parties, government)?
60. Are there PSCs that only provide services to one group (e.g. political party, ethnic group)?
61. Is there an ethnic dimension to the formation and use of PSCs (e.g. are there PSCs 
with certain ethnic, religious, linguistic, clan or family affiliations, or is their formation a 
reaction to inter-ethnic politics)?
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 9: Background and trends
QUESTION SOURCES
62. Is insecurity and/or crime a serious problem in the country? (please give details of any 
specify significant threats to the security of citizens.)
63. When did PSCs first begin operating in the country?
64. How has their presence and role varied over time? (e.g. the services they provide, the 
clients they work for, the number of companies operating)
65. What events explain these trends (if any)?
66. What conditions create the current demand for PSCs in the country?
67. What is your prediction regarding the future work of PSCs in the country (e.g. do you 
predict that the number of PSCs will increase or decrease, and why?)
Other comments: [please provide any additional information you feel is important below]
Part 10: Interviews held
NAME ORGANISATION DEPARTMENT JOB TITLE
CONTACT 
DETAILS
INTERVIEW DATE
[Police]
[Ministry of Interior]
[Professional/trade 
organisations]
[Private Security 
company]
[Client: member of 
the international 
community]
[Client: 
international/ 
multinational 
company]
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NAME ORGANISATION DEPARTMENT JOB TITLE
CONTACT 
DETAILS
INTERVIEW DATE
[Client: national 
company]
{Client: Small/local 
business]
[Chamber of 
Commerce]
[Human Rights 
Group]
Final comments: [Is there any further information you feel is important?]
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